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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the last two decades, network industries have been going through a tremendous
transformation. Many countries worldwide started to liberalize traditionally monop-
olized network industries, such as telecommunications, electricity, railways and the
airline industry. Technological progress stimulated the development of new industries
and products, a decline in production costs and a rise in quality. New technologies, such
as personal computers, the Internet, mobile telephony, CD players and many others
experienced dramatic growth rates. For instance, at the end of 2004, about 83% of EU
citizens were connected to mobile telephone networks, just one decade after the startup
of digital cellular services. Also Internet penetration in many countries worldwide has
exceeded 60% of households within one decade.
This transformation process and the establishment of new industries have a critical
impact on lifestyle, working methods and the economy as a whole, through the rising
share in GDP and the creation of new jobs. It is extremely important to understand
the mechanisms, which determine the competition and consumers’ behavior in network
industries. In this way, an appropriate support could be provided for the regulatory and
competition policy, which should facilitate the creation of competitive and innovative
network industries. The key determinants of equilibrium outcomes in many network
industries, such as computers, the Internet and telecommunications, are network effects
and consumer switching costs.
Network effects and switching costs introduce differences in the nature of compe-
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tition, such as ’competition for the market’ or ’life-cycle competition’, as compared to
traditional industries. When switching costs are present, firms enjoy ex post market
power over their own consumers. Network effects extend this power to future genera-
tions of buyers. Eventually, socially inefficient market outcomes are possible, such as
unreasonable high prices, high industry concentration, entry barriers, standardization
on inferior technology. Thus, switching costs and network effects have been a central
issue in many antitrust cases, for instance, in the US and the European Microsoft
case. The regulatory and competition policy must be appropriately adjusted in or-
der to deal with network technologies, where the dynamic perspective of competition
becomes critical for the final assessment. Apart from theoretical justifications, there
is also a crucial role of empirical studies, which may provide decisive arguments on
whether or not policy intervention is needed.
There is a large body of theoretical literature on switching costs and network effects.
Their impacts on consumer choice and competition are well known (see Farrell and
Klemperer (2004)). However, there are still some interesting questions, which may be
addressed by economic theory. Empirical research is even more in demand. Network
externalities and switching costs in the mobile telecommunications industry are the
key focus of this dissertation. In this chapter, I shortly set out the contributions of
this dissertation to the literature on switching costs and network externalities. Each
subsequent chapter includes a detailed motivation and a review of related literature.
One should note, that network externalities have no dynamic consequences when
switching costs are nil. In such a case, it is completely optimal for consumers to be
myopic, as they can switch between brands as they please in every period. However,
all existing dynamic models of network effects presume lock-in, that is sufficiently
high switching costs, which prevent consumers from switching between brands. It is
curious whether parallels drawn in the literature between the results of models with
switching costs and those with network effects are due to genuine similarity between
switching costs and network effects, or are just an artifact of presumption of lock-in
in network effects models. In Chapter 2, written jointly with Toker Doganoglu, we
conduct a theoretical analysis of competition between network technologies. We build
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on Klemperer (1987) and analyze competition in a two-period differentiated-products
duopoly in the presence of both switching costs and network externalities. We show
that they have opposite implications on the demand. While the former reduces demand
elasticities, the latter increases them. Increases in marginal network benefits imply
lower prices in both periods while the effects of switching costs are ambiguous. When
network effects are strong, and switching costs are moderate, prices in both periods
may be lower than those in a market without network effects and switching costs.
Moreover, we show that the first period prices are quadratic-convex functions of the
level of switching costs, therefore for certain parameter values increasing switching costs
may reduce equilibrium prices. This point is very important, as the common message
in the literature about fully dynamic models is that switching costs unambiguously
increase steady state prices.
Usually, the theoretical results may be used only as logical arguments for the policy
design. In many cases the theory provides ambiguous results, which depend on para-
meter values. For instance, in the model mentioned above, the levels of equilibrium
prices depend on the magnitude of switching costs and network externalities. This
emphasizes the importance of empirical studies in support for the theory. In the fol-
lowing chapters, I carry out three empirical analyzes of mobile telephony to identify
and quantify the determinants of competition and consumers’ choices.
In Chapter 3, also written jointly with Toker Doganoglu, we analyze the impact
of network effects on the diffusion of mobile services in Germany using monthly data
from January 1998 to June 2003. We use a random utility framework, discussed com-
prehensively in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) and Berry (1994), to estimate
demands for mobile services provided by competing network operators. In the ana-
lyzed period, we observe the explosive growth in the subscriber base and the rather
moderate decrease in prices. Our conjecture is that prices alone cannot account for
such rapid diffusion. We explore the possible contribution of network effects to indus-
try growth. In the estimation, we use publicly available market share data and price
indices generated from data that we have collected. Our results suggest that network
effects played a significant role in the diffusion of mobile services in Germany. In the
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absence of network effects, if prices remained as observed, the penetration of mobiles
could be lower by at least 50%. Current penetration levels could be reached without
network effects only if prices were drastically lower. Furthermore, assuming that ob-
served prices are the result of pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we compute marginal
costs and markups. The Lerner index for all network operators increased over time
from about 13% in January 1998 to about 30% in June 2003. This increase is due to
the fact that the margins remained almost constant while the prices decreased.
This analysis required collecting a unique database on pricing mobile services in
Germany. We use monthly price listings published in telecommunications magazines
and on the Internet, which include all tariffs of network operators and independent
service providers in the time period January 1998 – June 2003. This database could
be potentially used for further studies, such as an analysis of welfare effects from entry
to mobile telephony or a study of the pricing strategies of mobile service providers.
Chapter 3 provides some information which may be helpful for policy design. The
extremely high cost of licences in the UMTS auctions provoked a debate on the ability of
firms to cover sunk costs and make further investments in consumer acquisition. As the
widespread use of 3G technology is an important social objective, it is crucial to know
to what extend the diffusion of 3G technology could be stimulated by network effects.
Thus, the knowledge of price elasticities and network benefits in the 2G telephony
could be some basis for projections onto 3G technology.
Chapter 4 presents an empirical analysis of switching costs in mobile telephony in
the UK. The presence of switching costs may have negative consequences on social
welfare because firms which have large market shares have incentives to charge higher
prices and exploit locked-in consumers rather than compete for new ones. Therefore, it
is important to provide measurements of switching costs. The empirical literature on
switching costs is scarce. This is due to the lack of appropriate detailed data sets on
individual choices. In this study, I use survey data on British households to estimate
the magnitude of switching costs in mobile telecommunications industry. I employ the
random utility framework, as developed by McFadden (1974). I estimate multinominal
and mixed logit models to identify state dependence in the choices of network opera-
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tors. According to mixed logit estimates for panel data there are significant negative
switching costs which vary across network operators. The choices of network opera-
tors are also explained by observable and unobservable heterogeneity of tastes. The
observable heterogeneity is represented by consumer characteristics such as: gender,
age and employment status. When multinominal logit is estimated switching costs
are overestimated due to ignorance of unobservable tastes. Thus, this study indicates
the importance of unobservable heterogeneity of tastes in the estimation of switching
costs. Both switching costs and persistent tastes of consumers lead to state-dependent
choices of network operators. Furthermore, the estimation of logistic regression indi-
cates that the probability of switching depends on consumer characteristics, such as
age, usage intensity and ways of spending leisure time. These results are consistent
with the findings in the consumer surveys conducted by the British regulator Oftel.
Chapters 3 and 4 identify and measure the magnitude of two key determinants of
competition and consumers’ choices in the mobile telephony. Apart from providing
arguments for regulatory and competition policy, it is also important to assess the
effectiveness of regulation which has been already implemented. In Chapter 5, I an-
alyze the impact of regulation on the development and competitiveness of the mobile
telecommunications industry across the European Union. In my view, the large dif-
ferences in the level of technology adoption, prices and market structure across the
EU countries are due to differences in regulatory policy and country specific charac-
teristics. I refer to earlier studies measuring the impact of regulation on the diffusion
of mobile services, such as Gruber and Verboven (2001). In a related paper, Parker
and Ro¨ller (1997) estimate the determinants of market conduct in the mobile industry
across the U.S. states. Using cross-country panel data, I estimate a reduced-form and
a structural model, and find that prices are significantly influenced by the regulatory
policy, which also explains the differences in demand for mobiles across the EU coun-
tries. In particular, the regulation implemented throughout the liberalization process
of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices for mobile services. Similarly,
the implementation of number portability for mobile services has a negative impact on
prices. Moreover, I estimate country specific average industry conducts, which allow
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me to compare the competitiveness of mobile telephony across the European Union.
For the purpose of this study, I have created a comprehensive data set on the regulation
in telecommunications industry in the European Union.
Chapter 2
Dynamic Duopoly Competition
with Switching Costs and Network
Externalities
2.1 Introduction
A product exhibits network effects when its value increases in the number of its users.
On the other hand, switching costs arise when consumers face frictions to change
the brand they consume either due to relationship specific investments or contractual
obligations. In many industries switching costs and network effects co-exist. Take, for
example, the case of computer software and operating systems such as Windows. The
higher the number of Windows users, the more applications software will be provided
for the Windows platforms which in turn will increase the value of the operating system
inducing more people to adopt it—a typical example of indirect network effects. At
the same time, software products require investments in learning to become familiar
with their features software, which makes switching to a new set of software products
costly. Similarly, mobile telecommunications is a textbook example for direct network
effects as the higher number of subscribers imply more communication possibilities.
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Switching costs in mobile telephony may arise due to transaction costs, such as the cost
of changing and redistributing the phone number. Moreover, many mobile telephone
operators subsidize handsets and require consumers to sign long term contracts, which
may be costly to break.
Examples are plenty, and are presented in an illustrative manner elsewhere as in
Shapiro and Varian (1998), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and
Klemperer (2004). Interesting dynamic issues arising in industries with such character-
istics have attracted economists’ attention not only due to the intellectual challenges,
but also due to increasing public policy debates over the operation of these industries.
Thus, there is a large body of literature on network effects and switching costs which
arose mainly in the last two decades. In fact, the recent survey by Farrell and Klem-
perer (2004) (FK hereafter) contains 35 pages of references suggesting a mature and
saturated knowledge base.
We will follow FK in summarizing the main results of literature, and begin by
noting that both network effects and switching costs could potentially extend the con-
sumer choice problem dynamically. Current choices of consumers affect their future
consumption leading to state dependent demands. Thus, expectations of consumers on
future pricing policies and future size of sales of a firm play a key role in determining
outcomes. In certain cases, historical accidents may determine long run behavior of
a given industry. Firms face incentives inducing them to adopt “bargains-then-ripoffs
type pricing policies. That is, early on firms compete fiercely to lock-in consumers, in
order to exploit them in the future when switching costs are present, and in order to
increase the willingness to pay of future generations in case of network effects. Lock-
ing into an inferior standard, excessive private incentives for incompatibility, distorted
incentives for entry are common features of models studying such industries. In most
models, consumers do not switch between brands in equilibrium. A message FK de-
livers is the similarity of outcomes in models with network effects and models with
switching costs. For a full review of the literature, we refer the reader to FK and the
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references therein.
Surprisingly, however, there is no model which studies industries where both net-
work effects and switching costs are present. Taking the risk of stating the obvious, we
would like to note that network effects have no dynamic consequences when switching
costs are nil. In such a case, it is completely optimal for consumers to be myopic,
as they can switch between brands as they please every period. In a typical dynamic
network effects model1, consumers are assumed to purchase only once, usually as soon
as they arrive to the market, and stay with their choice forever even though the net
present value of buying an alternative might become positive at a future date.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing dynamic models of network effects pre-
sume lock-in, that is sufficiently high switching costs preventing consumers from switch-
ing between brands. Hence, it is curious whether parallels drawn between the results
of models with switching costs and those with network effects are due to genuine sim-
ilarity between switching costs and network effects, or just an artifact of presumption
of lock-in in network effects models. Our goal in this paper is to attempt to identify
the consequences of network effects and switching costs both on consumer behavior
and strategies of firms when they co-exist in a meaningful way.
We adopt a very stylized model of preferences which allows consumers to switch
between brands in equilibrium. We build on the model of Klemperer (1987) by simply
appending a network benefit term to the valuation of products.2 We will consider
a simple two-period price setting model of competition between two firms which are
horizontally differentiated a` la Hotelling. Only some of the consumers survive to the
next period. Those that leave the market are replaced by new consumers. Furthermore,
some consumers receive a taste shock which changes their location on the unit interval,
thus they might wish to switch the brand they buy. We assume that switching costs
are sufficiently low that at least some of these consumers will be able to change the
brand they purchase. The rest of the consumers are rigid, that is, their preferences
1See, for example, Farrell and Saloner (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1992).
2When network effects vanish, the model boils down to that of Klemperer (1987).
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remain as in period one as well as they have very high costs hindering any desire to
switch in the second period.3
Consumers form rational expectations of not only current network sizes but also of
future network sizes and prices. Given prices consumers are able to compute fractions
of current and future consumers buying from each firm correctly. For rational expec-
tations demands to be well-behaved, that is to avoid situations where firms can corner
the market, we assume that the marginal network benefits are sufficiently low.
We derive a subgame perfect equilibrium where firms share the market in both
periods, in the second period some of the consumers with changing preferences switch
the brands, while the rigid consumers purchase again from the same firm they shopped
in the first period. This behavior could be supported in equilibrium only for certain
parameters constellations. We derive sufficient conditions on the parameters, which
simply states that switching costs must be sufficiently low to induce switching in the
second period as well as the network effects in order to avoid tipping towards one
product in each period, and the size of the population of rigid consumers must be
sufficiently small.
The rational expectations demands we derive for each period exhibit interesting
properties. First period demands become more price sensitive with higher marginal
network benefits. In contrast, however, increasing switching costs reduce price sensi-
tivity of first period demands. Thus, in the first period switching costs and network
effects operate in completely opposite directions. In the second period, both switching
costs and network effects imply a positive shift in demand for a firm which carries over
a market share more than one half. However, the latter effect is present only when
there are switching costs. That is, in the absence of switching costs, network effects
have no dynamic consequences. The second period demands become more price sensi-
tive when marginal network benefits increase, while switching costs have no impact on
the price sensitivity.
3We keep the rigid segment in the model in order to preserve the parallels with Klemperer (1987).
Alternatively, one could view our model as one with a distribution of switching costs in the population.
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Second period equilibrium prices increase with the customer base of a firm carried
over from the first period. However, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the
two period competition is symmetric. Thus, in both periods firms share the market
equally. Second period prices increase in the share of rigid consumers, decrease with
marginal network effects and are not affected by the switching costs.
First period prices are unambiguously reduced by higher marginal network benefits.
However, switching costs may have different effects on the equilibrium prices. We
explore how switching costs and network effects impact the equilibrium prices in the
first period by means of Monotone Comparative Statics. This allows us to uncover
the mechanisms that change equilibrium prices in response to a change in one of these
features.
First period equilibrium prices turn out to be a quadratic-convex function of the
switching costs faced by flexible consumers. Thus, for certain parameter constellations,
increasing switching costs reduce first period prices. This occurs when marginal second
period profits respond to a change in the switching costs more than first period marginal
profits. We show that this could occur when switching costs are low, in particular,
when there are no rigid consumers, there is no impact of a change in switching costs on
marginal first period profits around zero, while second period marginal profits decrease
in switching costs. Thus introducing slightly higher switching costs decrease first period
prices.
Note that some of these results are obtained in the literature in models where
switching costs and network effects are considered in isolation. Our results not only
confirm existing ones, but also provide insights when these features exist together. For
example, a policy conclusion we can draw is that whenever moderate switching costs
exist together with relatively strong network effects, the market may be sufficiently
competitive in terms of prices. Thus, a regulatory agency may refrain from costly
intervention. Furthermore, we show that the U-shaped nature of first period equilib-
rium prices can be exploited in a way to improve consumer surplus. We show that a
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redistributable switching tax, even though it will always reduce aggregate welfare, may
increase aggregate consumer surplus.
In section 2, we present the model. We derive the equilibrium and discuss its
properties in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
As in Klemperer (1987), we analyze competition between two firms over two periods.
The consumer population have peculiar characteristics. For example, they value the
number of consumers purchasing a brand, they incur switching costs if they wish to
change their brand choice, and some of them have changing tastes. The model is
very stylized and builds on Klemperer (1987) by simply appending a network benefit
component to the utilities of consumers. In fact, it is equivalent to that of Klemperer
(1987) when network effects vanish. Let us begin by describing features of consumer
utilities which remain the same over the two periods. We assume that consumers have
a reservation price,4 denoted by v, that is sufficiently high so that all consumers buy
as soon as they arrive. The reservation price is the same for both products and all
consumers in any period. Furthermore, each consumer has an affinity towards one of
the brands in each period which could be due to effects of a typical consumer’s social
circle or exposure to different marketing mixes. We capture this affinity by means of a
standard Hotelling horizontal differentiation model.
Thus, we assume firms a and b are located at opposite ends of the unit interval,
that is La = 0 and Lb = 1 where Li denotes the location of firm i. Consumers are
assumed to be uniformly distributed between the two firms. If a consumer located at
x ∈ [0, 1] makes her purchase from i, she incurs a utility reduction equal to t | x−Li |,
where t measures the magnitude of this reduction, or with standard terminology unit
“transport” costs. It is important to note that we do not interpret these costs literally
4We could also refer to this term as the stand alone value, as customary in the network effects
literature.
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as transportation costs. In our model, horizontal differentiation arise due to different
reactions to marketing and hence a typical consumer may change her views over time.
Moreover, consumers derive a network benefit proportional to the number of other
consumers purchasing a given product. That is, if a product is bought by N consumers,
then each of these consumers derive a benefit equal to kN , where k measures the
magnitude of network effects. In particular, we will require the magnitude of the
network effects to be sufficiently small relative to the transportation costs in order to
avoid situations where one firm corners the market. Hence, in each period, both firms
will have positive sales.
The consumer population evolve in different ways from period one to two. Particu-
larly, only a fraction, 1−ν, of the first period consumers survive to the next period, and
those who leave the market are replaced by new unattached consumers. A second group
of mass µ, receive a taste shock, and thus, are relocated along the unit interval. This
taste shock could be interpreted as a change in a consumer’s affinity due to changes in
her social circle, as well as exposure to a different marketing mix. We assume the taste
shock to be independent of first period tastes; admittedly a rather strong assumption.5
Hence, some consumers may find a product different than what they have bought in
the first period more attractive. However, to change the brand they consume, they will
have to incur a switching cost, s, which we assume to be sufficiently small so that some
consumers switch in equilibrium. The rest of the consumer population, with a mass of
1− µ− ν, is rigid in their tastes and face much higher switching costs, sr.
6 Therefore,
they continue to purchase from the firm which they bought in the first period. For
expositional ease, we refer to unattached second period consumers7 as new (n), the
group with changing preferences and low switching costs as flexible (f), and those with
5Similar modelling of changing preferences can be found in Klemperer (1987) and von Weisza¨cker
(1984).
6Notice that even if they have changing preferences, sufficiently high switching costs would prevent
them from switching.
7One could include this group to those with changing preferences, but assume that this group
incurs zero switching costs. Thus, if we allow everybody to change their preferences, we arrive at a
model with a distribution of switching costs; namely, none, moderate, and high.
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high switching costs and constant tastes as rigid (r) consumers.
In summary, the net first period utility of a consumer located at x ∈ [0, 1] can be
written as
U i1(x, p
i
1, N
i
1) = v + kN
i
1− | x− Li | t− p
i
1, i = {a, b}
where N iτ and p
i
τ represent the expected network size and the retail price of firm i at
period τ . While the second period utility, which also is a function of their type and
first period choice, is given by
U
i|j
2h (x, p
i
2, N
i
2) =


v + kN i2− | x− Li | t− p
i
2 if i = j or j = 0, and h ∈ {n, f, r},
v + kN i2− | x− Li | t− p
i
2 − s if i 6= j, j 6= 0 and h = f,
v + kN i2− | x− Li | t− p
i
2 − sr if i 6= j, j 6= 0 and h = r,
Consumers choose that brand which maximizes their utility. This problem is rela-
tively easier in the second period, since consumers will learn their types, and given this
information and their expectations on the contemporary network sizes, they will select
the brand which provides them with the highest net benefit. On the other hand, the
first period choice is significantly more involved. First, consumers are uncertain about
which group they will belong to in the second period. Moreover, since their choice this
period constrains their behavior due to potential switching costs, they need to have
beliefs about future. Given prices in the first period, they need to form expectations
about current and future network sizes and future prices. We will adopt Rational Ex-
pectations (RE) as the mechanism for expectation formation. A typical consumer will
select the brand that maximizes the expected discounted sum of lifetime utilities,
U j(x, pj1, N
j
1 ) = U
j
1 (x, p
j
1, N
j
1 ) + δE
[
U
i|j
2h (χ, p
i
2, N
i
2) | j, p
a
1, p
b
1
]
,
where δ is the discount factor and E[· | ·] is the conditional expectations operator.
Expectations are taken over the distribution of types, and distribution of potential
second period tastes. Notice that the cumulative expected utilities depend only on the
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first period observables. Consumers compute N j1 ,N
j
2 and p
j
2 rationally. That is, N
j
τ is a
demand function conditional on prices in τ , and delivers the realized network sizes for
all relevant prices for τ = 1, 2. In the first period, consumers solve the firms’ problem
in the future and anticipate second period equilibrium prices and therefore network
sizes exactly.
Firms select prices in order to maximize their discounted cumulative profits. For
simplicity we assume that firms have the same discount factor as consumers, δ. We
assume away fixed costs, and normalize marginal costs zero which is quite an innocent
assumption given the linearity of consumer utilities. We presume that firms cannot
distinguish among old locked-in and new consumers, and thus, restrict firms strategies
to nondiscriminatory, linear prices.8
2.3 The Two-Period Game
Given the preferences we have introduced, we will look for a subgame perfect equi-
librium in prices. However, we have certain ex ante restrictions on the nature of this
equilibrium. We presume that the market is covered and shared in each period which
in turn requires conditions on v and k. Furthermore, we assume some of the flexible
consumers are able to switch in equilibrium in both directions which imposes an upper
bound on s. On the other hand, the switching costs faced by the rigid types need to
be sufficiently high so that they continue buying the same brand in the second period.
Furthermore, these main features should occur for each level of market share firms
carry over from the first period. In the following, we first derive the equilibrium strate-
gies assuming that the conditions which make such outcomes possible are met, and
8We would like to note that price discrimination is potentially a powerful instrument to extract
more surplus from the locked-in consumers while competing aggressively for the new ones. If we have
allowed firms to practice price discrimination among their locked in consumers and first time buyers,
they would prefer loosing their low valuation locked in customers—the ones who end up closer to the
other firm in the second period—to their competitors. The intuition of this is similar to poaching
behavior studied in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) as well as Gehrig and Stenbacka(2004). We stick with
linear pricing and no price discrimination in this paper to be comparable to the previous literature;
mainly to Klemperer (1987).
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then derive restrictions on the parameters such that this outcome can be supported in
equilibrium.
2.3.1 The Second Period
We start solving the two-period game by finding the second period equilibrium prices.
We first need to derive second period demand functions in order to construct the profits.
Due to switching costs, the second period choices of consumers which remain in the
market depend on their first period choices, therefore we need to find the demands
from each consumer group. Let us first consider the new unattached consumers who
are distributed uniformly along the unit interval with mass ν. This group simply
compares the utilities from product a and b, and select the brand which provides them
the highest net benefit. Thus, finding the indifferent consumer is sufficient to identify
the demand faced by firms from this group of consumers. Formally, let d
a|0
2 denote
this location, then it must satisfy U
a|0
2n (d
a|0
2 , p
a
2, N
a
2 ) = U
b|0
2n (1 − d
a|0
2 , p
b
2, 1 − N
a
2 ) where
pi2 and N
i
2 are the second period price and expected network size of firm i respectively.
Notice due to the fact that consumers are uniformly distributed, d
a|0
2 also is equal to
the fraction of new consumers buying from firm a. Solving this equation yields,
d
a|0
2 =
1
2
+
k
2t
[2Na2 − 1] +
1
2t
[pb2 − p
a
2], (2.1)
and since we assume that the market is covered d
b|0
2 = 1− d
a|0
2 .
The group of flexible consumers, which has a mass of µ, evaluate each product anew
as they are now placed at a different point along the unit interval. For example, one
consumer who was closest to firm a in period one, could very well be closer to firm b in
period 2. Therefore, who they have bought from in the first period has a crucial impact
on their second period choice. Let us first consider those who have bought from a in the
first period. Identifying the demands of this group of consumers is once again equivalent
to finding the indifferent consumer with one difference. Even though firm 2 announces
Chapter 2 Switching Costs and Network Externalities 17
a retail price of pb2, consumers face p
b
2 +s when they consider buying from b. Recall our
prevailing assumption that switching costs, s, are sufficiently low that some will prefer
switching to firm b. Let us denote the fraction of consumers from this group which
prefer firm a by d
a|a
2 . Then, it must satisfy U
a|a
2f (d
a|a
2 , p
a
2, N
a
2 ) = U
b|a
2f (1−d
a|a
2 , p
b
2, 1−N
a
2 ),
and is given by
d
a|a
2 =
1
2
+
k
2t
[2Na2 − 1] +
1
2t
[pb2 + s− p
a
2]. (2.2)
The fraction of consumers who has bought a in the first period, but prefers b in
the second period is simply d
b|a
2 = 1 − d
a|a
2 . Applying similar arguments, the frac-
tion of flexible consumers who have purchased from b and switches to a, d
a|b
2 , solves
U
a|b
2f (d
b|a
2 , p
a
2, N
a
2 ) = U
b|b
2f (1− d
a|b
2 , p
b
2, 1−N
a
2 ), and is given by
d
a|b
2 =
1
2
+
k
2t
[2Na2 − 1] +
1
2t
[pb2 − p
a
2 − s]. (2.3)
Likewise, the fraction of consumers who remain loyal to b is d
b|b
2 = 1−d
a|b
2 . Notice that
these consumers perceive firm a’s price as pa2 + s.
Finally, the fraction of consumers with unchanged preferences (1−ν−µ) will choose
in the second period exactly the same brand as before, since their switching cost sr is
assumed to be sufficiently high.
Therefore, the total second period demand faced by firm i ∈ {a, b} in period 2 is
given by
di2 = µ[d
i|a
2 N
a
1 + d
i|b
2 N
b
1 ] + (1− µ− ν)N
i
1 + νd
i|0
2 , i = {a, b}. (2.4)
Rational expectations about the network sizes imply N a2 = d
a
2 and N
b
2 = 1 − N
a
2 =
1− da2 = d
b
2. Let
α =
sµ + t(1− µ− ν)
2(t− kµ− kν)
and
β =
µ + ν
2(t− kµ− kν)
.
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Solving (2.4) with imposing the rational expectations restrictions yields
da2 =
1
2
+ β(pb2 − p
a
2) + α[2N
a
1 − 1], (2.5)
and db2 = 1−d
a
2. For each firm to face downward sloping demand curves, t−kµ−kν > 0
must hold; that is, the network benefits must be relatively small compared to the
transportation costs or the share of rigid consumers must be relatively high.
It is easy to verify that whenever t− kµ− kν > 0
∂α
∂s
=
µ
2(t− kµ− kν)
> 0,
∂β
∂s
= 0,
∂α
∂k
=
(sµ + t(1− µ− ν))(µ + ν)
2(t− kµ− kν)2
= 2αβ > 0,
and
∂β
∂k
=
(µ + ν)2
2(t− kµ− kν)2
= 2β2 > 0.
Thus, a close inspection of (2.5) suggests that, the second period demand of a firm
with a user base larger than one half shifts outward, while the demand of the other
firm contracts when switching costs increase. However, the price responsiveness of the
demand is not affected by the same change which is an artifact of our two period model.
Since there is no future, neither the new consumers nor the flexible ones need to worry
about low current prices implying high ones in the future and vice versa.
Similarly, a slight increase in k not only shifts the demand of the firm with a higher
user base outward, but also makes the demands more sensitive to price differentials.
The price effect is due to rational expectations; i.e., consumers observing a price dif-
ferential expect the demand of the lower price firm to increase both due to an increase
in utility via price directly and via the network benefits indirectly. The upward shift
in demand however occurs only when coupled with switching costs. When s = 0 and
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ν + µ = 1, that is when there are no switching costs and no rigid consumers, the
network effects only have an impact via price sensitivities.
It is exactly this point which has not received much attention in the literature.
The similarities between results obtained in models with switching costs and in models
with network effects arise due to the outward shift of the demand when consumers are
locked-in. But what locks consumers in is not the network effects, it is the switching
costs which are usually assumed to be very high that no one switches.
Given that the fixed and marginal costs are normalized to zero, the second period
profit functions of the firms are simply their revenues and given by Πa2 = p
a
2d
a
2 and
Πb2 = p
b
2d
b
2. And due to the linearity of demands, the profit functions are concave in
the own price of each firm.9 Thus, first order conditions(FOCs) describe a candidate
Nash equilibrium with prices given by
pi2 =
1
2β
+
α
3β
[2N i1 − 1] (2.6)
=
t
ν + µ
− k +
1
3
(s µ + t(1− ν − µ))
(
2 N1
i − 1
)
ν + µ
, i = {a, b}.
However, note that we have imposed certain behavioral assumptions on the demand
side when we derived rational expectations demands. These behavioral assumptions
translate to constraints which firms should take into account when formulating their
best responses. Namely, we require some consumers to switch brands in the second
period which is only possible when 0 < d
a|b
2 ≤ d
a|a
2 < 1. If this condition holds, then
0 < d
a|0
2 < 1, since d
a|b
2 ≤ d
a|0
2 ≤ d
a|a
2 . Observe that both d
a|a
2 and d
a|b
2 will be functions
of N i1 in equilibrium, therefore these restrictions should hold for every possible value of
N i1, namely 0 ≤ N
i
1 ≤ 1. This is necessary, since, in the first period, firms would foresee
the equilibrium in the second period. By restricting our attention to cases where the
postulated behavior occurs for each N i1, we avoid situations where second period profit
functions become non-differentiable for certain strategies that might arise in the first
9Notice that β ≥ 0.
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period.
Furthermore, as µ + ν → 0, firms place a higher weight on revenues from the rigid
consumers, and since these consumers face very high switching costs, each firm will find
it most profitable to exploit this segment to the fullest extent. Namely, they might
select their prices in order to drive the net surplus of the marginal rigid consumer to
zero, which in turn might drive their demand from new and flexible consumers to zero.
In fact, such a strategy may be profitable for any value of µ+ν when v is large enough.
Remember also that we have assumed v to be sufficiently large that all consumers buy
for reasonable ranges of prices. Even though we do not explicitly derive the necessary
conditions, we assume that v is sufficiently large to induce all consumers to participate,
while it is sufficiently small that neither firm finds it optimal to just serve the rigid
consumers for all 0 ≤ N i1 ≤ 1 and all reasonable prices of the other firm.
Let
P =
{
µ + ν ∈
[
2
5
, 1
]
, k ∈
[
0, kmax
]
, s ∈
[
0, smax
]}
where
smax = t−
t(1− ν)(1− kβ)
tβ + (2µ + ν)(1− kβ)
,
and
kmax =
2
3
t.
At the candidate equilibrium prices, the type of behavior we have postulated, i.e. new
consumers buy from both firms, some flexible consumers switch to the other brand,
and rigid ones stick to their first period choice, is realized if parameters belong to P .
Lemma 1 A sufficient condition for the second period prices given in (2.6) to consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium is (µ + ν, k, s) ∈ P. At these prices, the equilibrium demands
are
di2 =
1
2
+
1
3
α(2N i1 − 1) (2.7)
Chapter 2 Switching Costs and Network Externalities 21
and the equilibrium profits are
Πi2(N
i
1) =
1
36β
[3 + 2α(2N i1 − 1)]
2 (2.8)
where i = {a, b}.
Proof. See Appendix.10
The second period equilibrium prices have a few interesting properties. First observe
that, whenever k < kmax, t−kµ−kν > 0, thus β is positive and demands are downward
sloping. Moreover, since α is also positive, the demand function of a firm carrying over
a market share that is larger than one half from the first period shifts outward enabling
this firm to charge a higher price. Furthermore, the second period profits are increasing
in the first period customer base which makes lock-in valuable. This would give both
firms incentives to compete more fiercely in the first period.
Both second period equilibrium prices and profits increase in switching costs when
a firm has a customer base, N i1, that is larger than one half. Thus, a firm which
dominates in terms of market shares in the first period would benefit from an increase
in the switching costs. On the other hand, an increase in the network effects, k, decrease
both the price and profit of a firm which carries over more than half of the first period
consumers to the second period. Hence, switching costs and network effects are forces
which act in completely opposite directions in equilibrium in the second period.
If the firms carry over a market share that is closed to one half from the first period
and µ + ν → 1, then the second period equilibrium prices could well fall below t, the
price which would have prevailed in the absence of switching costs and network effects.
Consequently, the presence of network effects might make the second period fiercely
competitive as well.
10We would like to emphasize once again that the restrictions defining P are only sufficient but not
necessary to induce the postulated behavior. Thus, the equilibrium prices are valid for a larger set of
parameters.
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2.3.2 The First Period
Consumers face a much more complicated task in decision making in the first period.
They need to evaluate a stream of benefits for two periods for each product in order
to select one. Consumers do not know their type initially, thus they need to figure out
their second period actions conditional on first period choices as well as the realizations
of their type. With probability ν, they will leave the market in which case they receive
no benefits, while with probability 1− µ− ν, they will be rigid and will buy the same
brand as in the first period. They will belong to the group of flexible consumers, i.e.
will be redistributed along the unit interval, with probability µ. Therefore, they will
switch to the other brand with some probability whichever brand they buy in the first
period. For example, if they are considering the second period benefit conditional on
having bought brand a in the first period, they will know that they will switch to brand
b if their new location along the unit interval is larger than d
a|a
2 and remain with brand
a otherwise. Formally, their expected benefit will be
EUa =
∫ da|a
2
0
U
a|a
2f (χ, p
a
2, N
a
2 )dχ +
∫ 1
da|a
U
b|a
2f (χ, p
b
2, N
b
2)dχ.
Similarly, the expected benefit of a flexible consumer conditional on buying brand b in
the first period can be written as
EU b =
∫ da|b
2
0
U
a|b
2f (χ, p
a
2, N
a
2 )dχ +
∫ 1
da|b
U
b|b
2f (χ, p
b
2, N
b
2)dχ.
In doing these complicated calculations, we assume that consumers rationally infer
next period prices (pa2, p
b
2), next period network sizes (N
a
2 , N
b
2) and critical values de-
termining whether they switch or not, (d
a|a
2 , d
a|b
2 ). Observe that each of these quantities
in equilibrium turns out to be a function of first period customer base of each brand,
and thus, first period prices. Therefore, given first period prices, rational consumers
should be able to compute first period demands which in turn determine second period
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equilibrium prices, network sizes, and critical values.
Hence, in the first period, a rational consumer chooses that brand which delivers
highest lifetime utility, that is they compare
Ua(x, pa1, N
a
1 ) = [v − p
a
1 − tx + kN
a
1 ] + δ
[
µEUa + (1− µ− ν)
[
v − pa2 − tx + kN
a
2
]]
and
U b(x, pb1, N
b
1) = [r − p
b
1 − t(1− x) + kN
b
1 ]
+δ
[
µEU b + (1− µ− ν)
[
r − pb2 − t(1− x) + kN
b
2
]]
.
Computing the difference yields
Ua(x, pa1, N
a
1 )− U
b(x, pb1, N
b
1) = p
b
1 − p
a
1 + (t− k + 2kN
a
1 − 2tx)
+
δsµ
t
(
k(2Na2 − 1) + p
b
2 − p
a
2
)
(2.9)
+δ(1− µ− ν)
(
pb2 − p
a
2 + (t− k + 2kN
a
2 − 2tx)
)
,
where we have used N b1 = 1−N
a
1 and N
b
2 = 1−N
a
2 . Observe that the right hand side
of (2.9) is decreasing in x, the distance from brand a. Thus, if there is a consumer
indifferent between the brands, all those consumers to the left will purchase brand a
and to the right will buy brand b.
The demands faced by firms, once again, can be identified by finding the location of
the indifferent consumer in the first period. Let da1 denote this location then it solves
Ua(da1, p
a
1, N
a
1 )− U
b(da1, p
b
1, N
b
1) = 0. (2.10)
Rational expectations on first period network sizes require da1 = N
a
1 = 1−N
b
1 = 1−d
b
1.
Imposing this condition as well as substituting second period prices from (2.6), second
period rational expectations network sizes from (2.7), we solve (2.10) for the first period
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demands yielding
di1 =
1
2
+
pj1 − p
i
1
γ
, i ∈ {a, b} and j 6= i, (2.11)
where
γ = 2(t− k) + 2tδ(1− µ− ν) +
4
3
αδ(sµ + t(1− µ + ν))(1− kβ)
tβ
.
Whenever k ≤ kmax, we have t− k > 0 and 1− kβ > 0, implying γ > 0, therefore first
period demands are downward sloping.11
Switching costs and network effects have their impact on the first period demands
through γ. A brief inspection reveals that
∂γ
∂k
= −2−
8δα2
3
< 0,
and
∂γ
∂s
=
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tβ
> 0.
That is, the first period demand becomes more sensitive to prices with an increase in
network effects, while they become less price sensitive with an increase in switching
costs. The latter is due to the fact that, rational consumers forecast a larger price
for the firm which carries over a larger customer base to the second period—the lower
priced firm in the first period. Hence, consumers do not easily buy in to initial price
cuts. On the other hand, a lower price in the first period implies a larger group of
consumers who would be “locked-in” in the second period implying a larger network
benefit. A lower price in the first period allows consumers to coordinate on one firm not
only in the first period but also in the second period. The difference between switching
costs and network effects are starker in the first period; they are demand side forces in
completely opposite directions.
11We would like to note that when k = 0, γ reduces to y introduced in Klemperer (1987) pp. 148.
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The cumulative profit functions of the firms are Πa = pa1d
a
1 + δΠ
a
2(d
a
1) and Π
b =
pb1d
b
1 + δΠ
b
2(d
b
1), where Π
a
2 and Π
b
2 are the second period equilibrium profits given in
(2.8). These profit functions are concave in own prices whenever 4δα2 < 9γβ. We show
in the appendix that when we restrict our attention to parameters in P , this condition
indeed is satisfied. Hence solving the FOCs yields symmetric first period candidate
equilibrium prices given by
pa1 = p
b
1 =
1
2
γ −
2δα
3β
. (2.12)
At these prices the profits of the firms are equal and given by
Πi =
γ
4
+
δ
4β
−
δα
3β
, i = {a, b}, (2.13)
which we show, in the appendix, to be non-negative when (µ + ν, k, s) ∈ P .
Proposition 1 A sufficient condition for the prices given in (2.12) to constitute a
Nash equilibrium in the first period is {µ + ν, k, s)} ∈ P. The equilibrium first period
demands turn out to be
da1 = d
b
1 =
1
2
. (2.14)
Given the first period customer bases, the second period equilibrium prices are also
symmetric and given by
pa2 = p
b
2 =
t
µ + ν
− k (2.15)
while the equilibrium demands in the second period also turn out be
da2 = d
b
2 =
1
2
. (2.16)
Proof. See appendix.
The second period equilibrium prices12 are always positive, while the first period
12Note once again that we only provide sufficient conditions in proposition 1, and the equilibrium
is valid for a larger set of parameters.
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prices could be negative. 13 The first period equilibrium prices are quadratic convex
in s—a feature we explore further when µ + ν → 1 below. It is important to note
that the quadratic convex nature of equilibrium prices implies that for some parameter
constellations, increasing the switching cost slightly may lead to a decrease in first
period prices. This is particularly interesting since we have previously shown that
increasing the switching costs reduces demand elasticities in the first period. However,
it also increases the value of carrying over a larger user base to the second period. We
analyze the relative importance of these effects in subsection 2.3.3.
Klemperer (1987) recognizes that first period prices may be lower than those in
a market without switching costs. However, he does not acknowledge the U-shaped
nature of of first period prices in switching costs which may have further policy impli-
cations. We present one such implication in subsection 2.3.5.
On the other hand, both first and second period prices decrease in the marginal
network benefits, k.14 Therefore, when there are network effects, anticompetitive con-
cerns in markets with switching costs may be reduced. In fact, the higher the network
effects the lower the prices, and there may be cases where prices fall below those in
a market without rigid consumers, network effects and switching costs. That is, any
worry policy makers might have concerning high prices due to switching costs may not
be well founded in the presence of sufficiently strong network effects.
Let pskτ be the equilibrium prices in the presence of both switching costs and net-
work effects, pkτ be the equilibrium price when only network effects exist, p
s
τ be the
equilibrium price with just switching costs and pτ be the equilibrium price without
switching costs and network effects in period τ . It is easy to verify that p2 = t/(µ + ν)
and p1 = t(1 + δ(1− µ− ν)/3). Observe that as µ + ν → 1, both p1 and p2 approach
t, the price that would have prevailed in a static standard Hotelling model. In the
following proposition, we summarize relationships of these prices both in the first and
13One likely configuration where first period prices can be negative occurs when s → smax, k →
kmax, δ → 1, µ + ν → 1 and µ > 1/2.
14First period prices are decreasing in k, since γ is decreasing in k, while α/β is constant in k.
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second period.
Proposition 2 (Price Orders)
1. The second period equilibrium prices can be ordered in two ways:
• Low network benefits: ps2 > p
sk
2 > p2 > p
k
2
• High network benefits: ps2 ≥ p2 > p
sk
2 > p
k
2,
2. The first period equilibrium prices must fulfill two conditions:
• ps1 > p
sk
1 and p1 > p
k
1
Notice the indeterminacy of first period price rankings. As we have noted above,
first period prices could fall below marginal cost—zero, in our model—for certain pa-
rameter constellations. In the next subsection, we investigate the incentives of firms
in setting their prices in the first period, and try to uncover the mechanisms through
which switching costs and network effects shape the first period equilibrium. The clear
message, however, is that the presence of network effects reduce prices in both periods.
2.3.3 The Monotone Comparative Statics
In this subsection, we explore further the impact of switching costs and network effects
on first period prices. We employ monotone comparative statics (MCS) to uncover the
mechanisms both these features affect the incentives of the firms.15 The MCS allow
us to separate the impact of switching costs and network benefits on the equilibrium
prices into first and second period effects. In the arguments below we maintain the
assumption that the parameters are in the set where the equilibrium we have derived
in Proposition 1 exists.
15In doing so we follow Vives (1999), pp.34-39.
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The derivative of the best response function of firm a, R(pb1, s, k) with respect to
switching costs can be written as16
∂
∂s
R(pb1, s, k) = −
∂2
∂s∂pa
1
Πa(R(pb1, s, k), p
b
1, s, k)
∂2
∂pa
1
2 Πa(R(pb1, s, k), p
b
1, s, k)
.
The denominator is negative because the profits are concave in pa1. Thus, the sign of
the left hand side depends on the sign of the numerator, which is determined by a few
non-zero partial derivatives and given by17
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
= pa1
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
+δpa2
[(
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
+
∂da2
∂da1
)
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
+
(
∂da2
∂pb2
∂2pb2
∂s∂da1
+
∂2da2
∂s∂da1
)
∂da1
∂pa1
]
(2.17)
When we evaluate (2.17) at the first period equilibrium prices, we obtain the direc-
tion of change in the best response function of firm a in the first period due to a change
in s around the equilibrium. After substituting the expressions for partial derivatives
and equilibrium prices, we get
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
=
3γβ − 4αδ
6β
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tγ2β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
+δ
1
2β
[
β
(
−
2α
3β
)
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tγ2β︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ 2α
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tγ2β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(2.18)
+ β
(
−
2µ
3(µ + ν)
)(
−
1
γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
µ
t− µk − νk
(
−
1
γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]
,
which after simplifications yields
∂2Πa
∂pa1∂s
=
2δ µ
3γtβ
(
2 α (1− k β)−
t β
ν + µ
)
. (2.19)
16We will only present the results here; see appendix for their derivation. Similar arguments apply
for the best response function of firm b due to symmetry.
17In writing (2.17), we suppressed arguments of da
1
= da
1
(pa
1
, pb
1
, s, k), pb
2
= pb
2
(da
1
(pa
1
, pb
1
, s, k), s, k),
and da
2
= da
2
(pa
2
(da
1
(pa
1
, pb
1
, s, k), s, k), pb
2
(da
1
(pa
1
, pb
1
, s, k), s, k), da
1
(pa
1
, pb
1
, s, k), s, k).
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All derivatives in (2.17) have definite signs except the first period effect, which de-
pends on the sign of first period prices. Switching costs affect second period marginal
profits through several different channels, however overall effect is ambiguous.18 When
first period prices are positive, marginal first period profits are increasing in the switch-
ing costs. This is due to the increase in γ, which in turn reduces first period demand
elasticity. The reduction in the first period demand elasticity also impact second period
incentives, first, through a negative indirect effect of the second period price of firm b,
pb2, on firm a’s second period demand, d
a
2 (2nd term in (2.17)); and second, through a
positive direct effect of the first period demand, da1, on the second period demand (3rd
term in (2.17)). The overall contribution of these three effects on the incentives of firm
a is positive yielding incentives to increase first period price, irrespective of the sign of
the first period equilibrium prices.
The fourth term in (2.17) results from the decrease in the responsiveness of second
period price of firm b, pb2, to the first period demand, d
a
1, due to an increase in switching
costs. When the first period price, pa1, increases, the first period demand, d
a
1, falls,
which encourages firm b to raise its second period price, pb2, and therefore the second
period demand, da2, and profits increase. When switching costs grow in magnitude,
the increase in firm b’s price is more, leading to incentives for firm a to increase first
period prices. The fifth term is due to a positive change in the responsiveness of the
second period demand, da2, to the first period demand when switching costs increase.
An increase in the first period price pa1 decreases the first period demand d
a
1, which
decreases the second period demand da2 and the profits. When switching costs rise,
the second period demand decreases more implying a negative impact on profits which
leads to an incentive to decrease first period prices. It is straightforward to show that
these two effects combined have a negative sign.
The overall direction of the movement of the best response function of firm a is
ambiguous. However, notice that the term in parenthesis in (2.19) is linearly increasing
18All the arguments below are based on the sign of partial derivatives given in (2.18), however they
are followed best referring to equation (2.17).
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in s.19 Thus, if the right hand side of (2.17) is positive at s = 0, it is positive for all s.
Otherwise, best response function of firm a shifts downwards around the equilibrium
for small s, implying lower equilibrium prices with a slightly higher s.
A similar analysis can be performed for network benefits. The change in the mar-
ginal profits due to a change in marginal network benefits, k, is induced through three
non-zero partial derivatives
∂2Πa
∂k∂pa1
= pa1
∂2da1
∂k∂pa1
+ δpa2
[
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
+
∂da2
∂da1
]
∂2da1
∂k∂pa1
, (2.20)
after the substituting the expressions for partial derivatives and equilibrium prices we
obtain
∂2Πa
∂k∂pa1
=
3γβ − 4αδ
6β
(
−
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
+δ
1
2β
[
β
(
−
2α
3β
)(
−
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ 2α
(
−
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]
(2.21)
= −
3 + 4δα2
3γ
< 0. (2.22)
Apart from the first period term, once again the effects of an increase in network
benefits have well determined signs. The overall effect is unambiguously negative,
implying that best response function of firm a shifts down around the equilibrium.
Since firm b’s reaction function moves also downward, equilibrium is obtained at lower
prices when network effects increase.
In contrast to the switching costs, higher network benefits result in a more elastic
demand in the first period for positive prices. And, the impact of increasing network
effects on the cumulative profits only operate through this increase in first period
demand elasticity as can be seen in (2.20). The second period effects go through two
19This is due to the fact that α is linearly increasing in s.
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channels, first a negative indirect effect of firm b’s second period price, pb2, on firm a’s
second period demand, da2, and second, through a direct positive impact of the first
period demand of firm a on the second period demand.
In summmary, the MCS we present in (2.18) and (2.21) not only allow us to dis-
entangle the first and second period effects of changes in switching costs and network
effects on pricing incentives of the firms in the first period, but also to identify the
channels which these changes affect incentives.
2.3.4 The Case without Rigid Consumers
A few of the results we have presented in the previous subsection become sharper when
we consider the case without rigid consumers, i.e., µ + ν → 1. This simply assumes
that every consumer, which survives from period one to two, could potentially switch,
and firms as well as consumers are all aware of this possibility. A brief inspection
of (2.12), suggest that second period prices decrease, however, the effects in the first
period prices is not immediately seen as decreasing the size of the rigid consumers
negatively impact second period profits and could reduce the first period incentives to
lock customers in. Nevertheless, if we keep µ constant and let ρ = µ + ν, i.e., replace
rigid consumers with new unattached ones, it is possible to show that
∂pa1
∂ρ
= −
1
3
(
2 s µ (t− k ρ)2 (s µ + t) + (s µ k − t (t− k))2 ρ2
)
δ
ρ2t (t− k ρ)2
< 0,
thus also first period prices decrease.
Next, we investigate the effect of changes in switching costs faced by flexible con-
sumers and network effects when µ + ν → 1. Substituting µ = 1 − ν in (2.17), after
simplifications, yields
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
=
δ(1− ν)[s(1− ν)(2t− 3k)− t(t− k)]
δ(1− ν)2s2(2t− 3k) + 3t(t− k)2
(2.23)
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The denominator is always positive when k < kmax. Hence, the sign of this expression
depends on the numerator, which is positive for s > t(t−k)
(1−ν)(2t−3k)
and negative otherwise.
More importantly, when s = 0, a slight increase in switching costs shift both best
response functions downwards leading to lower first period equilibrium prices. Thus,
when switching costs are sufficiently low, the incentives to exploit locked-in consumers
in the second period dominates and first period competition is fiercer.
In particular, consider the case when switching costs are zero, which implies first
period equilibrium prices of pi1 = t − k. After substitution of µ = 1 − ν and s = 0 in
(2.18), one can show that
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0,µ=1−ν
= 0 + δ(t− k)
[
0 + 0 +
1− ν
6(t− k)2
−
1− ν
2(t− k)2
]
= −
δ(1− ν)
3(t− k)
.
Clearly the decrease in equilibrium prices is due to the impact of a small increase in
switching costs on future profits, since the first period effect is identically zero. A
similar result can be found in Doganoglu (2005) where it is shown in a fully dynamic
setup that small switching costs might lead to lower prices in steady state compared
to no switching costs.
2.3.5 Switching Taxes: A Policy Suggestion
In this subsection, we present a rather interesting policy implication of our results.
The fact that by making switching costly between firms, first period equilibrium prices
may be reduced suggests that there is a possibility of increasing first period consumer
benefits. A feature of our model which limits this increase is the fact that market size
is constant. That is, we assume that all the consumers buy anyways, therefore the
reduction in prices do not lead to an increase in the size of the consuming population.
The effects of switching costs on market participation remains an interesting issue to
explore, however it is beyond the scope of the current paper. Still, we are able to argue
below that even though introduction of a switching tax reduces aggregate welfare,
Chapter 2 Switching Costs and Network Externalities 33
consumer surplus can be increased in detriment to firms’ profits.
After lengthy but straightforward computations, aggregate welfare, that is the
equally weighted sum of the consumer surplus and profits, turns out to be
W = (1 + δ)(r −
t
4
) + (1 + δ)
k
2
− δsµ(
1
2
−
s
2t
)−
δµs2
4t
. (2.24)
The first term represents the welfare in a market without switching costs and network
effects over two periods. The second term accounts for the aggregate network benefits,
as every consumer has access to a network of size one half in both periods. The third
term corresponds to the losses which arise in the second period when some flexible
consumers decide to incur the switching costs and change the firm they buy from. The
fourth term, on the other hand, is due to the inefficient allocation of flexible consumers
to the firms in the second period. Notice that some flexible consumers located to the
right of the midpoint between the firms continue to buy from firm 1 in the second
period instead of patronizing firm 2 which is closer to their location. This introduces
a welfare loss as the cost of extra distance travelled by these consumers.
If a policy maker were to institute a switching tax, some of the losses in the second
period could be avoided by refunding the tax revenue to consumers. That is, the
third term in (2.24) will vanish if s were to be interpreted as a redistributable tax.
This interpretation is more sensible when there are no rigid consumers, i.e. when
µ + ν → 1—a case we focus on below. Nevertheless, such a tax would still reduce
aggregate welfare due to inefficient allocation of consumers among the firms in the
second period, since the fourth term in (2.24) will not vanish. However, incurring this
cost may yield a significant shift of surplus from the firms to the consumers via the
decrease in the first period prices. Whenever µ + ν → 1, the first period prices can be
simplified to
p∗1 = t− k −
2
3t
δµs(t− µs)−
δµ2s2k
t(t− k)
. (2.25)
Notice that the last two terms are negative whenever the equilibrium we describe in
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proposition 1 exists, hence, introducing a switching tax, s, will reduce prices in the
first period.
Consider an industry without switching costs and no rigid consumers. Introducing
a redistributable switching tax, s, will increase consumer surplus in the first period by
an amount equal to the last two terms of (2.25), while reducing it in the second period
by an amount equal to the fourth term of (2.24), hence the net change in consumer
surplus is given by
∆CS =
2
3t
δµs(t− µs) +
δµ2s2k
t(t− k)
−
δµs2
4t
,
which is easily shown to be quadratic concave function of s, with ∂∆CS/∂s
∣∣
s=0
> 0.
Therefore, the change in consumer surplus is positive for positive switching tax levels.
As we mentioned above, such a policy may increase consumer surplus, nonetheless
reduce profits even more that the aggregate welfare will go down. A policy maker
whose objective is biased towards consumer benefits, i.e. one which places a much
lower weight to profits, would find such a policy attractive however. Doganoglu (2005)
presents a similar case in favor of switching taxes in a fully dynamic model based on
welfare comparisons in the steady state.
2.4 Conclusion
We have analyzed the two-period model of duopolistic competition with switching
costs and network effects, built on the model of Klemperer (1987). We have shown
that switching costs and network effects are forces in opposite directions early on. That
is, consumer would like to be part of a network which would be large in the future. But
firms with large user bases are able to sustain high prices in the presence of switching
costs, thus reducing their attractiveness for consumers early on. The clear signs of these
phenomena can be exemplified in our first period demands, which becomes more(less)
price sensitive with an increase in marginal network benefits (switching costs). When
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there are no switching costs, the size of a network does not play an important dynamic
role, as can be seen in the second period demands we have derived. Network effects
increase price sensitivity of consumers when expectations are rationally formed, since
in this case a price decrease not only has a direct positive impact on the utility of a
marginal customer, but also an indirect effect through the network benefits.
Subgame perfect(SP) equilibrium prices in both tend to be lower as network effects
increase. In both periods, this is due to increased price elasticity of demands faced by
firms. The effects of switching costs, on the other hand, on the equilibrium outcomes
are less clear cut. In the second period, the switching costs faced by flexible consumers
tend to increase the price charged by a firm which carries over an installed base larger
than one half. However, in the SP equilibrium of the whole game, switching costs have
no effect. Nevertheless, the second period on the SP equilibrium prices increase with
an increase in the size of the population of rigid consumers.
The effects of switching costs on the first period equilibrium prices is ambiguous.
Even though the firms face demands with a lower price elasticity when switching costs
increase, they also face a more profitable second period when they are able lock in
more than half of the first period consumers. While the former effect leads to incen-
tives to increase prices, the latter encourages firms to reduce their prices. Hence, the
equilibrium is attained when these opposing incentives are balanced.
However, there is no telling ex-ante where this balancing would occur. Thus our
first period prices could be lower than those in a market without network effects and
switching costs. We show that the first period prices are quadratic-convex functions of
the level of switching costs, therefore for certain parameter values increasing switching
costs may reduce equilibrium prices. We can see this clearly in our example without
rigid consumers, where around zero, increasing switching costs have no impact on
marginal first period profits while it reduces second period profits, leading to lower
equilibrium prices.
This point is very important to note, as the common message in the literature
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studying fully dynamic models is that switching costs unambiguously increase steady
state prices. A common assumption shared by all the fully dynamic models is that
switching costs are sufficiently high that consumers do not expect to switch, and in
equilibrium there is no switching. However, it is not obvious whether this would be
the case for small switching costs as our model in this paper suggests. Essentially, one
would expect that in a fully dynamic model, firms would be in a situation much like
the first period, but at the same time have some installed bases. Thus in a steady
state, we expect the prices to inherit the same U-shape as we have derived in this
paper. In a related model, Doganoglu (2005) shows that in fact for small switching
costs steady state prices may be below those in a market without switching costs. We
have shown that this property may be exploited to increase aggregate consumer surplus
by introducing a switching tax.
Naturally, there are a few directions in which one could extend this paper. We
think that a fully dynamic analysis is warranted. A more interesting issue is related
to the market size. In this model, the total demand is completely inelastic, that is all
consumers buy no matter what. However, both network effects and switching costs
are likely to have effects on the participation incentives of the marginal consumer. A
thorough welfare analysis could only be conducted, when these incentives are taken
into account.
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2.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We have imposed certain behavioral assumption on the demand side when we derived
rational expectations demands in the second period. Namely, market is covered, both
firms make positive sales to all the consumer types, and some flexible customers of each
firm find it better to switch to the other brand. Switching in both directions occur, for
each Na1 ∈ [0, 1], only when
0 < d
a|b
2 ≤ d
a|a
2 < 1,
which in turn implies 0 < d
a|0
2 < 1, since d
a|b
2 ≤ d
a|0
2 ≤ d
a|a
2 .
When we evaluate d
a|a
2 given in (2.2), at the second period rational expectations
demands and equilibrium prices, we obtain
1− d
a|a
2 =
2
3
α (1− k β) Na1
t β
+
1
2
t− s
t
−
1
3
α (1− k β)
t β
. (2.26)
Similarly, when we evaluate d
a|b
2 given in (2.3),
d
a|b
2 = −
2
3
α (1− k β) Na1
t β
+
1
2
t− s
t
+
1
3
α (1− k β)
t β
(2.27)
For switching to occur in between both brands, we need the right hand sides of both
(2.26) and (2.27) to be positive for all N a1 ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that 1−d
a|a
2 increases in N
a
1
when k ≤ kmax, therefore we need to evaluate the right hand side of (2.26) at N
a
1 = 0.
On the other hand, d
a|b
2 decreases in N
a
1 requiring us to evaluate the right hand side of
(2.27) at Na1 = 1. It is easy to verify that both (2.26) and (2.27), evaluated at N
a
1 = 0
and Na1 = 1 respectively lead to the same condition, namely,
1
2
t− s
t
−
1
3
α (1− k β)
t β
> 0,
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which yields, after substituting for α and simplifying, an upper bound on s given by
s ≤ t−
t(1− ν)(1− kβ)
tβ + (2µ + ν)(1− kβ)
≡ smax.
It is easy to see that smax ≤ t, whenever 1−kβ > 0 which holds when k ≤ 2t/3 ≡ kmax.
However, in order to guarantee that there are some positive switching costs, we need
smax > 0. Observe that
∂
∂k
smax =
3
4
t(1− ν)(µ + ν)2
(tβ + (2µ + ν)(1− kβ))2(t− kµ− kν)2
> 0,
therefore the smallest value of smax occurs when k = 0, and given by
smax
∣∣
k=0
=
t
5µ + 3ν
[
5(µ + ν)− 2
]
,
and is positive whenever µ + ν > 2/5. Therefore whenever (µ + ν, s, k) ∈ P , some
first period consumers of firm a switch to firm b, while some customer of b switch to
a and the new customers buy from both firms in equilibrium for all N a1 ∈ [0, 1]. By
assumption, we have that v, the reservation price of consumers, is sufficiently large
that all consumer buy, while it is sufficiently small that neither firm prefers to serve
just the rigid consumers. Therefore, prices given in (2.6) constitute a Nash equilibrium
in the second period.

Proof of Proposition 1
We solve the FOCs of each firm simultaneously implied by the cumulative profit func-
tions to obtain the candidate first period equilibrium prices given in (2.12). To show
that these prices indeed constitute a Nash equilibrium in the first period, we need to
prove then when (µ + ν, k, s) ∈ P , γ is nonnegative, cumulative profit functions are
concave in the price of each firm’s own price, and equilibrium profits are nonnegative.
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Concavity of profit functions:
Concavity of profit function requires
0 <
4
9
δα2
β
< γ,
therefore, whenever profit functions are concave γ > 0. Rewriting the above condition,
we require
H = γ −
4
9
δα2
β
> 0,
which yields
H = 2 t− 2 k + 2 δ t (1− ν − µ) +
2
9
(s µ + t− t ν − t µ)2 δ (−9 k ν + 5 t− 9 k µ)
t (ν + µ) (t− k µ− k ν)
,
when we substitute the expressions for α and β. It is straightforward to verify that
∂H
∂k
= −2−
8
9
(s µ + t− t ν − t µ)2 δ
(t− k µ− k ν)2
< 0.
Thus, it is sufficient to show that H > 0 when k = kmax. Evaluating, H at k = kmax
yields
H =
2
3
t + 2 δ t (1− ν − µ)−
2
3
δ (s µ + t (1− ν − µ))2
t (3− 2 µ− 2 ν)
(2.28)
+4
δ (s µ + t (1− ν − µ))2 (1− ν − µ)
t (ν + µ) (3− 2 µ− 2 ν)
Notice that only the third term is negative. Furthermore, sµ + t(1− µ− ν) < t, thus
the third term becomes even more negative when we replace sµ + t(1− µ− ν) with t.
Hence, it is easy to verify that
H ≥
2
3
t−
2
3
δ t
(3− 2 µ− 2 ν)
=
2t
3
[
1−
δ
3− 2(µ + ν)
]
≥ 0,
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since δ ≤ 1 and 3− 2(µ + ν) ≥ 1. Therefore, the profit function are concave in firm’s
own prices. Moreover, γ > 0. 
Equilibrium profits are non-negative:
The equilibrium profit from both periods is given (2.13) and this expression is once
again decreasing in k. Thus, it is sufficient to verify that profits are non-negative when
k = kmax. Substituting the expressions for γ, α, β and k = kmax in (2.13) yields
G =
t
6
+
1
2
δ t (1− ν − µ) +
δ (s µ + t (1− ν − µ))2 (1− ν − µ)
t (ν + µ) (3− 2 µ− 2 ν)
−
1
3
δ (s µ + t (1− ν − µ))
ν + µ
+
1
6
δt(3− 2µ− 2ν)
µ + ν
.
Notice that only the fourth term is negative. It is easy to verify that
G ≥
t
6
−
1
3
δsµ
ν + µ
+
1
6
δt
µ + ν
≥
t
6
[
1−
δµ
µ + ν
]
+
t
6
δ(1− µ)
µ + ν
≥ 0,
where the first inequality follows from simply ignoring second and third terms in G,
second inequality from s ≤ t and the last from the fact that δ < 1, s ≤ t, µ ≤ 1 and
µ/(µ + ν) ≤ 1. Therefore, in equilibrium firms obtain nonnegative profits, even if they
charge below cost prices in the first period. 
Each firm’s profit function is concave in its own price, and equilibrium profits
are nonnegative when (µ + ν, k, s) ∈ P , hence solution of FOCs indeed describe an
equilibrium.

Monotone comparative statics
A convenient method to disentangle effects of certain variables on firms incentives is
to use Monotone Comparative Statics (MCS). Essentially, MCS tells us how the best
response function of a firm will shift if one of the model parameters changes.
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Consider two-period profit of firm a for a fixed pa1 and p
b
1:
Πa(pa1, p
b
1, s, k) = p
a
1d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k) + δΠ
a
2(d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k), s, k),
where
Πa2(d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k), s, k) = p
a
2(d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k), s, k)d
a
2,
and
da2 = d
a
2(p
a
2(d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k), s, k), p
b
2(d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k), s, k), d
a
1(p
a
1, p
b
1, s, k), s, k).
We will suppress the dependency of da1, p
a
2, p
b
2 and d
a
2 on their arguments below for ease
of exposition.
Let R(pb1, s, k) denote the best response price of firm a when firm b charges p
b
1.
Then, the FOC implies
∂
∂pa1
Πa(R(pb1, s, k), p
b
1, s, k) = 0,
and therefore
∂
∂s
R(pb1, s, k) = −
∂2
∂s∂pa
1
Πa(R(pb1, s, k), p
b
1, s, k)
∂2
∂pa
1
2 Πa(R(pb1, s, k), p
b
1, s, k)
.
A similar expression also applies for changes in marginal network benefits, k. Given
that profit function of firm a is concave in pa1, it is easy to see that
sign
[
∂
∂s
R(pb1, s, k)
]
= sign
[
∂2
∂s∂pa1
Πa(R(pb1, s, k), p
b
1, s, k)
]
.
We can, therefore, find out how the best response of a firm will change with respect
to a change in switching costs, and more importantly identify through which channels
this change takes place, by looking at the derivative of the first order condition with
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respect to the switching costs holding first period prices at pb1 and firm a’s best response
to it as constant. A particularly appealing choice is setting pb1 to the first period
equilibrium price of firm b, in which case firm a’s best response is simply also to
charge the equilibrium price. Thus, MCS around the equilibrium prices will allow us
characterize the equilibrium incentives of firms in a transparent manner.
The FOC of firm a in the first period is
∂2Πa
∂pa1
= da1 + p
a
1
∂da1
∂pa1
+ δ
[(
da2 + p
a
2
∂da2
∂pa2
)
∂pa2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+ pa2
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+ pa2
∂da2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
]
.
Observe that
da2 + p
a
2
∂da2
∂pa2
= 0,
since it is the FOC in the second period, and it is identically zero because in a subgame
perfect equilibrium firm’s take equilibrium payoffs from future given at their equilib-
rium level. Therefore, the derivative of the FOC with respect to switching costs, holding
first period prices constant, amounts to
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
=
∂da1
∂s
+ pa1
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
+δ
[(
∂pa2
∂da1
∂da1
∂s
+
∂pa2
∂s
)
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+pa2
(
∂2da2
∂s∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+
∂da2
∂pb2
∂2pb2
∂s∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
)
+
(
∂pa2
∂da1
∂da1
∂s
+
∂pa2
∂s
)
∂da2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+pa2
(
∂2da2
∂s∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+
∂da2
∂da1
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
)]
.
Let us first list a few partial derivatives which will also be useful in our analysis with
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respect to network effects. It is straightforward to confirm that
∂da1
∂pa1
= −
1
γ
,
∂da2
∂da1
= 2α,
∂da2
∂pb2
= β,
∂pb2
∂da1
= −
2α
3β
,
∂pa2
∂da1
=
2α
3β
.
The partial derivatives of involving da1 with respect to switching costs are
∂da1
∂s
= −(pa1 − p
b
1)
1
γ2
∂γ
∂s
= 0,
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
=
1
γ2
∂γ
∂s
=
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tγ2β
,
and those involving da2 are
∂2da2
∂s∂da1
=
µ
t− µk − νk
,
∂2da2
∂s∂pb2
= 0.
We have only one term involving pa2 given by
∂pa2
∂s
=
2(pb1 − p
a
1)
3γβ
∂α
∂s
= 0,
and another involving pb2 which is given by
∂2pb2
∂s∂da1
= −
2µ
3(µ + ν)
.
After eliminating the elements equal to zero we arrive at
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
= pa1
∂2da1
∂pa1∂s
+ δpa2
[(
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
+
∂da2
∂da1
)
∂2da1
∂s∂pa1
+
(
∂da2
∂pb2
∂2pb2
∂s∂da1
+
∂2da2
∂s∂da1
)
∂da1
∂pa1
]
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and after substituting the partial derivatives and equilibrium price we obtain
∂2Πa
∂s∂pa1
=
3γβ − 4αδ
6β
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tγ2β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
+δ
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β
(
−
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3β
)
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3tγ2β︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ 2α
8δµα(1− kβ)
3tγ2β︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
β
(
−
2µ
3(µ + ν)
)(
−
1
γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
µ
t− µk − νk
(
−
1
γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]
A similar analysis might be conducted for network benefits. The derivative of the
first order condition with respect to marginal network benefits, k, yields
∂2Πa
∂k∂pa1
=
∂da1
∂k
+ pa1
∂2da1
∂k∂pa1
+δ
[(
∂pa2
∂da1
∂da1
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+
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)
∂da2
∂pb2
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∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+pa2
(
∂2da2
∂k∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+
∂da2
∂pb2
∂2pb2
∂k∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+
∂da2
∂pb2
∂pb2
∂da1
∂2da1
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)
+
(
∂pa2
∂da1
da1
∂k
+
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∂k
)
∂da2
∂da1
∂da1
∂pa1
+pa2
(
∂2da2
∂k∂da1
∂da1
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+
∂da2
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∂2da1
∂k∂pa1
)]
.
The partial derivatives with respect to marginal network benefits involving da1 are
∂da1
∂k
= −(pa1 − p
b
1)
1
γ2
∂γ
∂k
= 0,
∂2da1
∂k∂pa1
=
1
γ2
∂γ
∂k
= −
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
,
those involving da2 are
∂2da2
∂k∂da1
= 4αβ,
∂2da2
∂k∂pb2
= 2β2.
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Once again, we have only one term involving pa2 given by
∂pa2
∂k
=
2da1 − 1
3β
∂α
∂k
−
3 + 2α(2da1 − 1)
6β2
∂β
∂k
+
2α
3β
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and another involving pb2 which is given by
∂2pb2
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= 0.
Thus, after eliminating elements equal to zero results in
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. (2.29)
Notice that
−
1
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∂pa2
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∂da2
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=
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∂k∂pb2
= 2β2,
as well as
−
1
pa2
∂pa2
∂k
∂da2
∂da1
=
∂2da2
∂k∂da1
= 4αβ,
thus, second and third, fifth and sixth terms cancel each other in (2.29), leaving only
∂2Πa
∂k∂pa1
= pa1
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+ δpa2
[
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∂pb2
∂pb2
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+
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]
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.
After substituting the partial derivatives and equilibrium prices we obtain
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=
3γβ − 4αδ
6β
(
−
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+/−
+δ
1
2β
[
β
(
−
2α
3β
)(
−
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+ 2α
(
−
6 + 8δα2
3γ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
]
(2.30)
Chapter 3
Estimating Network Effects in
Mobile Telephony in Germany
Introduction
In the last decade mobile telephony has been the fastest growing segment in the
telecommunications industry. In June 2003, after a few years of exponential growth,
there were more than 60 million subscribers of mobile telephony providers in Germany.
Between January 1998 and June 2003, the total number of subscribers grew by about
700%. During the same period of time, the index of prices for mobile services calculated
by the German Statistical Office came down by about 41%. Whether such a moderate
price decrease can fuel the exponential change in the market size is a question that
awaits an answer.
At a first glance, it is unlikely that prices alone can account for such a large increase
in the user base. The introduction of prepaid cards and new services, such as the
short message service (SMS) and wireless application protocol (WAP), together with
increasing attractiveness of handsets has played a very important role for the industry
development. However, network effects may be another force which can rationalize
such tremendous growth rates. A product that exhibits network effects becomes more
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valuable when more people use it. In our opinion, network effects influence consumers’
subscription decisions to mobile services.
Network effects in mobile telephony may have different origins. First, an increase
in the number of mobile users raises communications possibilities. In particular, the
consumption of mobile services can be attributed to a single person and not to a
household. This implies a much larger potential market size than in the case of fixed
telephony. Second, in addition to voice telephony, mobile firms can offer several other
services, such as SMS, MMS, WAP and email, which may themselves be subject to
network effects. Finally, the spread of mobile services within an individual’s social
circle may exert social pressure inducing her to subscribe. For instance, lack of mobile
contact may lead to exclusion from spontaneous social events.
In this paper, we investigate whether network effects have an impact on the sub-
scription decisions of consumers to mobile telephony services in Germany. Our analy-
sis is based on publicly available industry data, namely subscription levels, prices and
churn rates in the period from January 1998 to June 2003 in monthly intervals. One
of our main goals is to present a simple methodology which employs such limited
information, and yet can enhance our understanding of the evolution of the mobile
industry.
The most easily accessible industry statistics in Germany, as in many other coun-
tries worldwide, are the subscription levels—that is, the total number of subscribers.
Although interesting in describing the state of the industry, this information by itself
is hardly useful in studying how consumer demand responds to changes in industry
determinants. An important shortcoming is due to the fact that often consumers sign
long term deals with their service providers, and hence, do not engage in decision mak-
ing every month. A simple first difference of the subscription levels, unfortunately,
does not correspond to sales, because a significant amount of consumers with expiring
contracts resign with their previous operator. Thus, using installed bases as a proxy
of sales would underestimate the role of network effects, since most consumers, partic-
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ularly those which are locked in, would not be able to respond to changes in network
sizes.
In this paper, we propose using churn rates to impute the fraction of switching
consumers and approximate the number of locked in consumers—i.e., those who do
not make subscription decisions.1 A simple first difference of the observed subscription
levels and the number of locked in consumers, then, should yield a good approximation
for the number of new contracts sold. The second set of important variables we need
are firm specific prices. However, these are hard to find in a prepared form since the
German Statistical Office provides only aggregate price indices. Nevertheless, industry
magazines and various Internet sites provide detailed information on the tariffs offered
by each provider. These can be used to construct operator-specific price indices.
We use these variables, i.e. installed bases, sales and prices along with several other
control variables, in estimating a system of demand equations. A clear drawback of
working with limited data is naturally the constraint it imposes upon the sophistication
of the estimated model. Therefore, we employ rather standard methods and standard
functional forms which have been successfully employed in earlier literature on network
effects. We explicitly state the economic and statistical assumptions necessary for
interpreting results of our simple estimation methodology based on rather limited data
as indicative of the strength of network effects in mobile telephony.
We use a standard aggregate nested logit model a´ la Berry (1994). We assume
that consumers first decide whether to subscribe to fixed telephony services only or to
mobile and fixed services, together. By normalizing with respect to the utility of fixed
telephony services, one can impute the mean utility levels of subscribing to mobile
telephony services via a simple transformation of observed market shares. We then
posit a relatively straightforward linear utility for subscribing to mobile services, and
search for parameters that allow our linear model to best explain the observed mean
utility levels.
1We do not have precise information about the number of people with expiring contracts and with
nil switching costs. We assume that all consumers with zero switching costs change network operators.
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In modeling network effects, we use the lagged total share of subscribers in the
population to proxy for network size. This assumes perfect compatibility between
services of the providers and the lack of price mediated network effects due to different
on-net and off-net prices. We test the appropriateness of this specification in two ways.
In the first extension, we allow own network size to have a different effect than the
size of the other operators’ network. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the network
effects are not firm specific—which supports our formulation. The second extension we
explore tests whether the linear specification we use is appropriate. We re-estimated
the model using a Box-Cox transformation of the network size. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that the network sizes affect utility in a linear fashion.
Our results suggest that network effects played a significant role in the diffusion of
mobile services in Germany. In the absence of network effects, if prices remained as ob-
served, the penetration of mobiles could be lower by at least 50%. Current penetration
levels could be reached without network effects only if prices were drastically lower.
Moreover, assuming that observed prices result from pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
we compute marginal costs and margins.2 The Lerner index for all network operators
increased over time from about 13% in January 1998 to about 30% in June 2003. This
increase is due to the fact that the margins remained almost constant while the prices
decreased.
The next section provides a short overview of empirical literature on network effects
and the telecommunications industry. In section 2 we present a brief history and the
state of the mobile industry in Germany. The model which we use for econometric
analysis is presented in section 3. Data description and estimation results follow in
sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we conclude our analysis in section 6.
2Clearly, the assumption of a static Nash equilibrium is highly likely to be incorrect given the
dynamic evolution of demand. Nevertheless, this exercise provides a crude first order approximation
to markups and their evolution, and hence, is informative.
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3.1 Literature
There is a growing body of literature that tries to measure indirect and direct network
effects in a variety of network industries. For instance, Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000)
study the diffusion of CD technology and find that the number of CD titles available
has an impact on the consumer’s willingness to adopt to the CD player. Park (2003)
analyzes the role of network effects in the standard war between VHS and Betamax
video recording systems. Similarly, Ohashi (2001) estimates a random utility model and
measures the role of network externalities in the diffusion of VCR in the U.S. between
1978 and 1986. Clements and Ohashi (2004) estimate indirect network effects in the
U.S. video game market between 1994 and 2002 using a nested logit model. Goolsbee
and Klenow (2000) estimate a reduced form diffusion model for home computers and
find that people are more likely to adopt computer technology in areas with a higher
fraction of computer users.
There are a number of earlier papers that focus on estimating a hedonic price func-
tion for products that exhibit network effects. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) use the
hedonic pricing model to determine the impact of network effects, defined as compatibil-
ity with the dominant standard, on the prices of microcomputer spreadsheets. Similar
approaches are employed by Hartmann and Teece (1990), Gandal (1994), Economides
and Himmelberg (1995), Moch (1995) and Gro¨hn (1999). For an excellent review of
the theoretical and empirical literature on network effects and switching costs, we refer
the reader to Farrell and Klemperer (2004).
The empirical studies that account for network effects in the telecommunications
industry are relatively scarce. Most studies focus on the diffusion of telecommunica-
tions services and use reduced form regressions and diffusion models. The presence
of network effects has usually not been taken into account. For instance, Gruber and
Verboven (2001) estimate a logistic diffusion model for the EU countries and find that
regulation and technological progress are important for the growth of mobile industry.
Wallsten (2002) uses data on the telecommunications industry worldwide to analyze
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whether the sequence of reforms, such as establishing a regulatory authority and pri-
vatization of the incumbent, matters. Koski and Kretschmer (2005) analyze the effects
of regulation and competition on the development of mobile telephony.
There are only a few recent studies which explicitly acknowledge network effects in
the telecommunications industry. Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) estimate network effects
in fixed-line telephony in terms of usage. Kim and Kwon (2003) use a consumer survey
to analyze Korean mobile telephony and conclude that consumers prefer carriers that
have larger consumer bases. Birke and Swann (2004) use household survey data to
identify price-mediated network effects in mobile telephony in the UK.
The paper most similar to ours is Grajek (2003) which estimates the magnitude of
network effects in the Polish mobile telephone industry during the period 1996-2001.
He essentially adopts the model of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and assumes that mobile
services are homogenous and firms set equal hedonic prices. He adopts a quadratic
network benefit function and allows the own and competitors’ subscriber base to have
a different effects on utility. He develops an estimating equation which explains the
total subscriber base in each period. Estimating a system of such equations, he finds
significant network effects which are mainly due to own installed base, despite full
technological compatibility between the networks of different firms. Our model differs
from Grajek (2003) in a number of aspects. We model services of different providers
as differentiated products. More importantly, we posit a model of sales each period.
3.2 Mobile Telephony in Germany
3.2.1 Development of the Industry
The GSM and UMTS mobile telecommunications systems were preceded by a few
technologically different analog networks – the first generation of mobile systems. The
first commercial mobile telecommunications network in Western Germany was provided
during the period 1958–1977 by the state-owned monopolist Deutsche Bundespost.
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The so-called ’A-network’ serviced about 70% of the country and amounted to only
11.000 users due to frequency limitations. In years 1972-1995, Deutsche Bundespost
was providing mobile communications services though the ’B-network’. For the first
time, roaming services in a few neighboring countries were offered. The total amount
of users serviced on this network was approximately 27.000, which was again due to
frequency limitations. The prices of mobile phones were very high and affordable only
for well situated groups of the society.
The following ’C-network’ was fully automated and used a SIM card to access the
network. Again, it was provided by the state-owned monopolist Deutsche Bundespost-
Telekom. This network was in use in years 1986-2000 and serviced a maximum of about
812.000 users. It was switched off after the introduction and successful development of
second-generation digital networks.
The analog networks were followed by second-generation (2G) digital ’D-networks’
(GSM 900) which started providing services in 1992. There were only two licenses
granted – the first to the state-owned Deutsche Telekom Mobilnet which was later
privatized and transformed into T-Mobile. The second license went to the first pri-
vate mobile network operator Mannesmann Mobilfunk, which was later taken over by
Vodafone. In 1993, a third license was granted to E-plus. Operation of this network
at 1800 MHz frequency began one year later. Another license was granted in 1997 to
Viag Interkom (later called O2) which started providing services in November 1998.
In 1999, the ’D-networks’ were granted transmission rights at 1800 MHz frequency as
well.
In 2000 the German government auctioned licenses for third-generation mobile net-
works (UMTS) that allow for the transfer of data at much higher rates in order to
satisfy the demands of multimedia applications. A total of DM 99 billion was paid
by six companies for the rights to develop 3G networks: Group 3G (Quam), T-Mobil,
Mannesmann-Vodafone, Auditorium, Mobilcom Multimedia and O2. These companies
were established by consortiums of large multinational telecommunications companies
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and actual GSM network operators. The network development and the introduction of
the 3G communications standard on the German market was expected to take place in
years 2002-2005. One of the license winners, Quam, entered the market in November
2001 by signing roaming agreements with other network operators. It acquired about
200 thousand consumers but subsequently went bankrupt one year later.3
3.2.2 Market Structure
The network operators may sell services to consumers directly or indirectly through
independent service providers (ISPs). In general, an ISP resells airtime on a third
party’s mobile network by providing billing and customer care services under the own
brand name. In Germany, network operators can commercially decide whether to sign
an ISP agreement. According to the German Telecommunications Act the agreements
between the network operators and ISPs have to be non-discriminatory and assure fair
competition between retailers. Typically, tariffs offered by the ISPs reflect tariffs of
the network carriers.
In 2003 there were four network operators—T-Mobile, D2 Vodafone, E-Plus and
O2—and about twelve ISPs in Germany. Of these four, only O2 has not reached an
agreement with ISPs. Out of these firms, only eight had significant market shares –
network operators: T-Mobil (29.9%), D2 Vodafone (27.7%), E-Plus (9.3%), O2 (6.3%)
and ISPs: Debitel (12.7%), Mobilcom (6.5%), Talkline (3.2%), Drillisch (2.4%). The
remaining ISPs accounted for only about 2.0% of subscribers.4 The market share of
ISPs has been decreasing over time. Because of data limitations and the aforementioned
market structure we assume that consumers can only choose among network operators.
Subscribers to ISPs are included into consumer bases of respective network operators.
Since the introduction of 2G networks, the mobile industry experienced dramatic
growth rates. At the end of 2003, the number of mobile subscribers reached 64.8 million
3Source: ”Connect” magazine, http://www.t-d1.de and http://www.xonio.de
4Source: www.RegTP.de
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which implies a penetration rate of 78.3%. The distribution of market shares among
four network operators remained stable in the last few years with T-Mobile maintaining
about 40.6%, D2 Vodafone – 38.1%, E-Plus – 12.7% and O2 – 8.6% as of 3rd quarter
2003. Clearly, as the high market shares of T-Mobile and Vodafone suggest, early entry
played a critical role for the size and growth of the consumer base. Late entrants E-plus
and O2 applied innovative pricing policies but did not manage to enlarge their market
shares substantially. For instance, since July 1999, O2 has been offering the Genion
tariff. Under this tariff users pay fixed line rates for calls within at least one hundred
meters around their declared home location and a lowered city tariff within the city
area. Since December 1998, E-Plus has been providing a range of Time & More tariffs
with free minutes and prices independent of call destination.
3.3 Empirical Model
We model demand for mobile subscriptions by a discrete-choice model, as discussed in
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) and Berry (1994). We follow the estimation
strategy proposed by Berry (1994) and invert market-share equations to find the im-
plied mean levels of utility for each alternative. We then posit a functional form for
this utility in terms of observed and unobserved variables. The unobserved variable
serves as our econometric error term and is interpreted as the mean value of consumers’
valuations for unobserved product characteristics, such as product quality, for instance.
We assume that all consumers have access to a fixed line. In the first stage they
decide whether to continue using a fixed telephone alone or to buy a mobile as well. In
the second stage the consumers choose a network operator. This is a standard nested
logit structure, where one branch is degenerated and no further choices are made. The
utility of an outside option for consumer i at time t is denoted by Ui0t and may vary
in time due its dependence on prices of fixed line services, for instance. The utility
derived by consumer i from using a fixed-line together with mobile services of network
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operator j can be written as
Uijt = Ui0t + rj − αpjt + V (z
e
t ) + ζgt + ξjt + (1− σ)ijt (3.1)
where rj is the stand alone value, pjt represents service price and V (z
e
t ) is the expected
network benefit, which we discuss in detail in the next subsection. The variable ζgt is a
common value of all products in group g = {0, 1} and has a distribution dependent on
σ. The nest g = 0 stands for fixed line alone and g = 1 represents the choice of mobile
telephony together with a fixed line. By normalizing with respect to the utility of
the outside option, the choice of alternatives becomes independent of the determinants
of the fixed line utility. The consumer’s tastes for products within the nest may be
correlated. When the choice of alternatives in the nest is independent, which implies
that σ = 0, nested logit is reduced to a simple logit. Finally, ξjt accounts for the
population average of the unobserved utility of operator j and ijt is the idiosyncratic
taste variable, which has a double exponential distribution.5
Following Berry (1994), we invert observed market shares to compute mean utility
levels for each product and treat them as observed. Using the observed utility level
and our specification in (3.1), we arrive at the following estimation equation
log(sjt)− log(1− st) = rj − αpjt + V (z
e
t ) + σlog(sjt|g=1) + ξjt (3.2)
where sjt represents the share of operator j in the total number of consumers that
make decisions about the subscription and st =
∑
j sjt. The share of operator j in the
total sales of mobile services is denoted by sjt|g. The unobserved utility, ξjt, serves as
the econometric error term.
5The only firm characteristics in the model are prices, stand alone values and unobserved qualities.
The other potential choice determinants, such as the coverage and reception quality, were constant
throughout the time of this study. An exception is O2, which had smaller network coverage right after
the entry in November 1998 but is excluded from this analysis for the reasons discussed in the next
section. According to tests carried on by telecommunications magazine ”Connect” from 30.11.2000,
the networks are hardly distinguishable in the coverage and reception quality.
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The specification of utility function (3.1) is representative of consumers with suffi-
ciently low (zero) switching costs and of new consumers. Otherwise, the utility function
may depend on the previous choice due to switching costs, for instance. Because we
miss precise data on the number of switching consumers and their choices of net-
work operators, we have to make simplifying assumptions. We assume that there
are three types of consumers. Consumers with sufficiently low switching costs and
new consumers choose network operators, while consumers with high switching costs
are locked-in and continue using the same mobile services. Hence, they are assumed
to be out of the market and are excluded from the computed market sizes. We use
data on accumulated subscriptions and churn rates to approximate the locked-in con-
sumers.6 One can compute the sales of an operator in a given period by the first
difference of the observed number of subscribers and the number of locked in con-
sumers. That is, sales of operator j in period t can be approximated by the difference
yjt = Zjt − (1− λjt)Zjt−1 where Zjt stands for the number of subscribers and λjt rep-
resents the churn rate.7 The total number of consumers who can make subscription
decisions is given by mt = Mt −
∑N
j=1(1 − λjt)Zjt−1, and represents our market size.
Here, Mt is the total market size in period t, including the locked-in consumers. Only
the consumers over an age 16, that is 84% of total population, are considered.8 Thus,
the share of subscribers of network operator j in the total number of consumers that
can make subscription decisions is given by sjt = yjt/mt. The share of the outside
good is computed as s0t = 1− st = 1−
∑N
i=1 sjt.
3.3.1 Network Effects in Mobile Telephony
So far we have not specified how consumers form expectations about network size and
how the network benefit function is formulated. Most of the empirical and theoretical
6We are very grateful to Jan Kranke for providing us with data on approximate quarterly churn
rates for network operators in Germany. We calculate monthly data by linear approximation.
7This approximation implicitly assumes that all consumers of a given firm with zero switching costs
buy other alternatives, and hence can be fully accounted for by the churn rate.
8The estimation results are robust with respect to the market definition.
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literature on network effects assumes linear network benefits. Swann (2002) examines
the assumptions on communications needs which are necessary for the utility function
to be either linear or s-shaped in the network size. He argues that an s-shaped utility
function in the network size is more realistic for an average consumer and that the
shape may differ for pioneers, medium adopters and late adopters. In the time period
considered in this study, the mobile telephony market in Germany was in its fastest
growth phase. Thus, the network benefits should be well approximated by a simple
linear function V (zet ) = βz
e
t . We provide a test which supports the linear specification
compared to a more general model where network benefit function is assumed to have
a Box-Cox form.
We employ a very simple rule for the formation of expectations. We assume that
consumers think that the network penetration in the last period will be realized in the
current period. When the market reaches a steady state, such formation of expectations
will be fulfilled. Networks are fully compatible and their users may freely communicate
with each other. Thus the expected penetration is represented by the sum of lagged
installed bases divided by the size of population, zet =
∑
j Zjt−1/Mt−1 ≡ zt−1. A new
subscriber to any of the networks brings the same marginal utility.
Clearly consumers derive network benefits from a fixed line network as well. In the
last decade, however, changes in the number of subscribers to fixed line telephony were
negligible. Given our assumption regarding the linear network benefit function and
the linear form of utility function in (3.1), any network benefits from the fixed line are
cancelled when we normalize with respect to the outside option. Furthermore, there
may also be asymmetric own and cross-network effects due to the differences in on-net
and off-net prices. We test for this possibility, and find that our data does not support
network effects with different magnitudes.
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3.4 The Data
The data on mobile subscriptions is collected from the Internet site of the German
regulator – RegTP. The subscription data is available from June 1992, but we restrict
this analysis to the period for which we could collect prices. As a result we have 66
monthly observations from January 1998 to June 2003. Because of the late entry of the
fourth network operator O2 in November 1998 and its small market share at the end of
the analyzed period (8,6%), it may be difficult to estimate demand for this operator.
In this study we only estimate demands for three main network operators, which in
total cover about 91% of the market: T-Mobile, D2 and E-Plus.
For the purpose of this study we need firm-specific prices. We collected tariff in-
formation from the price listings published in telecommunications magazines and on
the Internet in the time period January 1998 – June 2003. We applied the methodol-
ogy used by the statistical office to compute firm-specific indices.9,10 First we assume
infrequent usage behavior and calculate expected monthly bills for all tariffs provided
by network operators. In addition to what the statistical office does, we assume some
randomness in calling behavior. Hence we randomize the number and length of phone
calls as well as the distribution of calls among destination networks and time-zones.
The distribution among destination networks is proportional to the market shares.
Moreover we account for price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls, which
is omitted in the computation of official indices. We simulate 200 bills for each tariff
and compute the mean values to compare tariffs. Out of the set of tariffs offered by
each network operator, we pick the tariff which delivers the lowest bill. The cheapest
9The German statistical office computes four monthly price indices for mobile services. First, three
consumer profiles are defined based on the consumption intensities: infrequent, average and frequent
users. Typically, network operators provide a set of tariffs for each profile. For all tariffs within
each profile, an expected monthly bill is calculated. Consumers are assumed to be perfectly informed
about the range of tariffs available each month on the market and choose the cheapest one. In this
way, three profile indices are created which are further used to calculate aggregate weighted price
index for mobile services. Tariffs consist of many price factors, such as on-net, off-net, fixed-line, time
zones, billing intervals and so on: But the statistical office uses only the most important ones in the
calculation. See Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, 1999.
10Source: magazine ”Connect”, http://www.teltarif.de
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tariff for the infrequent user is the one, which determines the subscription decision of
the marginal consumer.
The price indices computed in this way are correlated with the official price indices
provided by the statistical office. Figure (3.1) presents changes in the minimum tariffs
for an infrequent user during the time period of this study. Apart from prices, firms
also compete in handset subsidies and often provide handsets for free. For instance,
in June 2003, T-Mobile offered six different handsets for the price of 1 Euro, D2 – ten
handsets, E-Plus – eight handsets and O2 – seven handsets.11 Network operators try
to recoup the initial investment in consumers through a stream of future payments.
3.4.1 Instrumental Variables
To account for the endogeneity of prices and the within group shares we use instru-
mental variables. We have to find instruments which are correlated with prices and
within group shares, but uncorrelated with the unobservable demand shocks. The error
terms may be autocorrelated due to the character of data. Thus the usage of lagged
endogenous variables, such as lagged consumer base, could be problematic.
Apart from the lagged installed base, we use only one exogenous variable in the
model – a dummy for Christmas sales. This may be a good instrument for prices.
Firms tend to offer special Christmas deals resulting in peak mobile sales in November
and December. At the start of the year, due to the preparation for the main telecom-
munications fair – CeBIT, firms tend to make announcements of new tariffs. This fair
is held in Hannover in early March. Thus the first quarter dummy may be used as an
instrument for prices.
Other candidates for instruments could be proxies for cost factors. For instance,
Evans and Heckman (1983) estimate the total cost function in fixed line telephony
using input prices as cost determinants. Input prices include the price of materials,
the price of capital and the wage rate. The only instrument we use here is the cost of
11Source: ”Connect” magazine, June 2003
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the telecommunications equipment, as provided by the German statistical office. The
correlation coefficient of prices for mobile services with the index of hourly wages in
the telecommunications industry is almost zero.
The time trend, which accounts for the technological innovation in mobile telephony,
may be a component of the cost function as well. It could be interpreted as a constant
upgrade in the quality of services and handsets. Furthermore the entry of Viag, which
took place in November 1998, could have decreased market prices. We use the number
of tariffs offered by network operators as an instrument for the within group shares.
Potentially, the variation in the number of tariffs should affect the within group shares.
Unfortunately we miss any other firm-specific variables. We use the following set of
instruments Wt = [1, christmast, quart1t, capitalt, timet, viagt, tariffsjt]. Our identi-
fying assumption is the mean independence of the demand shocks in (3.2) with the set
of instruments, i.e. E(ξjt | Wt) = 0.
3.5 Estimation Results
The demand for mobile subscriptions is dependent on service prices, the lagged total
installed base and a dummy for Christmas sales. The coefficients for price and network
benefits are assumed to be the same for all three networks. However, the Wald test
rejects the equality of demand intercepts (see Table 3.1).
First, demands are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage
least squares (2SLS) with the set of instruments discussed in the previous section. The
estimation results are presented in Table (3.1). According to the Hausman specification
test, the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of prices may be rejected at a significance
level of 10%. The Breusch-Godfrey test indicates autocorrelation of the error terms in
all three demand equations. We account for the problem of endogeneity and autocor-
relation by estimating the parameters using general method of moments (GMM) with
the Newey-West estimator for the covariance matrix of the moment conditions.
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We also estimated two different versions of the model to check the robustness of our
results. The first extension considers differential magnitudes of own and cross network
effects. Estimating demand functions that include both own and cross installed bases
as explanatory variables turns out to be impossible due to the high correlation of
subscriptions. Hence we fix the estimate of the own network effects to the value from
our preferred specification (column III in Table 3.1) and test whether the cross network
effects are significantly different. In this case the estimate of cross network effects is
given by β0 = 1.72 (column IV in Table 3.1). The Wald test statistic of 4.44 implies
that we cannot reject the equality of own and cross-network effects at a significance
level of 1%.12 Therefore, network effects resulting from the total installed base seem
to be a justified assumption.
Our second extension considers a possible nonlinearity of the network benefit func-
tion. Similar to Clements and Ohashi (2004), we use a Box-Cox transformation of
the lagged penetration of mobiles and specify the modified network benefit function
as V (zet ) = β
(1+zt−1)λ−1
λ
. This transformation allows for our linear specification when
λ = 1 and logarithmic when λ = 0. Once again, due to a collinearity problem, we are
not able to estimate β and λ simultaneously. Again we fix the coefficient of network
effects β and estimate λ. The hypothesis that λ = 1 cannot be rejected, which sup-
ports the use of a linear network benefit function (Wald test statistics of 0.42). Also
Clements and Ohashi (2004) cannot reject the hypothesis of a linear specification for
indirect network effects.
The estimates of all parameters are significant, as presented in Table (3.1). In par-
ticular, σ is estimated to be 0.80, which implies a relatively high correlation of choices
within the nest. We calculate the elasticities of demand to interpret the estimates
of coefficients for price and network effects. The own and cross price elasticities of
12Note that when we computed firm specific price indices, we took the difference in on-net and
off-net prices into account. Thus, any price mediated network externality is already captured in the
price indices.
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demand in the nested logit model are specified as
Esjtpkt =


− α
1−σ
pjt
[
1− σsjt|g=1 − (1− σ)sjt
]
if k = j;
α
1−σ
pkt
[
σskt|g=1 + (1− σ)skt
]
if k 6= j.
where sjt is the share of network operator j in sales at time t and sjt|g=1 is the within
group share. Table (3.2) presents the average elasticities for GMM estimates for period
January 1998 – June 2003. We also calculate the elasticity of demand for mobile services
in total, which is given by
Estpjt = −αsjt(1− st)
pjt
st
The values in Table (3.2) are interpreted as follows: on average in the period January
1998 – June 2003, a 1% price increase by T-Mobile resulted in 0.52% decrease in total
sales. Similarly, a 1% price increase by D2 and E-Plus led to a decrease in total sales by
0.52% and 0.19%, respectively. The elasticity of demand for mobile services in respect
to the past installed base is specified as
Estzt−1 = βzt−1(1− st).
If the previous period total installed base increased by 1%, current period sales would
surge on average by 0.69%. This indicates strong network effects. If there were no
network effects, the industry growth would be stimulated only by price changes. As
presented in Figure (3.1), the penetration level in the absence of network effects could
be at least 50% lower, compared to the current case. This is due to the fact that prices
remained almost constant in the second part of the period analyzed. Network effects
also have an impact on the equilibrium prices, which is ignored in projections. In the
absence of network effects, the current penetration level could be reached only if prices
were significantly lower. Figure (3.1) suggests that prices would have to fall to zero
or even lower. These projections indicate the importance of network effects for the
growth of the industry. There was also a significant Christmas effect which resulted in
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an increase in demand for mobile subscriptions during the months of November and
December.
Furthermore, assuming that observed prices are the result of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, we can make use of the first-order equations to retrieve information about
marginal costs. This assumption ignores the effects of current prices on future profits,
which potentially leads to overestimated markups. The estimates of markups may be
interpreted as an upperbound. Following Berry (1994), using first-order conditions for
the nested logit model, the marginal cost may be written as
cjt = pjt −
[
(1− σ)
α
/
[1− σsjt|g=1 − (1− σ)sjt]
]
(3.3)
Using the estimates of α and σ from the demand side we may calculate the changes in
marginal cost and markup for each network operator over the time period analyzed.
Figure (3.1) shows changes in the Lerner index calculated as (pjt−cjt)/pjt. The Lerner
index for all network operators increased over time from about 13% in January 1998
to about 30% in June 2003. This increase is due to the fact that the margins remained
almost constant while the prices decreased. The Lerner index at the end of the period
differed across network operators with E-plus having the lowest value of about 28%,
T-Mobile roughly 31% and D2 approximately 36%.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the role of network effects in the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry in Germany. We find that network effects have a significant impact on
consumers’ decisions regarding subscriptions to mobile telephony. We are able to dis-
entangle the impact of price and network effects on subscription demand and estimate
reasonable price elasticities. On average in the period January 1998 – June 2003, a 1%
price increase by T-Mobile resulted in 0.52% decrease in total sales. Similarly, a 1%
price increase by D2 and E-Plus led to a decrease in total sales by 0.52% and 0.19%,
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respectively. If the previous period total installed base increased by 1%, current period
sales would surge on average by 0.69%. If there were no network effects, the penetra-
tion of mobiles at the end of the period analyzed could be at least 50% lower. Current
penetration levels could be reached only if prices were drastically lower. Furthermore,
by estimating the price coefficient and assuming Nash equilibrium in prices we could
provide measurements of marginal costs.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.1: Nested logit – T-D1, D2 Vodafone, E-plus
OLS 2SLS GMM GMM own GMM bc
Name Est. (t) Est. (t) Est. (t) Est. (t) Est. (t)
rd1 -2.62 (-8.77) -2.83 (-8.40) -2.92 (-21.68) -3.03 (-37.77) -2.84 (-27.13)
rd2 -2.69 (-9.24) -2.89 (-8.81) -2.98 (-22.46) -3.08 (-40.14) -2.90 (-28.14)
re1 -2.96 (-8.68) -3.21 (-7.43) -3.28 (-30.34) -3.32 (-40.71) -3.24 (-38.30)
β 1.34 ( 6.09) 1.40 ( 5.17) 1.47 ( 10.23) 1.47 1.47
β0 1.72 ( 14.49)
α -2.46 (-8.40) -2.27 (-6.44) -2.16 (-15.14) -1.98 (-21.55) -2.28 (-17.44)
Christ. 0.31 ( 4.78) 0.31 ( 4.85) 0.33 ( 4.84) 0.36 ( 4.89) 0.33 ( 4.88)
σ 0.85 ( 6.57) 0.79 ( 3.49) 0.80 ( 23.34) 0.89 (29.49) 0.76 ( 20.78)
λ 0.82 ( 3.03)
mse td1 0.1073 0.1090 0.1098 0.1105 0.1081
mse d2 0.1193 0.1196 0.1199 0.1200 0.1190
mse e1 0.1002 0.1000 0.1000 0.1004 0.0995
N*obj. 20.80 6.1479 12.2979 11.9607 12.3651
Hausman 12.55
Pr > χ2 0.0840
Wald 171.29 4.44 0.42
Pr > χ2 0.001 0.035 0.51
Table 3.2: Demand elasticities – prices and past consumer base
T-Mobile D2 E-Plus Mobiles st
T-Mobile -4.48 2.22 2.22 -0.52
D2 2.19 -4.20 2.19 -0.52
E-Plus 0.79 0.79 -5.04 -0.19
Network effect 0.69
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Figure 3.1:
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Chapter 4
Estimating Switching Costs in
Mobile Telephony in the UK
4.1 Introduction
When consumers terminate their current relationship with a seller, they have to bear
one-time switching costs. An important implication of switching costs is that homo-
geneous products ex-ante become heterogeneous after the purchase.1 Switching costs
provide firms with market power because consumers will switch only if competitors
charge lower prices. The existence of switching costs is a focal point in many antitrust
cases and in regulation policy. Thus, identifying and measuring switching costs may
support the policy makers by indicating whether there is a potential for abuse of market
power and inefficiencies in consumers’ choices.
Mobile telephony is an example of an industry in which consumers are believed to
have high switching costs, for instance, due to compatibility costs, transaction costs or
search costs. The first one arise when operators lock handsets to be used exclusively
within their own networks. In this way, consumers are prevented from switching to
another network after getting a subsidized handset. Transaction costs arise when con-
1Klemperer (1995) provides a general explanation of the sources of switching costs.
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sumers change the telephone number after switching network operator. Some effort is
required to distribute a new telephone number among friends. Alternatively, the num-
ber may be ported which in reality can also be costly for consumers. Finally, search
costs arise because consumers have to gather information about other networks.2
The regulators of the telecommunications industry assume that switching costs
are present and introduce regulation which aims to decrease them. The prime way
of decreasing transaction costs is by implementing portability of numbers. Number
portability in the UK was introduced in January 1999. Compatibility costs may be
reduced by prohibiting handset-locking. Lack of intervention by the British regulator
Oftel (later renamed to Ofcom) in this matter is due to the belief that prohibition
of handset-locking would have zero effect on the competition and consumers’ switch-
ing behavior.3 Finally, search costs could be decreased by providing consumers with
comprehensive information about all services that are available on the market. The
British regulator provides consumers with recommendations about the choice of mobile
services. There are also plenty of commercial online services which provide support in
making the choice of network operator, tariff and handset.
Restraining from taking the presence of switching costs in mobile telephony as
given, this paper provides an empirical test whether consumers have disutility from
switching network operators. For that purpose it uses uses survey data on British
households (Home OnLine) between the years 1999-2001. According to mixed logit
estimates for panel data there are significant negative switching costs which vary across
network operators. The choices of network operators are also explained by observable
and unobservable heterogeneity of tastes. The observable heterogeneity is represented
by consumer characteristics, such as: gender, age and employment status. When
multinominal logit is estimated switching costs are overestimated due to ignorance
of unobservable tastes. Thus, this study indicates the importance of unobservable
heterogeneity of tastes in the estimation of switching costs. Both switching costs and
2For detailed discussion see NERA, 2003. ”Switching costs”.
3Oftel, Review of SIM-Locking policy, 26 November 2002.
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persistent tastes of consumers lead to state-dependent choices of network operators.
Furthermore, the estimation of logistic regression indicates that the probability of
switching depends on consumer characteristics, such as age, usage intensity and ways
of spending leisure time. These results are consistent with the findings in the consumer
surveys conducted by the British regulator Oftel.
The next section provides an overview of empirical literature on switching costs.
Section 3 briefly presents the mobile telecommunications industry in the UK. Section 4
presents the empirical model, describes the estimation methodology and data. Section
5 discusses estimation results. Finally, section 6 concludes the analyzes.
4.2 Literature
There is an exhaustive body of theoretical literature on switching costs. The number
of empirical studies is scarcer which is mainly due to lack of appropriate data on
the purchase history of individuals. Following the methodology used in the report
prepared by NERA for the British Office of Fair Trading, the empirical methods for
estimating switching costs may be divided into indirect and direct.4 Indirect methods
use aggregate data to identify switching costs, usually by estimating reduced-form
pricing equations. For instance, Borenstein (1991) measures the magnitude of switching
costs in the U.S. retail gasoline market. Knittel (1997) analyzes the changes in prices for
long distance telephone calls in the U.S. after AT&T divestiture in 1984, and explains
price rigidity by the presence of search and switching costs. Viard (2002) studies the
impact of the introduction of number portability on prices for toll-free numbers in the
U.S. He finds that when firms cannot discriminate between old locked-in consumers
and new ones, switching costs may have an ambiguous effect on prices. Several other
empirical studies provide evidence for the presence of switching costs in a range of
industries, such as banking loans, credit cards, electricity, airlines, computer software,
4NERA, 2003. ”Switching costs”.
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television and others (for a review and a list of references see Farrell and Klemperer
(2004)).
Direct methods use information on individual consumer choices and employ random
utility framework. There are very few studies of this type. For instance, Chen and
Hitt (2002) use household data to estimate the magnitude of switching costs and brand
loyalty in the online brokerage industry. They find that consumers’ switching costs vary
across firms which may control their magnitude through adequate product design and
retention strategies. Epling (2002) studies competition in the long distance telephony
market in the U.S. after 1996. She finds empirical evidence for the heterogeneity in the
subscriber switching costs and concludes that consumers with high switching costs end
up paying higher prices. Shum (2004) estimates switching costs using panel data on
households’ breakfast cereal purchases. Apart from the economic literature, there is a
growing number of related marketing studies on brand loyalty and state dependence
in consumer choices.
One important issue which arises when the state dependence of choices is esti-
mated directly, is that consumers could have unobservable persistent heterogeneous
preferences. Heckman (1981) draws a difference between true state dependency and
spurious state dependency. True state dependence is a consequence of all observable
factors which can be switching costs and brand loyalty. Spurious state-dependence
results from persistent heterogeneity in the preferences for brands. Consumers may
continue buying the same product because it fits better with their idiosyncratic tastes.
Hence, the parameters representing switching costs may be overestimated when spuri-
ous state dependence is ignored. There is a large body of empirical studies which try
to separate true and spurious state dependence. Among studies specifically on switch-
ing costs, Chen and Forman (2003) suggest two strategies to separate switching costs
from spurious state dependence. They employ an instrumental variable approach and
mixed logit estimation, and their findings show high switching costs in the market for
routers and switches. Goldfarb (2003) measures loyalty for Internet portals control-
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ling for household-specific heterogeneity by estimating a separate regression for each
household. Shum (2004) accommodates unobserved heterogeneity via random effects.
This study estimates switching costs directly using data on individuals’ choices of
network operators in mobile telephony. Mixed logit is estimated in order to account for
the unobservable consumer heterogeneity. The estimation results indicate that both
switching costs and persistent tastes lead to state-dependent choices of network oper-
ators. Thus, when unobservable tastes are ignored, switching costs are overestimated.
4.3 Mobile Telephony in the UK
Currently, the mobile telecommunications industry in the UK is represented by five net-
work operators: Vodafone, BT Cellnet (later renamed to O2), One2One (later renamed
to T-Mobile), Orange and Hutchinson 3G. The first four operators provide services in
the GSM technology, while Hutchinson 3G is one of the UMTS licence winners and
started to provide 3G services in 2003. Vodafone and BT Cellnet launched their net-
works in 1985 (analog at first). Orange and One2One entered the market in 1994. Until
their entry, Vodafone and BT Cellnet were prohibited from supplying services directly
to consumers. They had to establish subsidiaries dealing with retail sales and were
obliged to provide wholesale airtime to independent service providers (ISPs). ISPs do
not possess network infrastructure but provide billing and customer care services under
own brand names. Later on, Vodafone and BT Cellnet were designated by Oftel as
having significant market power in the retail market. Again they were required to pro-
vide wholesale airtime to ISPs. Orange and One2One were not obliged to do this. ISPs
are not considered in this analysis. Thus, the number of choices is restricted to four
network operators because the survey was conducted before the entry of Hutchinson
3G.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Estimation Methodology
In the present study, the choices of network operators are modelled by employing the
random utility framework developed by McFadden (1974). In this approach individ-
ual utility functions are estimated by assuming utility-maximizing heterogenous con-
sumers. The utility function includes observable choice determinants and a stochastic
component which represents unobservable idiosyncratic preferences. Consumer’s val-
uation of the product typically depends on its price and other attributes as well as
on consumer demographics. When switching costs are present, the previous choice
influences current utilities. Switching costs cause a bias in the consumer preferences
towards the alternative which was chosen before. However, the choice may also be
state-dependent due to persistent consumer tastes which are unobserved by the econo-
metrician.
All surveyed consumers have access to a fixed line and noone gives up fixed line
connection throughout the survey period. Thus, they decide whether to continue using
a fixed telephone alone or to buy a mobile as well. The utility of an outside option for
consumer i at time t is denoted by Ui0t and can vary in time due to its dependence on
prices of fixed line services. The utility derived by consumer i from using a fixed-line
together with mobile services of network operator j out of J operators available on the
market may be written as:
Uijt = Ui0t + rj + αpijt + βxjt + γjzit +
J∑
k=1
wksijkt + ξij + ijt = Vijt(ξij) + ijt (4.1)
By normalizing with respect to the utility of the outside option, the choice of alterna-
tives becomes independent of the determinants of the fixed line utility. In general, the
utility of mobile telephony can be determined by individual specific service price pijt,
network attributes xjt, a firm-specific dummy rj and consumer demographics zit. A
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set of dummies sijkt accounts for switching from alternative k to alternative j. These
variables are constructed as follows: a dummy sijkt takes value zero if consumer i has
chosen the same network operator j = k in the previous period t−1 and one otherwise.
For consumers which did not make any choice in the previous period, the value of sijkt
is equal zero.
sijkt =


0 if j=k or consumers are new that is k=0
1 otherwise.
The persistent consumer heterogeneity is represented by ξij. Finally, ijt is the idio-
syncratic unobservable taste variable which captures the effects of other unmeasured
variables. The parameters in front of consumer demographics γj account for observ-
able consumer heterogeneity. The coefficients for switching dummies wk represent the
disutility which the consumer bears when changing network operator. In formulation
(4.1), the disutility from switching operator depends on the network from which con-
sumers switch. Each network operator employs a different policy towards switching
consumers. For instance, there may be differences regarding the cost of unlocking the
handset or porting the number. Moreover, artificial switching costs can also vary across
networks, such as an ongoing loyalty program or psychological costs when consumers
are uncertain about the quality of other networks. Alternatively, switching costs could
be assumed to be the same across networks. The disutility from switching can also
be heterogenous across consumers, that is, random coefficients for switching dummies
could be estimated.
Consumers maximize utility and choose network operator m with the greatest value
among all alternatives, Uimt ≥ maxj∈Ci,j 6=mUijt, where Ci is the choice set of individual
i. When there is no persistent consumer heterogeneity (ξij = 0) and the stochastic
utility component ijt is distrtibuted independently and identically extreme value, the
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choice probabilities simplify to closed-form multinominal logit expressions
Pimt = P [Vimt + imt ≥ maxj∈Cit,j 6=mVijt + ijt] =
exp(Vimt)∑
j∈J exp(Vijt)
(4.2)
The iid assumption about ijt implies proportional substitution across alternatives and
is inappropriate in many situations. In this case, the outside option – fixed line tele-
phony – is assumed to be an equal substitute to mobile services. The iid assumption
enters also for choice sequences made by the consumer over time. Thus, the choice
probabilities for panel data are derived exactly in the same way as for the cross sec-
tion. In many cases choices are correlated over time and when the spurious state
dependence is ignored, the coefficients for switching costs wk could be overestimated.
Mixed logit gets over this constraint by decomposing the unobserved factor into
two parts. The first one contains all the correlation and heteroskedasticity, and the
second one is iid extreme value distributed. The first unobserved component may
follow any distribution: lognormal, uniform, triangular, gamma or any other. When
explanatory variables and density are appropriately specified, any utility-maximizing
behavior could be represented by a mixed logit model, in particular nested logit (see
Train (2003) for further discussion).5 In the present case, ξij are assumed to have joint
normal density. The choice probabilities have no closed-form expressions and are given
by:
Pimt =
∫
ξ
[
exp(Vimt(ξim))∑
j∈J exp(Vijt(ξij))
]
f(ξ)dξ. (4.3)
5In the case of mobile telephony, nested logit represents a plausible pattern of consumer choice. In
the first stage consumers choose between having fixed line only and fixed line together with mobile.
In the second stage they select one out of four mobile operators (see Chapter 3). Thus, the mobile
networks are closer substitutes than fixed line. Nevertheless, the mixed logit model estimated in this
study is more general than nested logit.
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The log-likelihood function for mixed logit equals to:
LL(·) =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
t
yijt log(Pimt),
where yijt = 1 if consumer i chooses alternative j in month t and 0 otherwise.
When dynamic choice models are estimated, an important issue to account for is the
initial conditions problem. The choice probabilities in the first observed period depend
on the choices in the earlier periods which are not observed. The probabilities for the
first choice must be somehow determined. The ways of dealing with this problem are
addressed by Heckman (1981a, 1981b) and Wooldridge (2002). As argued in the next
subsection, the initial conditions problem may be ignored in the present case. This is
due to the fact that for most consumers their first choice of mobile operator is included
in the data.
Besides estimation of simple logit model (4.2) and simulated mixed logit (4.3),
consumer’s decision whether to switch network operator could be regressed on firm
dummies and consumer characteristics, as given by following logistic regression:
log
[
Pit(switch)
1− Pit(switch)
]
=
∑
j
βsrj + γ
szit + ωijt (4.4)
4.4.2 The Data
The data used in this paper is based upon the British households survey Home OnLine
which is available for research purposes through the Institute for Social and Economic
Research at the University of Essex. It was conducted on a representative sample of
British households. The aim of the survey was to gather individual and household
level data about the use of information and communications technologies. The data
consists of three annual waves: October-December 1998, January 2000 and February
2001. The first wave comprises 1000 households with response rate of 57%. Households
that dropped out in the next waves were replaced by new ones. The response rate
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accounted for 75.7% and 67.1% respectively in the second and third wave.
Not all respondents provided information about the use of mobile services. For
instance, in the first wave, out of 2608 individuals, 478 declared to have mobile phones
and 1315 not to have them (penetration rate 26.66%). In the second and third waves,
the respective numbers were: 2555, 844, 725 (53.79%) and 2406, 1106, 450 (70.99%).
According to ITU statistics mobile penetration rates in the UK at the end of respective
years accounted for 25.11%, 45.68% and 72.70%. Thus, the penetration in the group of
people which answered the question about mobile subscriptions seems to be accurate.6
In the second wave, 239 individuals were subscribed to mobile services in both first
and second waves, 480 remained unsubscribed in both waves, 292 started using mobile
services in the second wave and 22 resign from the usage of mobiles (see Table 4.1).
In the third wave, 573 declared their network operators both in the second and third
waves. In the group of 558 consumers which declared no subscription to mobile services
in the second wave 320 remain unsubscribed and 238 started using mobiles in the third
wave. Finally, 22 consumers gave up the usage of mobiles in the third wave.
There were 613 consumers which declared not to have mobile phone in the first
wave, and they provided information about their further choices both in the second
and third waves. The amount of consumers which provided information about the
network operator of their choice in all three waves looks as follows: 64 consumers of
BT Cellnet, 29 of Orange, 77 of Vodafone and 17 of One2One. Table (4.2) presents
tracking of consumer choices over all three waves.7. Altogether in this analysis I used
2078 consumers of whom 692 provided information about usage of mobile services in
the one wave only (33.3% of all), 586 in two waves (28.2%) and 800 in all three waves
(38.5%).
For majority of consumers, as shown in Table (4.2), the first ever choice of network
6The penetration rates within the total sample account for 18.3% in year 1998, 33% in year 2000
and 46% in 2001. Thus, many consumers who did not mark any answer had mobile phones.
7The sample used in this study is representative for the whole database which is checked using
basic comparative statistics in Table (4.5)
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operator is contained in the data.8 When the choices are observed from the beginning,
the initial conditions problem does not arise and mixed logit may be used to capture
state-dependence in dynamic models (see Train (2003)).
4.4.3 Choice Determinants
One may refer to surveys conducted by Oftel to determine factors that could influence
the choice of network operator. According to the survey from February 2002, around
59% of consumers indicated the cost of using mobile services as the critical choice
factor. Followed by this are the coverage and reception quality mentioned by 21%.9
The percentage of consumers which take these factors into account is relatively small
which indicates that consumers perceive the coverage and reception quality to be the
same for all network operators. According to official statistics provided by Oftel, the
differences in coverage and reception quality across networks are negligible. Table (4.3)
presents results based on call success rate survey conducted between October 1999 and
March 2000 showing small variation across all regions. Based on this table, the impact
of these factors is equivalent to adding a constant to each utility function, except the
fixed line, that is βxjt = βxt, and as such cannot be identified in the estimation.
Firms set different prices for consumers with different usage intensity. Hence, there
is no single price for all consumers, but rather a set of prices targeted at segments of
consumers. Table (4.4) presents the prices for representative tariffs for two different
usage patterns based on a study conducted by Oftel. For any consumer with certain
81278 consumers had no mobile phone in the first wave and 148 consumers for whom the first wave
information is missing had no mobile phone in the second wave. Among the other 205 individuals
which did not provide any information about the usage of mobiles in the first wave, statistically about
half were not subscribed to any network in the first wave. This is because the mobile penetration was
about 46% in 1999 and 25% in 1998. Still, there is a group of 446 consumers which declared usage
of mobile services already in the first wave. However, the penetration of mobiles a year before was
around 13-14% compared to 25% in 1998. Thus, within this group statistically around 230 consumers
made their first choice in the first wave. Altogether, there may be about 330 consumers out of 2078
for whom their first choice of network operator is not observed. The results of this study should not
be significantly influenced by the assumption that the first declared choice of these 330 consumers is
their first choice of network operator at all. This assumption eventually leads to underestimation of
switching costs.
9Consumers use of mobile telephony, Oftel, Q8 February 2002
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usage pattern, given small differences in monthly costs, the expected cost of using
mobile services provided by any network operator could be assumed to be equivalent. In
particular, adding some uncertainty and randomness in the intensity of usage, monthly
bill values presented in Table (4.4) would not be distinguishable. Since only differences
in utilities matter, price coefficient α cannot be identified.10
Summing up, consumer choice is determined by consumer demographics, switching
costs and some unobserved factors. Firm dummies can differ significantly across net-
works because of differences in brand values and other factors, such as network effects.11
Any potential price differences may also show up in the firm dummies. Consumer char-
acteristics represent observable heterogeneity of tastes and determine a match between
consumer preferences and service offered by particular operators. Following variables
are used in the estimation: gender, age and employment status (see Table 4.5 for simple
statistics).12
Finally, the list of consumer characteristics which influence switching between net-
works is given in Table (4.7). All variables take ordered discrete values, except the em-
ployment status. Dummies for being employed, retired, full-time student or at school
and unemployed are used in the regression. The unemployment dummy includes all
other categories, such as: on maternity leave, looking after family or home, long term
sick or disabled, on a government training scheme, etc.
10It is clearly a very strong assumption that each consumer perceives prices of mobile services set
by different network operators as equal. There is no empirical evidence in support of this assumption.
However, some very weak test can be performed based on available data. The cost of using mobile
services reported by some individuals in the survey may be regressed on consumer demographics and
firm dummies. Firm dummies turn out to be insignificant in such regression which means that on
average the bill value is independent on network operator.
11Even though all networks are fully compatible, there may be asymmetric network effects due to
the differences in on-net and off-net prices which make larger networks more attractive. Birke and
Swann (2004) use the same Home OnLine survey data, together with market-level data on prices and
call traffic, to identify price-mediated network effects.
12Some other consumer characteristics could also explain heterogeneity of tastes, but these are not
available for all three waves. For instance, variables, such as: the number of local and non-local
friends and relatives, and hours spent weekly on housework significantly determine choice of network
operators when multinominal logit is estimated for the third wave only.
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4.5 Estimation Results
4.5.1 MNL and Mixed Logit
The presence of switching costs is tested in four specifications. First, multinominal logit
is estimated assuming that switching costs are the same across networks (specification
I in Table (4.6)). The utility of the outside option is normalized to zero. Since only
differences in utility matter, all estimates are interpreted as a differential effect of
the utilities of mobile operators, compared to fixed line subscription. All consumer
characteristics are significant and have plausible signs. The probability of starting
usage of mobiles increases for employed individuals and is higher for males. Moreover,
consumers above 30 years old are less willing to start using mobile services than very
young consumers. This probability decreases dramatically for consumers above 60
years. There are some differences in the estimates across networks that should capture
part of consumer heterogeneity. Furthermore, the value of mobile telephony is rising
over time, as represented by dummies for the second and third wave. The estimates of
time dummies are interpreted relative to the value of mobile telephony in the first wave.
Simple logit estimates indicate presence of significant switching costs between mobile
services. As discussed in the subsection on the estimation methodology, simple logit
ignores the presence of persistent heterogeneity which leads to overestimated switching
costs.
In the second specification, switching costs are assumed to differ according to the
network from which consumers switch (specification II in Table 4.6). As already ar-
gued, such differences may be explained by varying contractual and psychological costs.
Indeed, there are significant differences in switching costs according to multinominal
logit estimates. The consumers of Orange have the highest switching costs, the con-
sumers of Vodafone the lowest. The likelihood ratio test can reject the hypothesis
that switching costs do not differ across network operators. The test statistics is equal
to χ2 = −2lnL0
L1
= 28, while the critical value for 3 degrees of freedom is equal to
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χ2(0.01, 3) = 11.34.
Third, mixed logit is estimated, in which consumers are assumed to have switching
costs, along with persistent unobserved brand preferences. Thus, the utility specifica-
tion (4.1) includes non-zero ξij. This specification implies temporal and intertemporal
dependence of choices. There is significant variation in individual preferences for net-
work operators given by the standard deviations for firm dummies (specification III and
IV in Table 4.6). The overall fit improves for mixed logit specification. The likelihood
ratio test can reject the hypothesis that there is not persistent consumer heterogeneity.
The test statistics is equal to χ2 = 26 which is greater than the critical value for 4
degrees of freedom χ2(0.01, 4) = 13.28 (specification II against III in Table 4.6). The
estimates of switching costs decrease which indicates that their magnitude was overes-
timated in simple logit. For comparison, in the final estimation consumers are assumed
to have no switching costs at all (specification IV in Table 4.6). The worse fit suggests
that true state dependence is present, as estimated in specification III in Table 4.6.
4.5.2 Logistic Regression
Next, the determinants of decision whether to switch network operator are estimated.
For this purpose, I use the group of consumers which provided information about the
mobile operator of their choice both in the second and third wave. The estimation of
determinants for switching between first and second wave is not possible due to missing
data, but there should be no significant differences in results. The estimation results
of the logistic regression (4.4) are presented in Table (4.8). Relative to consumers of
BT Cellnet, the subscribers to Vodafone are more likely to switch and the subscribers
to Orange are more likely. This result is in accordance with the estimates of switching
costs. The estimates of consumer characteristics have plausible interpretation. Older
consumers are less willing to switch (Age) which is consistent with findings in the
Oftel’s surveys. Consumers who tend to spend more time on reading books (Leisurg)
and on housework (Housewk) are more willing to switch, but also consumers who
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spend more time watching live sports (Leisurb) are more likely to change operator.
Finally, consumers who declared that they replaced the usage of fixed line services by
the usage of mobile services (Mpuse) are also more likely to switch networks. This is
consistent with Oftel’s finding that heavier users tend to switch more. Table (4.8) lists
some statistical tests of the model, such as the AIC, Schwartz Bayesian Criterion and
Likelihood-Ratio test. These tests do not allow to reject the null hypothesis that none
of the explanatory variables is related to changes in the probability of switching.
4.6 Conclusion
Numerous studies suggest presence of switching costs in mobile telephony. This paper
estimates the magnitude of switching costs in mobile industry using multinominal logit
and mixed logit for panel data on British households in years 1999-2001. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis addressing the issue of switching
costs between network operators in the mobile telecommunications industry.
According to the estimation results, the time-dependence of choices of network op-
erators is due to both switching costs and persistent tastes. Switching costs differ
significantly across network operators. When multinominal logit is estimated, switch-
ing costs are significant, but overestimated due to ignorance of unobservable tastes.
Thus, this study indicates the importance of unobservable heterogeneity of tastes in
the estimation of switching costs. Apart from unobserved heterogeneity, the choices of
network operators are explained by consumer characteristics, such as gender, age and
the employment status The consumers of Orange have the highest switching costs and
consumers of Vodafone the lowest. Furthermore, in the logistic regression, the prob-
ability of switching depends on consumer characteristics, such as age, usage intensity
and ways of spending leisure time. This is consistent with findings in consumer surveys
conducted by the British regulator Oftel.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.1: Switching between waves 1/2 and 2/3
Wave 1/2 Cellnet Orange Vodafone One2One Fixed Total Oftel
Cellnet 52 8 8 9 7 84
61.9% 9.5% 9.5% 10.7% 8.3% 32.2% 34.00%
Orange 3 34 0 5 5 47
6.3% 72.3% 0.00% 10.6% 10.6% 18.0% 15.00%
Vodafone 18 9 65 3 8 103
17.4% 8.7% 63.1% 2.9% 7.7% 39.5% 38.00%
One2One 3 0 5 17 2 27
11.1% 0.00% 18.5% 62.9% 7.4% 10.3% 13.00%
Total 76 51 78 34 22 239
29.1% 19.5% 29.8% 13.0% 8.4% 100.00%
Fixed 99 67 81 45 480 772
12.8% 8.7% 10.5% 5.8% 62.2% 100.00%
Wave 2/3 Cellnet Orange Vodafone One2One Fixed Total Oftel
Cellnet 148 9 19 13 7 196
75.5% 4.5% 9.7% 6.6% 3.6% 32.98% 32.00%
Orange 9 126 6 3 4 148
6.1% 85.1% 4.0% 2.0% 2.7% 25.13% 22.00%
Vodafone 23 15 112 13 4 167
13.7% 9.0% 67.0% 7.8% 2.4% 28.45% 27.00%
One2One 10 7 3 57 7 84
11.9% 8.3% 3.6% 67.8% 8.3% 13.44% 19.00%
Total 190 157 140 86 22 595
32.0% 26.4% 23.5% 14.4% 3.7% 100.00%
Fixed 61 83 53 41 320 558
10.9% 14.9% 9.5% 7.3% 57.3% 100.00%
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Table 4.2: Consumer choices over three waves
Wave 1 Wave 2/3 Fixed Cellnet Orange Vodafone O2O missing Total
Fixed Fixed 231 39 62 37 28 83 480
Cellnet 5 61 3 4 4 22 99
Orange 2 2 50 2 1 9 66
Vodafone 4 9 4 30 6 28 81
One2One 3 3 2 0 20 17 45
missing 0 0 0 0 0 507 507
Total 245 114 121 74 59 666 1278
Cellnet Fixed 2 1 0 0 1 3 7
Cellnet 1 33 1 4 3 10 52
Orange 1 1 3 1 0 2 8
Vodafone 0 2 1 3 0 2 8
One2One 1 2 0 0 3 3 9
missing 0 0 0 0 0 60 60
Total 5 39 5 8 7 80 144
Orange Fixed 2 1 0 0 0 2 3
Cellnet 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
Orange 0 1 17 2 1 13 34
Vodafone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
One2One 1 0 1 0 1 2 5
missing 0 0 0 0 0 39 39
Total 3 3 18 2 3 57 86
Vodafone Fixed 2 0 1 2 0 3 8
Cellnet 0 10 0 3 1 4 18
Orange 1 0 7 0 0 1 9
Vodafone 0 4 6 34 4 17 65
One2One 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
missing 0 0 0 0 0 62 62
Total 3 14 14 39 7 88 165
O2O Fixed 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Cellnet 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
Orange 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vodafone 0 0 0 3 0 2 5
One2One 0 0 0 1 10 6 17
missing 0 0 0 0 0 24 24
Total 0 2 0 4 11 34 51
missing Fixed 83 19 20 14 12 0 148
Cellnet 1 42 5 8 3 0 59
Orange 0 5 49 1 1 0 56
Vodafone 0 8 4 41 3 0 56
One2One 2 5 4 2 21 0 34
Total 86 79 82 66 40 0 353
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Table 4.3: Call success rate survey
Held calls Set-ups Connect& Held calls Set-ups Connect&
complete complete
Cellnet One2One
East Anglia 95.2% 95.9% 99.3% 98.8% 99.4% 99.4%
London 96.6% 98.4% 98.2% 96.0% 97.3% 98.7%
Midlands 97.4% 98.6% 98.8% 97.4% 98.6% 98.8%
Northern England 97.2% 98.5% 98.7% 97.0% 98.5% 98.5%
Northern Ireland 93.8% 96.6% 97.2%
Scotland 95.4% 98.0% 97.4% 88.0% 91.6% 96.1%
South East Engl. 96.4% 98.3% 98.1% 96.6% 98.4% 98.2%
South West Engl. 96.2% 97.7% 98.5% 96.8% 98.6% 98.2%
Wales 94.8% 96.4% 98.4% 84.7% 88.3% 95.8%
National 96.5% 98.1% 98.3% 95.6% 97.3% 98.3%
Orange Vodafone
East Anglia 98.8% 99.3% 99.5% 98.9% 99.4% 99.5%
London 97.4% 99.0% 98.4% 96.0% 97.2% 98.8%
Midlands 97.6% 98.4% 99.3% 96.8% 98.2% 98.6%
Northern England 98.6% 99.2% 99.5% 96.5% 98.3% 98.2%
Northern Ireland 97.2% 98.2% 99.1% 95.8% 97.0% 98.8%
Scotland 96.1% 96.9% 99.2% 96.3% 98.2% 98.1%
South East Engl. 97.5% 98.4% 99.1% 97.3% 98.6% 98.7%
South West Engl. 97.9% 99.1% 98.8% 97.2% 98.5% 98.7%
Wales 96.7% 97.7% 98.9% 90.4% 93.8% 96.3%
National 97.7% 98.6% 99.1% 96.4% 97.9% 98.4%
Source: Mobile network operators’ call success rate survey October 1999 – March 2000, Published
May 2000 by Oftel
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Table 4.4: The cost of using mobile services in the UK per annum: representative
mobile packages for two different calling patterns
Operator Package Fix. Nat. Mob. Int. SMS Disc. Hand Sum
Basket 1
Orange Pre/Just Talk 0.0 12.8 4.5 0.2 2.8 0.0 60.0 80
One2One Pre/Up2You Std 0.0 15.5 3.4 1.4 0.7 0.0 60.0 81
Cellnet Pre/Pay & Go 0.0 18.3 4.3 1.4 3.1 0.0 60.0 87
Vodafone Pre/Pay As U Talk 0.0 18.3 4.9 0.6 8.3 0.0 60.0 92
Basket 2
Orange Pre/Just Talk 0.0 40.6 16.9 1.7 3.6 0.0 60.0 123
One2One Pre/Up2You Std 0.0 48.7 12.7 13.5 2.4 0.0 60.0 137
Cellnet Pre/Pay & Go 0.0 58.0 16.2 13.5 4.8 0.0 60.0 152
Vodafone Pre/Pay As U Talk 0.0 58.0 18.6 6.2 10.4 0.0 60.0 153
Source: ”International benchmarking study of mobile services and dial-up PSTN Internet access”,
Oftel, December 2000
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of variables used in simple logit and mixed logit
Variable
Wave 3 Description N Mean Std Min Max
work employment dummy 1725 0.56 0.49 0 1
sex sex dummy(female=1) 1725 0.54 0.50 0 1
age age 1725 44.60 17.96 16 93
age> 30 dummy for 60 >age> 30 1725 0.53 0.50 0 1
age> 60 dummy for age> 60 1725 0.21 0.41 0 1
Wave 2
work employment dummy 1033 0.61 0.49 0 1
sex sex dummy(female=1) 1033 0.56 0.49 0 1
age age 1033 46.00 16.61 16 90
age> 30 dummy for 60 >age> 30 1033 0.59 0.49 0 1
age> 60 dummy for age> 60 1033 0.21 0.41 0 1
Wave 1
work employment dummy 1153 0.59 0.49 0 1
sex sex dummy(female=1) 1153 0.56 0.49 0 1
age age 1153 47.22 16.59 16 87
age> 30 dummy for 60 >age> 30 1153 0.60 0.49 0 1
age> 60 dummy for age> 60 1153 0.23 0.42 0 1
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Table 4.6: Simple logit and mixed logit for panel data
I II III IV
Variables Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t
rj Cellnet -2.183 -12.93 -2.152 -12.81 -2.595 -11.35 -4.690 -11.12
Orange -2.298 -13.46 -2.360 -13.22 -2.458 -13.28 -4.678 -12.02
Vodafone -2.041 -12.19 -2.007 -12.15 -2.529 -9.46 -4.870 -10.34
One2One -2.512 -12.22 -2.559 -12.14 -2.841 -10.64 -5.421 -10.39
std Cellnet 1.140 5.99 3.257 13.19
Orange 0.401 1.82 2.815 12.87
Vodafone 1.243 5.02 3.528 11.62
One2One 0.766 2.60 3.104 10.38
time wave 2 0.865 10.15 0.877 10.30 1.005 10.41 2.117 14.98
wave 3 1.526 15.93 1.520 15.84 1.756 14.84 3.695 19.85
s costs mob2mob -2.647 -28.79
Cellnet -2.435 -16.06 -2.145 -10.14
Orange -3.366 -16.62 -3.374 -11.39
Vodafone -2.232 -14.39 -1.777 -6.84
One2One -2.980 -13.37 -2.899 -10.98
Cell. age> 30 -0.241 -1.70 -0.233 -1.65 -0.208 -1.27 -0.151 -0.51
age> 60 -0.985 -4.77 -0.990 -4.83 -1.108 -4.64 -1.837 -4.52
sex -0.355 -3.03 -0.359 -3.09 -0.421 -3.06 -0.761 -3.09
employed 0.670 4.78 0.665 4.81 0.732 4.58 1.004 3.77
Orange age> 30 -0.371 -2.63 -0.388 -2.64 -0.420 -2.79 -0.698 -2.65
age> 60 -1.129 -5.47 -1.135 -5.34 -1.189 -5.48 -2.105 -5.50
sex -0.307 -2.54 -0.313 -2.52 -0.320 -2.53 -0.514 -2.19
employed 0.693 4.77 0.680 4.46 0.685 4.42 1.142 4.54
Vodaf. age> 30 -0.359 -2.54 -0.339 -2.43 -0.326 -1.96 -0.353 -1.18
age> 60 -1.386 -6.14 -1.369 -6.10 -1.574 -6.04 -2.760 -6.07
sex -0.571 -4.66 -0.565 -4.67 -0.655 -4.46 -1.177 -4.27
employed 0.640 4.41 0.661 4.63 0.805 4.59 1.371 4.72
O2O age> 30 -0.372 -2.14 -0.370 -2.08 -0.435 -2.30 -0.812 -2.58
age> 60 -1.696 -5.96 -1.673 -5.85 -1.795 -5.84 -3.063 -6.11
sex -0.229 -1.48 -0.222 -1.42 -0.226 -1.37 -0.346 -1.17
employed 0.328 1.90 0.320 1.82 0.316 1.69 0.432 1.40
LL N of obs. 3908 3908 3908 3908
N of cases 19540 19540 19540 19540
Log Lik. -3980 -3966 -3953 -4110
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Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics of variables used in switching regression
Variable Description N Mean STD Min Max Corr.
Mobbill Quarterly mobile bill 672 87.70 71.58 12.0 450.0 1.00
Mpcalln Mobile - average calls per week 672 3.53 1.64 1.0 6.0 0.51
Cellnet Cellent dummy 672 0.32 0.47 0.0 1.0 -0.05
Orange Orange dummy 672 0.20 0.40 0.0 1.0 0.05
Vodafone Vodafone dummy 672 0.32 0.47 0.0 1.0 -0.00
One2One One2One dummy 672 0.12 0.33 0.0 1.0 0.02
Age Age 668 40.49 12.85 16.0 77.0 -0.14
Leisurb Leisure: watch live sport 672 4.51 1.11 1.0 6.0 -0.06
Leisurd Leisure: meal in restaurants 672 2.84 0.90 1.0 6.0 -0.21
Leisurh Leisure: drink in pub-club 476 2.95 1.25 1.0 5.0 -0.14
Leisurg Leisure: read books 672 2.59 1.64 1.0 6.0 0.06
locrang Non-local friends&relatives 476 3.15 1.61 0.0 5.0 0.08
Housewk Time spent housework in week 650 8.49 8.36 0.0 70.0 -0.14
Rushd Rush - tasks around home 476 2.86 1.14 1.0 8.0 0.09
Rushe Rush - shop for essentials 476 3.35 1.10 1.0 8.0 -0.09
Mpwhy2 Mobile - reason useful for work 536 1.60 0.48 1.0 2.0 -0.26
Mpwhy7 Mobile - reason personal safety 476 1.36 0.48 1.0 2.0 0.32
Mpwhy1st Mobile - reason 1st important 476 2.29 1.26 1.0 5.0 -0.18
Mpuse Mobile - replace phone use 672 2.70 0.60 1.0 8.0 -0.27
Mptype Mobile - payment type 476 2.05 0.57 2.0 9.0 -0.08
Empstat Current employment situation 672 1.77 1.62 1.0 9.0 -0.11
Employed Employment dummy 672 0.76 0.42 0.0 1.0 0.16
Retired Retirement dummy 672 0.09 0.28 0.0 1.0 -0.11
Nowork Unemployment dummy 672 0.08 0.28 0.0 1.0 -0.14
Student Student dummy 672 0.05 0.22 0.0 1.0 0.03
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Table 4.8: Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Model I Model II
Variables Estimate Wald χ2 sign. Estimate Wald χ2 sign.
Intercept 1.37 0.97 0.32 -0.38 0.23 0.62
Class 2 0.004 0.00 0.99
Class 3 -0.33 0.36 0.54
Class 4 0.23 0.14 0.70
Class 5 -0.45 0.47 0.49
Class 6 -0.17 0.08 0.76
Orange -0.54 2.66 0.10 -0.63 4.27 0.03
Vodafone 0.53 3.84 0.04 0.48 4.22 0.03
One2One 0.30 0.77 0.37
Age -0.02 4.01 0.04 -0.01 5.74 0.01
Leisurb -0.19 3.23 0.07 -0.18 3.08 0.07
Leisurd 0.06 0.22 0.63
Leisurh -0.10 1.08 0.29
Leisurg -0.21 7.62 0.00 -0.18 6.59 0.01
Locrang 0.006 0.00 0.93
Housewk 0.02 3.83 0.05 0.02 4.55 0.03
Rushd -0.03 0.12 0.72
Rushe -0.06 0.32 0.57
Mpwhy2 -0.47 2.74 0.09
Mpwhy7 -0.35 1.49 0.22
Mpwhy1st 0.04 0.23 0.62
Mpuse 0.32 1.87 0.17 0.30 1.90 0.16
Mptype -0.04 0.07 0.78
Retired 0.48 1.86 0.17 0.41 1.60 0.20
Nowork 0.26 0.27 0.59
Student -0.11 0.06 0.79
Model Fit Intercept Covariates Intercept Covariates
N used 550 550
AIC 581.599 585.067 581.599 559.752
SC 585.909 697.125 585.909 598.542
-2 Log L 579.599 533.067 579.599 541.752
L-Ratio 46.53 0.0056 37.84 0.0001
Score 44.47 0.0096 36.46 0.0001
Wald 40.19 0.0278 33.67 0.0001
Chapter 5
The Competitiveness of Mobile
Telephony across the EU
5.1 Introduction
Traditionally, the telecommunications industry was perceived as a public monopoly
and was regulated by politically influenced national authorities. More recently, the
development of the pan-European liberalized telecommunications industry has become
an important component of European economic integration. The first steps towards the
constitution of a common regulatory framework for telecommunications services in the
European Union can be traced back to 1984.1 The main aspects of regulation were the
development of standards, common research and development programs for the least
developed regions. The second phase was initiated in 1987, when the European Com-
mission (EC) published the Green Paper on the development of the common market
for telecommunications services and equipment.2 It was followed by many successive
Resolutions regarding the telecommunications industry. In April 1994, for example,
the Commission published the Green Paper on mobile and personal communications
1For a detailed report on the regulation of telecommunications industry in the European Union
see: European Commission (1999) ”Status Report on European Union Electronic Communications
Policy”.
2Source: European Commission (1987) ”Towards a dynamic European economy: Green Paper on
the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment”.
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which addressed the need for a common regulatory framework for mobile services.3
This Green Paper points out the particular role of mobile services for the future of the
telecommunications industry and the prospective benefits for society at large. It also
sets out the main goals of telecommunications policy, in particular, the creation of a
mass market for personal communications services and the foundation of pan-European
networks and services.
In March 2002, the EC adopted a new regulatory framework for electronic com-
munications which responds to the changes in the telecommunications industry after
the liberalization on January 1, 1998. It should have been implemented in all Mem-
ber States by July 2003, but eight Member States failed to meet this deadline and in
October 2003 the EC opened infringement proceedings against those countries.4 The
new framework assumes that the national regulators are able to correctly assess the
level of competition and should therefore apply the regulatory obligations only when
competition is not in effect.5
The EC is responsible for providing a common European regulatory framework for
the telecommunications industry and for monitoring its implementation. All Member
States must establish independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs) responsible
for the implementation of regulations within the country’s territory. The main tasks
of the NRAs, as defined by the Commission Directives, are consumers protection and
the establishment of an innovative, competitive, and sustainable telecommunications
industry.6 The competencies of NRAs, the objectives and the intensity of regulation
vary across countries. Governments and regulators approach many regulatory issues
differently, for instance, the licensing policy in the mobile industry. This might be one
3Source: European Commission (1994) ”Towards a personal communications environment: Green
Paper on a common approach to mobile and personal communications in the European Union”.
4Source: European Commission (2004) ”Six Member States face Court action for failing to put in
place new rules on electronic communications”.
5Source: European Commission (2002) ”Eighth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommu-
nications Regulatory Package”.
6Source: European Commission (2002) ”Eighth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommu-
nications Regulatory Package”.
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of the reasons why the market structure, growth rates and prices differ by country.
In addition, there could be some other non-regulatory country-specific factors that
influence the diffusion and prices in the telecommunications industry. For instance, the
diffusion of mobile services might depend on the cultural background of the society,
wealth status, or geographical characteristics of the country.
According to the new regulatory framework for electronic communications, assess-
ment of industry competition is the basis for regulatory intervention. For instance,
the EC assigned the consultancy firm Teligen to conduct analysis of competition in
telecommunications industry across the EU countries. Teligen uses data on the market
structure, prices and regulation to develop the ”Index of Competitive Development”,
which quantifies the degree of competition in key telecommunications services.7 The
index is constructed by scoring and weighting the variables identified as measures of
competition. Hence, this index represents only an intuitive evaluation of competition
and can lead to misleading conclusions. In the present paper, I use a simple theoretical
framework to analyze the impact of regulatory policy and country-specific factors on
the development and competitiveness of mobile telecommunications industry across
the European Union.
In order to assess the impact of regulation on demand and prices of mobile services,
I estimate a reduced form model using data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. I
consider a set of regulatory variables, which are perceived as pro-competitive tools, such
as the introduction of number portability, regulation of interconnection charges and
presence of airtime resellers. Number portability reduces consumer switching costs and
should decrease prices (-). The regulation of interconnection charges should decrease
marginal costs of providing mobile services in the industry and therefore may lower
prices (-). The presence of airtime resellers might increase competition and cause
prices to fall (-). Moreover, liberalization of fixed-line telephony caused more intense
regulation of fixed telephony or communications services in general, which surely had
7Source: Teligen (2000) ”Study on Market Entry Issues In EU telecommunications Markets After
1 st January 1998: A Report for the European Commission”
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an impact on competition in the mobile industry (-).
Indeed, the estimation results suggest that the regulatory policy significantly in-
fluences the level of prices and the demand for mobile services. In particular, the
liberalization of fixed-line telephones has a significant negative impact on prices and a
positive impact on the demand for mobile services. Similarly, the implementation of
number portability in the mobile industry has a negative impact on prices. Further-
more, regulation of interconnection charges through the designation of mobile operators
with significant market power increases the demand for mobile telephony but the esti-
mate remains insignificant on the supply side. The presence of airtime resellers, which
in the opinion of regulators should decrease prices, is in fact, insignificant. Moreover,
due to technological innovation, the mobile industry has enjoyed a substantial annual
increase in demand.
Afterwards, I use significant explanatory variables to estimate a structural model.
In this way some important information about the industry could be retrieved, in
particular, the estimates of price elasticity and average market conduct. Eventually,
the Member States could be compared in respect to the level of competition in mobile
telephony, which is a valuable information for the regulatory authorities.
There is a large body of studies conducted by different consultancy firms on be-
half of the EC. These consultants assess the progress in the implementation of the
telecommunications regulatory framework across Member States. However, contrary
to this study, most of the publicly available reports provide descriptive analysis of the
industry. A multivariate econometric analysis is required to justify and approximate
the influence of particular regulatory and non-regulatory factors. To the best of my
knowledge, apart from Gruber and Verboven (2001), there is no other econometric
study that addresses the impact of regulation on the diffusion of mobile telecommu-
nications services across the EU. Their study indicates the importance of government
regulation and technological progress for the development of the industry. In particu-
lar, the increase in capacity and quality of services, through the transition from analog
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to digital technology, results in an increase in the subscriber base. Moreover, compe-
tition, defined as at least two competitors on the market, contributed to diffusion of
mobile services. However, Gruber and Verboven (2001) estimate a logistic diffusion
model using panel data up to 1997 and the question of the importance of further regu-
lation remains unanswered. Moreover, they do not use price data to jointly analyze the
demand and supply sides. Such an analysis is conducted by Parker and Ro¨ller (1997)
for the mobile telecommunications industry in the U.S. They estimate a simple static
structural model of competition to examine the determinants of market conduct. This
theoretical framework was widely applied in the new empirical industrial organization
literature (NEIO) (see Bresnahan (1989)). However, apart from high demand on data,
there are also theoretical disadvantages of such analysis (see Corts (1999)).
In the next section I provide a short introduction of the evolution of the mobile
telecommunications industry and its regulation in the European Community. In section
3, I derive the model for the empirical analysis, present the data, provide the estimates
of the model. The estimation results are discussed in section 4. The final section
provides conclusion.
5.2 Mobile services in the European Union
5.2.1 Development of the Mobile Industry
The era of mass mobile telecommunications in the European Union started in the
early 1980s with the first generation analog systems, such as Nordic Mobile Telephone
(NMT), British Extended Total Access Communication System (ETACS) and the Ger-
man standard (C-450). These systems were primarily designed for the transmission of
voice signals. Because of capacity constraints, incompatibility, low quality and security,
the analog systems have been phased out. The licenses for providing analog mobile ser-
vices were granted to state-owned, fixed-line monopolies, with the exception of France,
the United Kingdom and Sweden, where duopolies were created. After the invention of
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second generation technology (2G), European countries decided to introduce common
technology platforms GSM-900 and later DCS-1800, to allow for pan-European roam-
ing. This time the licenses were not exclusively granted to the incumbent operators.
Licensing policies varied by countries, allowed for a different number of operators and
simultaneous or sequential market entries. The second-generation technologies should
be followed by third-generation systems (3G), which combine the mobile voice commu-
nications functions with high capacity data transfer and mobile access to the Internet.
The licenses for UMTS technology were first granted in Finland in March 1999 and last
in Ireland in June 2002. The extremely high cost of licenses in some countries and the
slowdown in the global economy postponed the development of UMTS networks. Thus,
the analysis of 2G mobile markets across the EU is a relevant basis for determining the
economic and regulatory factors that accelerate the diffusion of UMTS technology.
The implementation of 2G technology was, in fact, extremely successful. Within
a very short period of time, mobile phones became a common product with a pene-
tration rate above that of any other telecommunications service. At the end of year
2001, about 73% of EU citizens were users of mobile networks and the value of the mo-
bile telecommunications market was expected to reach approximately 82 billion euros
(about 38% of the total revenue in the telecommunications industry)8. The establish-
ment of a competitive market structure resulted in lower prices, and greater variety
and quality of mobile services. However, penetration rates and price levels differ across
Member States. One possible explanation is variation in the regulatory policy, which
is the subject of this study.
5.2.2 Regulation of the Mobile Industry
Until 1998 the telecommunications regulatory policy focused mainly on the liberaliza-
tion of fixed-line telephony. After 1998, foreseeing the future convergence of fixed and
8Source: European Commission (2001) ”Seventh Report on the Implementation of the Telecom-
munications Regulatory Package”.
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mobile telecommunications services, the regulators concentrated on the mobile indus-
try as well. Also, the new regulatory framework for electronic communications is, to a
great extent, concerned with the regulation of mobile telephony.
Some tools of the telecommunications regulatory policy could have crucial influence
on industry growth and prices. First, NRAs have the ability to designate any operator
as having a significant market power (SMP) in the retail or interconnection market.
In the retail market, an operator is designated to have an SMP when its subscriber
market share exceeds 25%.9 In the year 2002, in thirteen EU countries, at least two
mobile operators were designated to have an SMP status. In Germany and Austria,
no operator was designated, even though this criterion was fulfilled. German NRA ex-
plained this decision by sufficient demand power, while the Austrian regulator did not
provide any explanation. The operators designated with an SMP in the retail market
are under special supervision. In particular, the regulators enforce the obligation of
charging non-discriminatory, transparent, and cost-oriented retail prices. The other
obligations imposed refer to cost accounting and network access.10 In the interconnec-
tion market, an operator is designated to have an SMP when its market share exceeds
25% in total revenue from call termination on mobile and fixed networks, including
on-net calls.11 In a few Member States, some operators were designated even though
this criterion was not fulfilled. In these cases regulators had made use of some other
criteria provided in the Interconnection Directive. The operators designated with an
SMP in the interconnection market must adopt the cost orientation principle for call
termination charges.12 The access charges can represent an important component of
9Source: European Commission (1997) ”Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of June 30, 1997, on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring
universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision
(ONP)”.
10Source: European Commission (2002) ”Eighth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommu-
nications Regulatory Package”.
11Source: European Commission (1999) ”Explanatory Note on Determination of Organisations with
SMP for implementation of the ONP Directives”.
12Source: European Commission (2002) ”Eighth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommu-
nications Regulatory Package”.
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the marginal cost of providing mobile services. Thus, the cross-country variation in
prices could be partially explained by differences in the regulation in terms of the SMP
designations.
The industrial organization literature suggests that the presence of switching costs
increases long-term equilibrium prices.13 Thus, high prices in mobile telephony may
be explained by the existence of consumer switching costs. Two of the key regulatory
tools reducing switching costs are carrier selection (CS) and carrier pre-selection (CPS),
which allow consumers to access other networks without being directly connected to
them. CS and CPS for mobile services were not mandated in the previous regulatory
framework for electronic communications. Hence, in 2002 they were in place in only a
few Member States and mostly for international calls (CS and CPS exist in Denmark,
Spain and Finland; CS only in Portugal and the UK). In fixed telephony the CS and
CPS were already implemented in all EU countries in year 2002. The other key pro-
competitive tool that reduces consumer switching costs is the portability of numbers. In
mobile telephony, similar to CS and CPS, it was not mandated in the former regulatory
framework. However, in year 2002, the mobile number portability (MNP) was already
implemented in nine Member States. In the case of fixed telephony, it was available in
all Member States in the year 2002.14
The licensing regime (i.e., the number of active network operators and the timing
of entries) could significantly explain the variation in prices. Moreover, the NRAs in
some countries enforce the presence of independent service providers, which buy airtime
from network operators and resell it to end users under their own brand names. The
presence of airtime resellers is perceived by the regulators as a necessary component of
a competitive environment in mobile telephony. The mobile industry is limited by the
scarcity of available spectrum. Thus, the airtime resellers can provide some additional
services and extend product variety. Furthermore, the presence of independent service
13See Klemperer (1995) for an excellent survey on competition in markets with switching costs.
14Source: European Commission (2002) ”Eighth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommu-
nications Regulatory Package”.
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providers may exercise competitive pressure and cause prices to fall. However, the
resellers’ prices usually mimic the prices of network operators, whose airtime they
resell.
Apart from the factors mentioned above, some other regulatory issues may have an
impact on the prices of mobile services, such as interconnection regime, competencies
of NRAs, etc. Unfortunately, the impact of these factors is very difficult to measure
and is not considered in this study.
5.2.3 Prices of Mobile Services
Mobile operators provide a wide range of services and apply price discriminating strate-
gies. Some simplifications are necessary to conduct an empirical analysis and create a
single price index for mobile services.
It is common practice to classify consumers into two main segments, business and
residential users, with respect to their patterns of use (high and low use). Residential
consumers pay lower monthly rental fees and higher calling charges, while business
consumers pay higher rental fees and lower calling charges. Operators usually target
each segment with a few different tariffs. Each tariff may set different charges for
particular services. Typical tariff components are connection charge, monthly rental
fees, call charges differentiated according to on-net and off-net destination or peak
and off-peak timing. Moreover, firms differentiate tariffs according to the billing of
calls, SMS, WAP, and mailbox charges, as well as discounts, such as free minutes
or special prices for selected phone numbers. Prices tend to change very often, for
example, some tariffs are cancelled or replaced by others or new services are introduced,
which makes the analysis of price evolution hard. Although national statistical offices
spend significant resources constructing price indices for mobile services, using these
indices for price comparisons between countries is inadequate because of the different
definitions of monthly use baskets.
To make this analysis reliable, prices must be comparable across countries and over
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time. On behalf of the OECD the consultancy agency Teligen applies a representative
basket methodology to analyze quarterly price developments of basic telecommunica-
tions services. However, this data is not available publicly and Teligen’s definition of
baskets alters over time in order to account for changes in service use. Thus, any com-
parison through time of the prices provided for the OECD is impossible. Therefore,
publicly available reports prepared by Teligen for the EC are used to construct my
own price indices. These reports contain detailed annual price information on basic
telecommunications services. In defining the basket, I followed the guidelines provided
by the OECD.15 Only the most important pricing elements are used in the calculation,
such as connection charges, monthly rental charges, on-net, and off-net, peak, and
off-peak call charges with appropriate weights. Based on the incumbents’ tariffs for
representative residential users, I create price indices for mobile services covering years
from 1998 to 2002.16
Consumers are assumed to make 365 calls a year of a 3 minutes duration. Out of
these, 80% are national calls to fixed numbers and 20% are to mobile numbers within
the same network. In total, 30% of all calls are made during the peak time and 70%
during the off-peak time. The monthly cost of the service consists of the total annual
cost of calls plus one-third of the network connection fee divided by twelve, plus the
monthly rental charge. The indices include VAT and are listed in $US PPP. The
measurement of prices in $US PPP makes them comparable across the EU countries
and over time. The most critical assumption, made in the definition of price indices,
is that the incumbents’ tariffs are representative of the whole industry, which I make
because of the lack of other comparable price data. However, the OECD and the EC
make the same assumption in their comparisons of prices across countries.
15Source: Teligen (2000) ”OECD Telecommunications Basket Definitions”.
16The tariffs are from January of each year, with the exception of the years 2001 and 2002, for
which the tariff is taken from December of the previous year. It is reasonable to assume that it do
not differ much from January’s tariff.
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5.2.4 Mode of Competition
In general, retail market for mobile services may be divided into two segments: residen-
tial and business users. According to a survey conducted by the EOS Gallup Europe
on behalf of the EC, in year 1999, 100% of small enterprizes across the EU countries
were equipped with at least one mobile phone.17 Therefore, observed growth in mobile
subscriptions, in the time period analyzed in this study, may be fully attributed to
residential users.18
Individual consumers decide about the network to which they want to subscribe
after they compare tariffs offered by different operators. They select a package which
best fits to their calling behavior. Basically, three decision stages may be distinguished:
subscription to network operator, choice of tariff and usage pattern, that is, what are
the usage preferences for particular services available within the package. Moreover,
decision about network subscription is determined by attractiveness of the handset,
which usually is part of the package. The more attractive is the handset, the more
valuable is particular tariff and network. Hence, firms provide handset subsidies, and
often distribute handsets for free. Afterwards, firms try to recoup their initial invest-
ment in consumers by setting higher prices of mobile services. In the present study, I
assume that the full cost of handset is included in the cost of service usage. However, in
fact, the regulation of competition in handset subsidies differs by country. In the case
of some countries it is prohibited, for instance, in Finland. Unfortunately, a precise
cross-country data about the regulation and competition in handset subsidies is not
available.
In deriving the model, I make an assumption, which corresponds to Parker and
Ro¨ller (1997) as applied to the US mobile industry, that firms compete in quantities.
The common reasoning is such: due to spectrum scarcity firms strategically set the
17Source: European Commission (1999) ”The Situation of Telecommunications Services in the
Regions of the European Union”
18A dramatic change in the number of firms or in the number of mobile subscribers within one
company is rather unlikely.
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amount of subscriptions to sell. Indeed, this was the case for analog networks. More-
over, according to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), under certain conditions, the capacity
constrained price game yields the same results as the Cournot quantity game. Thus,
one could also view the competition in the mobile industry as a game, in which firms
strategically install capacity and then compete in prices. First, because the scarcity of
spectrum causes capacity restrictions, and second, because price competition may in
fact be more accurate for this industry.19
Furthermore, I assume that firms use static strategies. However, if firms set prices
(quantities) dynamically, that is to optimize long-term profits, the estimates of market
power in static models may be seriously misleading, as Corts (1999). Accordingly, in
the first part of this study, I use a reduced form to estimate determinants of cross-
country and time variation in equilibrium prices and demands. In the second part, I
estimate a structural model and attempt to compare the level of competitiveness across
the EU countries.
5.3 Empirical analysis
5.3.1 The Data
On behalf of the EC, data have been collected to evaluate the progress in the telecom-
munications reforms across the European Union. The EC reports on the implementa-
tion of telecommunications regulatory package and the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU) database are the main sources of data used in this analysis. The
price indices described in the previous subsection are developed using reports prepared
for the EC by Teligen.
Because of very similar social, economic and regulatory environment in the Eu-
ropean Community, some of the variables suggested by previous studies of mobile
19In Germany, for instance, the GSM networks were about to reach their capacity limits and were
granted additional DCS licenses.
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telephony worldwide were not considered in this analysis at all. The variables such
as the independence of the NRAs are constant in the country and time dimension.20
Some other variables are very difficult to quantify to make the countries comparable
with each other, such as the interconnection regime, for instance. Furthermore, in the
time period considered many regulatory tools had already been implemented, such as
the incumbents’ privatization, or are still awaiting implementation, such as the carrier
selection and pre-selection.
The variables used in the study can be divided into two groups: regulatory variables
and non-regulatory country-specific, socioeconomic variables. On the demand side I
explain mobile subscriptions (Mobile)21 with country population as a logarithm (Pop),
GDP per capita in $US PPP as a logarithm (GDP), and penetration rate of the fixed-
line telephony as a logarithm (Fixed). These variables were used in previous studies,
for instance in Gruber and Verboven (2001). They find a significant negative impact of
fixed-line subscriptions on the diffusion of mobiles across the EU countries. Moreover,
countries with higher GDP per capita may experience a higher demand for mobile
services.
The mobile industry has been steadfast in the process of a rapid technological in-
novation. I account for this using a common time trend variable (Time). It can be
interpreted as a constant upgrade in the quality of services, the rising range of avail-
able services, as well as the enhanced performance and decreasing prices of mobile
handsets.22 Gruber and Verboven (2001) found that the change from analog to digi-
tal technology had a significant impact on the diffusion of mobiles. However, in the
time period I analyze, the change was already made and the only way to account for
the technological switch is through a variable representing the time passed since the
start-up of digital networks. The difference between the time trend and the timing of
20According to the EC reports on the implementation of telecommunications regulatory package.
21The mobile subscriptions I take from ITU telecommunications database, which does not differen-
tiate between business and residential subscriptions. Pre-paid consumers are included as well.
22Mobile telephony is a prime example of an industry with network effects. Because of high collinear-
ity of time trend and past subscriber base, the time trend variable may account for both technological
innovation and network effects. However, in the paper I refer to (Time) as technological innovation.
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technological change is a different drift for particular countries and both variables are
highly correlated, as shown in table 5.4. Therefore, a significant coefficient for only one
of the variables can be estimated. Finally, as motivated in the earlier subsection on the
regulation of the mobile industry, the presence of airtime resellers could contribute to
an increase in demand for mobile services. Because it is relatively difficult to follow the
number of resellers and the scale of their activity across the EU countries, I consider
their potential impact on the industry by using a dummy variable (Service).
On the supply side, two kinds of explanatory variables are considered to explain
the prices of mobile services (Mobbill): exogenous price shifters and the determinants
of the marginal cost. As for the price shifters, I consider a set of regulatory variables: a
dummy for the introduction of number portability in mobile networks (MNP), a dummy
for the allowance of airtime resellers (Service), and a dummy for the liberalization of
the fixed telephony market (Libera). All these variables are expected to have a negative
impact on prices. Moreover, the pricing equation derived in the next subsection requires
an inverse of the number of mobile operators as explanatory variable (1/N).
The other explanatory variables are potential determinants of the marginal cost of
providing mobile services. I consider the average hourly labor compensation rate in
the industry in $US PPP as the proxy for the cost of labor in the telecommunications
industry (Labor), the interest rate on the 10-year government bonds as the proxy for
the cost of capital (Bond), and the cost of electricity in $US PPP as the proxy for
the marginal cost of call transmissions (Elect). Moreover, I incorporate into the cost
function the time trend to account for possible technological innovation on the supply
side (Time). Regulation may also lead to lower marginal costs of providing mobile
services. I use a dummy for the designation of any mobile operators with an SMP
in the interconnection market (SMP).23 The firms designated with an SMP must set
cost-oriented interconnection charges to decrease the marginal costs of the other firms
23I do not consider designation with an SMP in the retail market because there is not enough
variation. In the whole time period analyzed, almost all NRAs designated at least one mobile operator
with an SMP status.
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on the market. Moreover, I use the country-specific cost dummies to explain possible
differences in the level of marginal costs across countries, for instance, factors such as
the differences in the country size or the concentration of population.24
An important issue to discuss is whether the regulatory variables in this study
might be considered as exogenous at all. The regulator is supposed to adjust the
regulation policy to the demand and supply shocks. However, my claim is that such
reaction would always be sufficiently delayed to be considered exogenous. At least
the regulatory variables considered in this study require respective legislation and the
process of their technical implementation is long. On the other hand, lobbying activities
could convince the regulator to postpone the introduction of regulatory tools to protect
the incumbent operator. The EC imposes an equal regulation policy on all countries
and enforces deadlines for its implementation. Moreover, a particular emphasis is put
on the independence of the regulators from political influence. Due to the reports
of the EC and the ITU, the NRAs in particular countries appear to be sufficiently
independent.25 Hence, the regulatory variables in this study can be considered to be
uncorrelated with the unobservable demand and supply shocks.
5.3.2 The Model
The inverse demand function is given by
pts = f(
Nts∑
i=1
qits, Xts, ts), (5.1)
where s = 1, ..., S is the country subscript, t = 1, ..., T is the time subscript, Nts is
the number of mobile operators in country s at time t, Xts represents observable and
ts unobservable demand shifters. The cost function has the same specification for all
24See the Appendix for data sources.
25Source: ITU (2002) ”Trends in Telecommunication Reform 2002: Effective Regulation - 4th
edition”.
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firms across the EU countries
TCits = FCits + V C(qits,Wts, ωts), (5.2)
where FCits represents firm specific fix costs, changing over time and across coun-
tries, V Cits is the variable cost depending on the number of network subscriptions
and some other country-specific cost drivers Wts. Finally, ωts stands for unobservable
cost shifters. For such demand and cost specifications, a firm’s profit function can be
expressed as
Πits = pts(.)qits − V C(qits,Wts, ωts)− FCits, (5.3)
which provides the first order conditions in the form
λits
∂pts(.)
∂qits
qits + pts(.)−MCits(.) = 0, (5.4)
where MCits(.) =
∂V Cits
∂qits
is the marginal cost function for firm i in country s and
λits = 1 +
∑Ns
j 6=i
∂qjts
∂qits
is conjectural variation (degree of collusion). The conjectural
variation formulation might be interpreted as the firms’ expectations about the reaction
of the other firms to a change in quantity (see Bresnahan 1989). I sum up FOCs (5.4)
over all firms within the industry and divide by the number of firms Nts to get the
average industry supply equation in the form
λts
Nts
∂pts(.)
∂Qts
Qts + pts(.)−
1
Nts
Nts∑
i=1
MCits(.) = 0. (5.5)
Three basic cases can be considered: λts = 0 in the perfect competition case, λts = 1
corresponds to Nash equilibrium and λts = Nts implies joint profit maximization. The
existence of any of these equilibria can be tested.
Chapter 5 Mobile Telephony across the European Union 105
5.3.3 Marginal Cost and Markup
An appropriate definition of marginal cost function is critical to get correct estimates of
conjectural variation λts in the supply equation. Due to some country-specific factors,
both marginal costs and market conduct may differ across the EU countries. The most
credible definition of the supply side should include a set of country dummies to explain
differences in conduct together with country dummies as components of marginal cost
function. However, this already requires an estimation of thirty coefficients for country
dummies and intercepts themselves. Given that only five years of data for fifteen
countries is available, such model specification is not possible to estimate. Thus, the
estimation of the supply side requires additional assumption.
I estimate two different models, in which either conduct or marginal cost is country-
specific. In the first case, conjectural variation parameter is country-specific and de-
pends on implemented regulation λts = [Dsη + Rtsδ]. Hence, the Member Stats are
assumed to have equal technology and conditions for providing mobile services. Apart
from variation in the cost factors, there is no difference in marginal cost across the EU
countries. Therefore, in fact, I estimate an average marginal cost across the Member
States in the time period analyzed. In the second case, I assume country-specific mar-
ginal costs and estimate an average market conduct across the EU countries given by
λts = [η + Rtsδ]. Differences in marginal costs may arise due to differences in country
terrain, coverage, law regulation and so on. In both cases firm expectations about the
reaction of the other firms to a change in own quantity depend on market regulation in
place. Obviously, each assumption introduces bias into estimation results. Therefore,
both marginal costs and market conducts could be under or overestimated and neither
model can provide correct information. However, these assumptions allow to estimate
the supply side. The comparison of estimates in both cases should provide a basis for
evaluation of competitiveness across the Member States. In the empirical analysis, I
assume a linear (industry average) marginal cost function, which consists of a constant
component and other cost determinants. Alternatively, a translog formulation could
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be used.
5.3.4 The Estimation
I estimate the following demand function
log(Qts) = ptsα + Xtsβ + ts, (5.6)
where Qts is the penetration of mobiles, pts the price index for mobile services, Xts =
[1, F ixedts, GDPts, Popts, Servicets, T imet] represents a set of exogenous explanatory
variables discussed in the previous subsection and ts is the unobservable error term.
For this demand formulation we have ∂pts(.)
∂Qts
= 1
αQts
.
First, I derive a reduced form model assuming that the collusion parameter is the
same across all countries and over time, λts = λ. Instead of estimating freely λ, Nash
equilibrium across all EU countries may be assumed (λ = 1). The regulatory variables
Rts enter the supply equation as exogenous linear price shifters.
26 Therefore, pricing
equation which corresponds to first order condition (5.5) may be written as
pts +
1
Nts
λ
α
+ Rtsδ = MCts (5.7)
where the linear marginal cost function is assumed to have a country-specific constant
component
MCts = Wtsφ + Dsγ + ωts (5.8)
Rts = [Servicets, Portabts, Liberats] is the set of regulatory variables, Wts = [Laborts,
Bondts, Electts, T imet, SMPts] represents cost determinants, Ds are country dummies
and ωts the unobservable cost shifters. The structural model (5.6) and (5.7) may be
26In this way, a direct effect of regulatory variables on prices without multiplication by the reversed
number of operators can be estimated.
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transformed into a reduced form specification with linear demand and supply
log(Qts) = −
1
Nts
λ−Rtsδα + Wtsφα + Dsγα + Xtsβ + ts (5.9)
pts = −
1
Nts
λ
α
−Rtsδ + Wtsφ + Dsγ + ωts, (5.10)
where ts = ts + αωts and ωts = ωts are the transformed unobservable demand and
supply shifters. This transformation allows instrumental variables estimation of the
simultaneous system of demand and supply to be avoided. For consistency of the OLS
estimates, the unobservables in both equations must be uncorrelated with the explana-
tory variables but they can be correlated with each other. Thus, SURE estimation
method (see table 5.7) of both equations (5.9) and (5.10) should be more efficient than
a simple OLS regression (see tables 5.5 and 5.6).
The variables, which turn out to be significant in reduced form estimation are used
in the structural estimation. Referring to discussion in the previous subsection, two
specifications of the pricing equation (5.5) are considered. In the first case, all countries
are assumed to have common market conduct
pts = −
1
Nts
1
α
[η + Rtsδ] + Wtsφ + Dsγ + ωts (5.11)
Hence, the structural model consists of equations (5.6) and (5.11). In the second case,
market conduct is country-specific and there is a common intercept in the cost function
for all countries:
pts = −
1
Nts
1
α
[Dsη + Rtsδ] + Wtsφ + ωts (5.12)
The structural model consists of equations (5.6) and (5.12).
I use an ordinary least squares estimation method (OLS) and two stage least squares
(2SLS) to estimate at first the demand equation (5.6) with pooled data as shown in
table (5.9). The reason for estimating demand with common constant for all countries
is that, country dummies in the reduced form estimation explain only 12% of variation
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in subscriptions (see specification IV in table 5.5). Moreover, the insignificance of
dummies cannot be rejected. This is an argument in favor for specification (5.6).
Next, I estimate jointly demand (5.6) and supply (5.11) using seemingly unrelated
regression method (SURE) and non-linear three stage least squares (N3SLS) to account
for a possible correlation of the error terms in both equations and for endogeneity of
explanatory variables (see table 5.10). Similarly, I estimate second specification of
structural model (5.6) and (5.12), which results are presented in table (5.11). In the
estimation I restrict coefficients to be the same in both time and country dimension.
This is necessary because of data limitations. It implies that the coefficients may be
interpreted only as average values across the EU countries in the time period analyzed.
Consistent estimates of structural model require an instrumental variables method.
Following set of instruments is used to estimate the demand side Zts = [log(GDPts)
log(Popts) Laborts Bondts Electts Liberats], that is respectively, GDP per capita in
$US PPP as a logarithm, population as a logarithm, cost determinants: cost of labor,
capital and electricity, and a dummy for liberalization of fixed telephony. In the joint
demand-supply estimation, I use the set of instruments defined above plus a dummy
for number portability and country dummies Zts = [log(GDPts) log(Popts) Laborts
Bondts Electts Liberats Portabts D1, ...D14]. The instruments cannot be correlated
with the unobservable demand and cost shifters and should be highly correlated with
the endogenous variables. The instruments GDP per capita and country population
are exogenous and apparently correlated with mobile subscriptions and prices (these
variables were used in the former studies). As I noticed in the previous subsection,
the regulatory variables should be exogenous and uncorrelated with the error terms in
both demand and supply equation. Finally, there is no reason for cost determinants
to correlate with unobserved shocks in telecommunications industry. The Hausman
specification test for demand (see table 5.9) and for demand-supply estimation (see
table 5.10 and 5.11) suggests that the IV estimation method is not necessary to use.
Thus, SURE estimation should provide consistent estimates.
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 The Reduced Form
I separately estimate the demand and supply sides using panel data analysis with
fixed and random effects. In the fixed effects formulation of the demand side, the
significant exogenous variables explain about 93% of the variation in subscriptions
(see specification III in table 5.5). The hypothesis of insignificant fixed effects can be
rejected with a high level of significance for all specifications. The fit for the random
effects specification is also very good with an R-squared of 0.89 (see table 5.8). However,
the Hausman test for random effects rejects the null hypothesis of random individual
effects with an m-value equal to 10.94. The supply side regression has a worse fit at
R2 = 0.80 in the case of fixed effects specification, but still high percentage of variation
in prices can be explained (see specification II in table 5.6). The fit in the random
effects specification is much worse with an R-squared of 0.58. There is much more
unexplained noise in the pricing policies of the firms than in the consumers’ decision to
purchase mobile phones. The first source of the unobservable supply shifters may be
the regulatory policy. There are some regulatory issues that cannot be easily quantified
and implemented in the model. Moreover, firms apply dynamic strategies while the
model I estimate is based on the assumption of a static equilibrium. Each country
seems to have a specific competitive environment, which is difficult to explain using an
econometric model.
The most important result indicating the impact of regulation on industry perfor-
mance is the significance of a dummy for liberalization on both the demand and supply
sides. Liberalization itself should not be seen exclusively as opening up fixed-line tele-
phony for competition. Many other regulatory processes have been initiated and the
power of NRAs has been strengthened. This variable also suggests possible depen-
dencies between mobile and fixed-line telephony. Liberalization apparently causes an
increase in competition and a drop in the residential expenditures on the fixed-line
Chapter 5 Mobile Telephony across the European Union 110
services, which may have induced consumers to buy mobile phones as an additional
service. Through negative impact on prices it also has a positive impact on the demand
side. Therefore, countries that liberalized their fixed-line industry earlier enjoy lower
prices for mobile services and a higher level of consumer subscriptions. Apart from the
potential welfare gains in the fixed-line industry, liberalization generates additional
surplus in the mobile telephony.
Referring to the earlier discussion, some other potential regulatory sources for price
changes may be considered: a dummy for the implementation of number portability
(MNP), a dummy for the presence of airtime resellers (Service), and a dummy for the
regulation of interconnection charges through the designation with significant market
power (SMP). The first two regulatory tools can reduce the price of mobile services.
Moreover, (Service) may also directly influence the demand for mobile subscriptions.
(SMP) could influence prices as a cost factor. However, in the supply regression, only
(MNP) turns out to have a significant negative impact on prices. Competition is
fiercer and prices are lower in countries that already enforce the portability of mobile
numbers. MNP raises consumer surplus, but to evaluate total welfare changes, the cost
of implementation must be taken into account. The cost-benefit analysis of number
portability is not a trivial issue and is currently subject to debate between regulators
and market players. (MNP) turns out to be insignificant on the demand side even
though it is a significant price determinant. This might be due to high correlation with
other explanatory variables on the demand side such as the time trend (Time) and the
liberalization dummy (Libera) as presented in table 5.4.
The presence of airtime resellers surprisingly does not have any impact on price and
demand, which suggests that such regulation is unneeded. The dummy for regulation of
interconnection charges through the SMP designation has a significant positive impact
on demand. This effect should come from the supply side, but the estimate of (SMP) in
the pricing regression is insignificant, which indicates again possible multicollinearity of
explanatory variables. In particular, SMP is highly correlated with the dummy for the
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liberalization of fixed-line, which may cause difficulty in estimating both coefficients
(see table 5.4). Still, an SMP designation can be considered as an important regulatory
tool contributing to growth in mobile subscriptions.
Gruber and Verboven (2001) find a significant negative impact of fixed-line sub-
scriptions on the demand for mobile phones together with an insignificant impact of
the GDP per capita. The present study suggests a contradicting result; insignificant
fixed-line penetration and a significant coefficient for GDP per capita. However, there
is a high correlation of fixed-line subscriptions with GDP per capita, as shown in table
5.4. Thus, it could be impossible to estimate the coefficients for both variables. GDP
per capita has a significant positive impact on mobile subscriptions across the EU
countries.27 However, when (GDP) is excluded, the estimate of fixed-line penetration
becomes positive with a significance level of 0.13 and its significance increases in the
estimation without fixed effects. This is because the fixed-line penetration does not
vary too much in time and therefore represents a kind of fixed effect. The other rea-
son for such differences in results may be drastic industry transformation which took
place through this time. Gruber and Verboven (2001) analyze the time period up to
1997, when the average penetration rate did not surpass 18%. In the time period I
analyze mobile subscriptions grew exponentially and in most countries they surpassed
a penetration rate of 70%. In addition, the decreasing prices of fixed-line and mobile
services in the past years may have allowed consumers to afford access to both net-
works. Moreover, the origins of use of fixed-line services nowadays are different. The
fixed-line connection is, to an increasing extent, used for access to the Internet. Thus,
mobile and fixed-line services could be seen as complements rather than substitutes,
even though they may indeed compete with each other in voice telephony services.
The time trend, which should account for the technological innovation, is significant
and positive on the demand side. Thus, technological progress has been constantly
27To account for possible differences in price levels across countries, I calculate GDP per capita in
$US PPP, which should better measure the potential income effects in cross-country analysis than
GDP in $US. Gruber and Verboven (2001) use GDP per capita without transformation.
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raising consumer valuation of mobile services and has significantly contributed to an
increase in demand. On the supply side, I use the time trend to account for a constant
decrease in the cost of providing mobile services. However, the coefficient of the time
trend on the supply side is insignificant and in the time period analyzed there was no
decrease in prices resulting from technological innovation.
The country dummies themselves explain 44% of price variation, which indicates
a significant difference in the price levels across countries and may have an origin in
different levels of marginal costs (see specification IV in table 5.6). The dummies
could also account for differences in the level of market competition across countries.
In the demand regression, country dummies explain only 12% of variation in mobile
subscriptions (see specification IV in table 5.5). All dummies are measured relative
to the reference country (UK) represented by the intercept in both the demand and
supply equations. Finally, the marginal cost of providing mobile services depends on
the cost of labor and the cost of capital. (Bonds) turns out to be insignificant in the
pricing regression, but both cost variables are significant and negative on the demand
side. It should be pointed out that there is not much variation in cost of labor, and
cost of capital over time. Thus, it is hard to get significant estimates of these three
variables within one equation.
The coefficient in front of the inverse number of competitors in the supply equation
λ
α
is insignificant, and similarly in the demand equation. Thus, the null hypothesis of
the collusion parameter being equal to zero (λ = 0) cannot be rejected, and the average
collusiveness across the EU countries in this time period could be considered close to
perfect competition. However, this conclusion would be wrong because the regulatory
variables drive prices down even further, which would imply that firms set prices below
marginal costs. Therefore, the country dummies may indeed include some information
about average industry conduct and this result should instead be subscribed to the
identification problem on the supply side.
To sum up, the differences in the price variation between specifications III and IV
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in table 5.6 are explained by the explanatory variables other than fixed effects: cost
factors and regulation. The regulatory policy significantly contributed to a decrease in
prices of mobile services. Namely, the liberalization of the telecommunications industry
contributed to an average decline in prices across Member States of around 16 $US
PPP and the introduction of mobile portability caused an average drop in prices of
around 7 $US PPP. Of course, these effects may be different from country to country
as the price levels differ significantly. The remaining price changes arise from changes
in marginal costs.
5.4.2 The Structural Form
The estimation of the reduced form demand and supply equations restricted the set of
potential explanatory variables to significant ones. It also signalled the identification
problem in the estimation of the supply equation. Thus, I estimate at first the demand
side (see table 5.9). The demand for mobile subscriptions might be simply explained
by prices, constant and time trend. It is driven to a large extent by decreasing prices of
mobile subscriptions. In this specification of the demand function the price elasticities
depend on the level of prices. Thus, over time there is a decrease in elasticities, which
is proportional to the decrease in market prices (see table 5.12). The estimate of price
coefficient in the demand equation α = 0.00921 (see SURE estimation results in table
5.10) allows to identify the parameter of market conduct in the supply equation. This
coefficient should remain unchanged in the joint demand-supply estimation, given that
the supply specification is correct. Moreover, annual increase in mobile subscriptions
due to technological innovation accounts for about 25%.
The estimation of the supply side is problematic due to all assumption which had
to be made to derive estimable supply equation. As already mentioned, a static conjec-
tural variation equilibrium is imposed, which may cause a bias in estimates of conduct
parameters. Moreover, country dummies in the marginal cost function and country-
specific collusion parameters cannot be identified at the same time. Therefore, two
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different formulations of the supply side are considered. First, conjectural variation is
defined as λts = [η + Rtsδ] and the supply equation is given by (5.12). In this case,
similarly to reduced form estimation, the regulation drives average collusion parameter
λts below zero, which suggests that firms set prices below marginal costs and have
negative markups (see table 5.11). Obviously, marginal costs must be overestimated.
Hence, the assumption of common conduct across the Member States must be very
severe. In the second specification, I assume that conjectural variation is represented
by λts = [Dsη + Rtsδ] and the supply side is given by (5.11). The estimation results
are presented in table 5.10. In this formulation the conjectural variation takes values
between 0 and 1 for almost all countries in year 1998 and over time λts gets closer to
zero due to regulation. The regulatory variables (Libera) and (Portab) have significant
negative impact on market collusiveness and decrease prices. For some countries, the
hypothesis of conjectural variation equal to zero cannot be rejected. The impact of
regulation on prices is unquestioned, but the results imply again that mobile telephony
in most countries is perfectly competitive. In some cases, the collusion parameter λts
becomes even negative (see table 5.13), which implies negative markups as presented
in table 5.15. This result is not plausible from theoretical point of view and industry
practice. The marginal costs must be overestimated, which makes the interpretation
of conduct parameters questionable.
In any specification, given short amount of data, it is not possible to disentangle
prices into marginal cost and markup. Therefore, the main conclusion of this analy-
sis should be, that the regulation, such as liberalization of fixed-line industry and
implementation of number portability, has a significant negative impact on industry
collusiveness and prices. Moreover, the structural model provides information about
average price elasticities presented in table 5.12. The average industry marginal costs
(see table 5.14) and the average market collusiveness (see table 5.13) may not rep-
resent trustable values. Nevertheless, the ordering of countries according to conduct
values can still have some meaning. Indeed, the ordering seems to be plausible. The
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Scandinavian countries, which are were most advanced in the startup and adoption
of mobile services have most competitive industries. The Member States which are
perceived as less advanced in the adoption of mobile telephony and had difficulties
with liberalization of telecommunications industry, such as Portugal, Greece, Ireland
and Spain, are among least competitive countries.28 These countries have higher prices
than Scandinavian countries and at the same time lower costs, in particular, the cost
of labor, which implies higher markups.
It must be noted that this is the only analysis which tries to evaluate the compet-
itiveness of mobile telephony across the European Union using a theory-based frame-
work and econometric methods. It may be considered as an alternative to the other
descriptive studies conducted by the EC and consultancy firms. In particular, it pro-
vides a broader insight into determinants of prices and competitiveness across the EU
than Teligen’s ”Index of Competitive Development”.
5.5 Conclusion
The mobile telephony in the EU is perceived as an exemplar for a successful imple-
mentation and regulation of a new technology. However, so far not much empirical
evidence has been provided on the importance of regulation for the development and
competition in mobile telephony. In this study I analyze the impact of regulatory policy
and country-specific factors on the diffusion and competitiveness of mobile telecommu-
nications services across the European Union.
I estimate a reduced form and structural model of mobile industry using panel
data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. The variation in mobile subscriptions
and prices seems to be well explained using the reduced form panel data analysis.
I find that the regulatory policy significantly influences the level of prices and the
demand for mobile services. In particular, the liberalization of fixed telephony has a
28Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal were granted additional transitional periods for the liberal-
ization of telecommunications industry to allow for necessary structural adjustments.
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negative impact on price and a positive impact on the diffusion. Therefore, the effects
of liberalization are not exclusively restricted to fixed telephony, but also contribute
to positive developments in the mobile industry. Moreover, the implementation of
number portability in the mobile telephony has a negative impact on prices. This
result confirms that a decrease in consumer switching costs raises competition and
causes prices to fall. Such a decrease in prices was expected by regulators but so far
has been not proven empirically. Furthermore, regulation of interconnection charges
through the designation of mobile operators with significant market power increases
the demand for mobile telephony. The raise in demand should result from the decrease
in costs and prices caused by SMP designation and lowered access charges but I do
not find any significant impact of this variable on prices. Nevertheless, the regulation
resulting from SMP designation has a positive impact on the development of the mobile
industry. The allowance of independent service providers does not lower the prices nor
increases demand. Therefore, the industry may perform equally well without such
regulation. Moreover, due to technological innovation the mobile industry has enjoyed
substantial annual increases in demand.
In the estimation of structural model, the regulatory variables have a significant
negative impact on the industry collusiveness. However, I am not able to disentan-
gle adequately prices into marginal cost and markup. The conjectural variation is
underestimated, which implies zero and negative markups in case of many countries.
Still, conduct estimates enable to compare the EU countries in respect to the level
of competitiveness. The ordering seems to be plausible. This econometric analysis of
competitiveness across the European Union may provide a credible alternative to other
descriptive studies.
Empirical evidence on the importance of regulation for the performance of the
mobile industry should be of particular interest to regulators. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the only study that explains the determinants of the variation in
prices of mobile services across the European Union. It provides some guidelines for
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the design of regulatory policy. This is particularly important for the ten new Member
States, which are about to adjust their telecommunications policy to the common
regulation in the European Union and for the future regulation of 3G services.
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5.6 Appendix
Figure 5.1: Mobile penetrations and monthly bills in $US PPP across the EU in 1998-
2002
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Table 5.1: Source of data
Variables Source
Penetration of mobiles as a logarithm (Mobile) ITU database
Price of mobile services (Mobbill) based on Teligen reports
Penetration of mainline as a logarithm (Fixed) ITU database
Number of mobile network operators (N)
inverse number of operators (N) EU reports
GDP per capita in $US PPP as a logarithm (GDP) ITU database
Population size as a logarithm (Pop) ITU database
Time trend (Time)
Time passed since entry of the first digital
operator in years (Digital) www.gsmworld.com
Dummy for liberalization of
fixed telephony market (Libera) ETO
Dummy for permission of airtime
resellers (Service) EU reports
Dummy for implementation of number
portability in mobile networks (MNP) ETO
Dummy for designation with SMP
in interconnection market (SMP) EU reports
10-year government bond yield (Bond) Eurostat & OECD
Hourly labor compensation costs in industry
in $US PPP (Labor) US Department of Labor
Electricity prices for industrial users
in $US PPP (Elect) Eurostat
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Table 5.2: Liberalization and number portability
Country Liberalization Portability GSM startup
Austria 01.1998 06.2003 12.1993
Belgium 01.1998 10.2002 01.1994
Denmark 1995 06.2001 07.1992
Finland 1994 08.2003 07.1992
France 01.1998 06.2003 07.1992
Germany 01.1998 11.2002 06.1992
Greece 01.2001 07.2003 07.1993
Ireland 12.1998 06.2003 03.1993
Italy 01.1998 03.2002 10.1992
Luxembourg 07.1998 07.2003 07.1993
Netherlands 01.1998 04.1999 07.1994
Portugal 01.2000 01.2002 10.1992
Spain 12.1998 11.2000 07.1995
Sweden 1993 09.2001 09.1992
UK 1996 01.1999 07.1992
Source: ETO and ECC (Electronic Communications Committee) and www.gsmworld.com
Table 5.3: Simple Statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Min Max
Mobbill 75 43.23 16.35 3243 19.68 106.86
Mobile 75 3.65 0.65 274.12 2.18 4.57
Pop 75 16.35 1.34 1227 12.95 18.22
GDP 75 10.12 0.22 759.01 9.62 10.79
Fixed 75 3.99 0.18 299.37 3.69 4.36
Time 75 3.00 1.42 225.00 1.00 5.00
Digital 75 6.73 1.66 505.00 2.50 9.50
Service 75 0.41 0.49 31.00 0 1.00
MNP 75 0.13 0.34 10.00 0 1.00
Libera 75 0.76 0.42 57.00 0 1.00
1/N 75 0.35 0.12 26.68 0.20 1.00
Labor 75 19.20 5.56 1440 6.41 30.80
Bond 75 5.37 0.87 403.40 4.50 9.90
Elect 75 6.28 1.27 471.00 3.00 9.00
SMP 75 0.26 0.44 20.00 0 1.00
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Table 5.4: Correlation matrix
Mobbill Mobile Pop GDP Fixed Time Digital Service
Mobbill 1.00 -0.66 0.28 -0.43 -0.47 -0.52 -0.55 -0.45
Mobile -0.66 1.00 -0.14 0.09 0.21 0.88 0.83 0.20
Pop 0.28 -0.14 1.00 -0.51 -0.28 0.00 0.03 -0.20
GDP -0.43 0.09 -0.51 1.00 0.54 0.01 0.06 0.44
Fixed -0.47 0.21 -0.28 0.54 1.00 0.12 0.29 0.73
Time -0.52 0.88 0.00 0.01 0.12 1.00 0.85 0.03
Digital -0.55 0.83 0.03 0.06 0.29 0.85 1.00 0.28
Service -0.45 0.20 -0.20 0.44 0.73 0.03 0.28 1.00
MNP -0.21 0.30 0.18 -0.02 0.15 0.36 0.20 0.14
Libera -0.71 0.67 0.01 0.32 0.35 0.55 0.56 0.34
1/N 0.23 -0.46 -0.47 0.24 -0.08 -0.49 -0.51 -0.07
Labor -0.03 -0.43 0.06 0.46 0.28 -0.49 -0.43 0.26
Bond 0.35 -0.39 -0.00 -0.34 -0.11 -0.36 -0.30 -0.11
Elect 0.26 -0.17 0.15 0.11 -0.43 0.02 -0.12 -0.44
SMP -0.39 0.47 -0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.38 0.35 0.04
MNP Libera 1/N Labor Bond Elect SMP
Mobbill -0.21 -0.71 0.12 -0.03 0.35 0.26 -0.39
Mobile 0.30 0.67 -0.43 -0.43 -0.39 -0.17 0.47
Pop 0.18 0.01 -0.52 0.06 -0.00 0.15 -0.00
GDP -0.02 0.32 0.35 0.46 -0.34 0.11 -0.03
Fixed 0.15 0.35 -0.13 0.28 -0.11 -0.43 0.01
Time 0.36 0.55 -0.50 -0.49 -0.36 0.02 0.38
Digital 0.20 0.56 -0.57 -0.43 -0.30 -0.12 0.35
Service 0.14 0.34 -0.13 0.26 -0.11 -0.44 0.04
MNP 1.00 0.22 -0.35 -0.16 -0.13 -0.05 0.02
Libera 0.22 1.00 -0.33 0.05 -0.47 -0.17 0.33
1/N -0.31 -0.49 1.00 0.09 0.23 0.05 -0.17
Labor -0.16 0.05 0.30 1.00 -0.16 0.08 -0.10
Bond -0.13 -0.47 0.05 -0.16 1.00 -0.06 -0.13
Elect -0.05 -0.17 0.07 0.07 -0.06 1.00 -0.29
SMP 0.02 0.33 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.29 1.00
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Table 5.5: Reduced form estimation – demand side
I II III IV I II III IV
Austria 3.389 0.366 0.246 0.066 Intercept -33.01 -8.118 -6.594 4.02
t-value 0.46 2.05 2.07 0.21 t-value -0.50 -1.85 -1.63 18.4
Belgium 2.965 0.291 0.211 -0.23 Fixed 0.3205 0.6034
t-value 0.45 1.88 1.67 -0.76 t-value 0.42 0.90
Denmark 3.680 0.035 0.139 0.050 GDP 1.0581 1.1079 1.2054
t-value 0.41 0.21 1.19 0.16 t-value 2.27 2.53 2.84
Finland 3.924 0.373 0.348 0.223 Pop 1.4987
t-value 0.43 2.95 2.83 0.72 t-value 0.40
France -0.36 -0.39 -0.39 -0.27 Time 0.1470 0.1476 0.1511
t-value -1.84 -3.75 -3.81 -0.90 t-value 5.64 7.03 7.34
Germany -0.18 0.224 0.267 -0.27 Service 0.0016
t-value -0.15 1.65 2.10 -0.88 t-value 0.01
Greece 2.787 0.224 0.206 -0.14 MNP 0.0402
t-value 0.44 1.16 1.08 -0.47 t-value 0.53
Ireland 3.887 -0.25 -0.41 -0.05 SMP 0.1488 0.1371 0.1383
t-value 0.38 -1.23 -3.49 -0.17 t-value 2.12 2.16 2.18
Italy 0.327 0.261 0.132 0.132 Libera 0.1551 0.1746 0.1741
t-value 1.27 1.47 1.27 0.43 t-value 1.64 2.11 2.11
Luxemb. 6.950 -0.55 -0.47 0.119 1/N -0.090
t-value 0.38 -1.93 -1.73 0.39 t-value -0.17
Netherl 2.149 0.154 0.190 -0.10 Labor -0.075 -0.076 -0.079
t-value 0.44 1.30 1.70 -0.33 t-value -5.53 -6.44 -6.76
Portugal 2.601 -0.00 -0.17 0.024 Bonds -0.157 -0.155 -0.162
t-value 0.40 -0.01 -1.04 0.08 t-value -2.77 -2.97 -3.13
Spain 0.515 0.030 -0.13 -0.21 Elect -0.046
t-value 0.36 0.14 -0.98 -0.70 t-value -1.15
Sweden 2.809 0.017 0.163 0.179
t-value 0.39 0.09 1.41 0.58
R-Square 0.931 0.928 0.927 0.120
MSE 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.238
DFE 48 53 54 60
F-value 3.66 5.63 5.94 0.59
signif. 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.86
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Table 5.6: Reduced form estimation – supply side
I II III I II III
Austria -17.039 -12.71 0.5851 Intercept 22.626 27.037 39.9
t-value -1.28 -2.17 0.07 t-value 0.51 1.81 6.64
Belgium -21.859 -16.41 -0.322 Time 0.8170
t-value -1.49 -2.70 -0.04 t-value 0.27
Denmark -20.840 -18.72 -11.75 Service -2.293
t-value -2.84 -3.39 -1.38 t-value -0.23
Finland -31.118 -26.38 -17.72 MNP -8.479 -8.445
t-value -3.17 -4.56 -2.08 t-value -1.90 -2.07
France -6.5398 -2.762 4.5668 SMP 1.4214
t-value -0.56 -0.47 0.54 t-value 0.35
Germany -9.8457 -8.004 8.7618 Libera -15.40 -15.53
t-value -0.77 -1.27 1.03 t-value -3.82 -4.76
Greece -4.4034 -1.986 14.547 1/N 7.9171
t-value -0.34 -0.27 1.71 t-value 0.48
Ireland -2.8797 -0.233 7.5849 Labor 1.3879 1.1091
t-value -0.24 -0.04 0.89 t-value 1.21 2.74
Italy -8.7529 -4.761 5.9391 Bonds 2.7300 2.5301
t-value -0.73 -0.83 0.70 t-value 1.31 1.65
Luxembourg -23.042 -19.95 -10.38 Elect -0.595
t-value -2.45 -3.43 -1.22 t-value -0.26
Netherlands 1.57683 5.0761 13.307
t-value 0.14 0.88 1.57
Portugal 20.1836 20.679 24.587
t-value 1.28 2.55 2.89
Spain 0.76807 4.4233 9.9742
t-value 0.06 0.78 1.17
Sweden -13.742 -9.735 -4.522
t-value -1.49 -1.78 -0.53
R-Square 0.8044 0.8022 0.4435
MSE 74.75 68.84 180.75
DFE 51 56 60
F-value 2.71 5.90 3.42
significance 0.0048 0.0001 0.0004
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Table 5.7: Reduced form estimation – SURE
Demand Supply Demand Supply
Austria 0.24274 -12.717 Intercept -6.2061 24.4460
t-value 2.04 -2.17 t-value -1.54 1.64
Belgium 0.20503 -16.603 GDP 1.16430
t-value 1.62 -2.73 t-value 2.75
Denmark 0.14320 -18.837 Time 0.15191
t-value 1.23 -3.41 t-value 7.39
Finland 0.33882 -26.441 Libera 0.17350 -14.713
t-value 2.76 -4.57 t-value 2.10 -4.52
France -0.3997 -2.3728 SMP 0.14556
t-value -3.84 -0.40 t-value 2.30
Germany 0.26283 -8.2642 Portab -8.0470
t-value 2.07 -1.31 t-value -1.98
Greece 0.19308 -0.8090 Labor -0.0781 1.18431
t-value 1.01 -0.11 t-value -6.69 2.93
Ireland -0.4083 0.52692 Bonds -0.1605 2.56974
t-value -3.47 0.08 t-value -3.11 1.68
Italy 0.12834 -4.5451
t-value 1.23 -0.79
Luxembourg -0.4472 -19.709
t-value -1.65 -3.39
Netherlands 0.18959 4.81950
t-value 1.70 0.84
Portugal -0.1817 22.0945
t-value -1.08 2.73
Spain -0.1438 4.95399
t-value -1.08 0.87
Sweden 0.1551 -9.7211
t-value 1.34 -1.78
MSE 0.0217 68.84
DFE 54 56
Hausman SURE 2.05
Pr > χ2 1.00
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Table 5.8: Random effects specification - separate estimation of demand and supply
Demand Supply
Intercept -2.10556 38.4175
t-value -1.03 3.07
significance 0.3051 0.0030
Fixed 0.409969 -37.6189
t-value 1.40 -2.99
significance 0.1655 0.0039
GDP 0.50423
t-value 2.09
significance 0.0403
Time 0.178847
t-value 9.41
significance 0.0001
MNP -8.46858
t-value -2.19
significance 0.0320
SMP 0.163281 -2.76449
t-value 2.78 -0.83
significance 0.0070 0.4070
Libera 0.20504 -18.7234
t-value 2.42 -5.89
significance 0.0180 0.0001
Labor -0.0517 0.441377
t-value -5.81 1.35
significance 0.0001 0.1823
Bonds -0.09283 2.25218
t-value -1.97 1.47
significance 0.0526 0.1474
R-Square 0.8921 0.5829
MSE 0.0234 74.15
DFE 67 69
Hausman m-value 10.94 .
significance 0.0903 .
Chapter 5 Mobile Telephony across the European Union 126
Table 5.9: Demand side estimation
OLS N2SLS OLS N2SLS
α -0.00799 -0.01596 -0.00781 -0.01033
t-value -3.62 -2.71 -4.20 -3.86
significance 0.0006 0.0086 0.0001 0.0002
Constant 6.484454 8.851053 3.62801 3.655373
t-value 4.01 3.67 28.09 19.51
significance 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0001
GDP -0.19478 -0.30005
t-value -1.28 -1.55
significance 0.2051 0.1263
Fixed -0.01655 -0.27902
t-value -0.09 -0.63
significance 0.9268 0.5338
Pop -0.04977 -0.04191
t-value -2.28 -1.68
significance 0.0259 0.0983
Time 0.233285 0.221621 0.233043 0.260301
t-value 10.61 4.55 10.89 8.66
significance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Objective 0.0442 0.001259 0.0477 0.006033
MSE 0.048 0.0597 0.0497 0.0548
DF 69 69 72 72
Hausman 10.25 11.23
Pr > χ2 0.114 0.106
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Table 5.10: Joint demand-supply estimation – country-specific conduct
OLS SUR N3SLS OLS SUR N3SLS
α -0.0078 -0.0092 -0.0097 Ireland -0.0914 -0.1165 -0.1479
t-value -4.22 -4.98 -4.38 t-value -0.59 -0.59 -0.49
Intercept 3.62801 3.70756 3.74702 Italy -0.1671 -0.2299 -0.2871
t-value 28.19 28.82 24.58 t-value -1.10 -1.19 -1.16
Time 0.23304 0.22675 0.22128 Luxemb. -0.4691 -0.5428 -0.6127
t-value 10.93 10.62 9.42 t-value -2.43 -2.40 -1.42
Libera -0.1917 -0.2517 -0.2946 Netherl. 0.28000 0.34559 0.18332
t-value -2.51 -2.76 -1.94 t-value 1.65 1.68 0.93
Portab -0.1918 -0.2068 -0.1845 Portugal 0.37166 0.34300 0.33781
t-value -1.77 -1.58 -1.52 t-value 1.89 1.47 1.00
Austria -0.3345 -0.3769 -0.4181 Spain -0.0257 0.00020 0.00943
t-value -1.95 -1.82 -1.94 t-value -0.18 0.00 0.03
Belgium -0.3853 -0.3517 -0.3718 Sweden -0.2716 -0.3408 -0.4028
t-value -2.17 -1.70 -1.48 t-value -1.71 -1.74 -1.66
Denmark -0.5050 -0.5515 -0.5686 η 0.55767 0.66625 0.78596
t-value -2.64 -2.54 -2.59 t-value 2.41 2.43 1.18
Finland -0.6294 -0.7335 -0.8053 Constant 3.03072 1.43069 -0.6529
t-value -2.96 -3.08 -2.79 t-value 0.28 0.12 -0.06
France -0.0808 -0.0074 0.02498 Labor 0.82713 0.69350 0.84576
t-value -0.52 -0.04 0.11 t-value 2.28 1.75 1.43
Germany -0.0464 0.07662 0.01814 Bonds 2.62557 3.34817 2.90789
t-value -0.26 0.34 0.07 t-value 1.66 1.97 1.56
Greece -0.0678 -0.1237 -0.0979
t-value -0.42 -0.61 -0.43
mse demand 0.0494 0.498 0.501 Hausman 10.59 25.89
mse supply 59.908 64.06 72.10 Pr > χ2 0.9861 0.3061
df demand 72.5 72.5 72.5
df supply 54.5 54.5 54.5
Objective 43.58 1.4898 0.5987
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Table 5.11: Joint demand-supply estimation – country-specific marginal cost
OLS SUR N3SLS OLS SUR N3SLS
α -0.00781 -0.00959 -0.00972 Ireland 3.9502 3.1919 -0.294
t-value -4.22 -5.20 -4.35 t-value 0.57 0.45 -0.03
Intercept 3.6280 3.7383 3.74453 Italy -2.350 -3.972 -6.229
t-value 28.19 29.12 24.50 t-value -0.38 -0.63 -0.83
Time 0.2330 0.22197 0.22175 Luxemb. -18.14 -17.91 -20.50
t-value 10.93 10.40 9.42 t-value -2.20 -2.11 -1.06
Libera -0.244 -0.3293 -0.3855 Netherl. 3.3203 4.0638 4.7180
t-value -2.68 -3.10 -2.14 t-value 0.54 0.65 0.75
Portab -0.183 -0.2137 -0.2879 Portugal 28.476 23.937 17.087
t-value -1.41 -1.35 -1.82 t-value 3.40 2.77 1.46
Austria -11.71 -11.400 -12.066 Spain 8.0963 8.8001 7.3330
t-value -1.90 -1.79 -1.99 t-value 1.31 1.38 0.79
Belgium -15.26 -11.307 -9.7588 Sweden -7.773 -8.653 -9.647
t-value -2.32 -1.67 -1.28 t-value -1.32 -1.43 -1.37
Denmark -18.10 -16.591 -16.04 Cost 6.7119 5.4861 12.264
t-value -3.09 -2.75 -2.78 t-value 0.49 0.39 0.92
Finland -24.75 -24.187 -24.661 Labor 1.3912 1.2349 0.9366
t-value -3.95 -3.75 -3.26 t-value 3.19 2.72 1.45
France 0.9286 3.83445 3.41937 Bonds 2.7763 3.4707 3.2636
t-value 0.15 0.59 0.45 t-value 1.68 2.04 1.71
Germany -7.462 - 3.6526 -1.5645 η 0.1560 0.2161 0.2968
t-value -1.11 -0.53 -0.21 t-value 1.28 1.43 0.63
Greece 5.1615 2.65033 -1.4055
t-value 0.71 0.35 -0.18
mse demand 0.0494 0.0500 0.0501 Hausman 46.88 -44.9
mse supply 77.453 81.42 88.69 Pr > χ2 0.0023 .
df demand 72.5 72.5 72.5
df supply 54.5 54.5 54.5
Objective 56.33 1.5822 0.5949
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Table 5.12: Price elasticities
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria -0.416 -0.344 -0.359 -0.359 -0.352
Belgium -0.399 -0.360 -0.364 -0.332 -0.337
Denmark -0.248 -0.244 -0.270 -0.228 -0.285
Finland -0.221 -0.204 -0.193 -0.193 -0.196
France -0.453 -0.438 -0.446 -0.357 -0.324
Germany -0.786 -0.399 -0.403 -0.311 -0.308
Greece -0.566 -0.557 -0.529 -0.446 -0.375
Ireland -0.580 -0.566 -0.400 -0.347 -0.262
Italy -0.622 -0.359 -0.407 -0.407 -0.288
Luxembourg -0.425 -0.284 -0.259 -0.191 -0.177
Netherlands -0.963 -0.441 -0.363 -0.292 -0.355
Portugal -0.741 -0.596 -0.596 -0.578 -0.413
Spain -0.659 -0.446 -0.524 -0.353 -0.282
Sweden -0.404 -0.395 -0.294 -0.221 -0.292
United Kingdom -0.516 -0.410 -0.354 -0.267 -0.256
Table 5.13: Average industry collusiveness
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 0.289 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
Belgium 0.314 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
Denmark -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.343
Finland -0.318 -0.318 -0.318 -0.318 -0.318
France 0.658 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.407
Germany 0.742 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491
Greece 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.542 0.290
Ireland 0.549 0.549 0.298 0.298 0.298
Italy 0.436 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184
Luxembourg 0.123 -0.128 -0.128 -0.128 -0.128
Netherlands 1.011 0.760 0.553 0.553 0.553
Portugal 1.009 1.009 1.009 0.757 0.757
Spain 0.666 0.666 0.414 0.207 0.207
Sweden 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 -0.133
United Kingdom 0.414 0.414 0.207 0.207 0.207
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Table 5.14: Average industry marginal costs in $US PPP
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 37.11 33.76 32.70 32.35 30.27
Belgium 39.45 36.22 34.71 33.68 31.23
Denmark 36.71 33.59 32.46 31.34 29.24
Finland 37.23 32.79 31.63 30.91 29.21
France 33.07 29.16 28.47 28.56 27.20
Germany 40.11 36.10 34.43 33.40 31.21
Greece 44.13 38.63 30.48 27.54 24.56
Ireland 34.01 27.82 26.65 26.69 25.04
Italy 39.98 32.13 30.38 30.03 28.19
Luxembourg 33.89 31.51 30.63 30.02 27.94
Netherlands 37.32 33.92 33.04 31.41 29.24
Portugal 28.61 23.18 22.23 23.47 21.85
Spain 34.46 28.77 27.57 27.43 25.82
Sweden 37.96 32.07 31.16 29.61 27.40
United Kingdom 37.89 32.20 30.27 27.72 25.78
Table 5.15: Average industry markup estimates in $US PPP
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 9.15 4.46 7.22 7.63 8.92
Belgium 4.90 3.88 5.85 3.30 6.31
Denmark -9.05 -6.47 -2.40 -5.91 2.48
Finland -12.62 -10.10 -10.06 -9.36 -7.41
France 17.34 19.50 21.10 11.10 8.86
Germany 47.26 8.29 10.45 1.23 3.05
Greece 18.77 23.35 28.34 22.05 17.13
Ireland 30.45 35.10 17.83 11.94 4.13
Italy 29.20 7.82 14.85 15.18 3.85
Luxembourg 13.37 0.09 -1.74 -8.73 -8.23
Netherlands 69.77 15.14 7.31 1.09 10.24
Portugal 53.79 43.10 44.01 40.80 24.07
Spain 38.79 20.83 30.66 11.82 5.51
Sweden 7.01 11.86 1.51 -4.98 5.08
United Kingdom 19.49 13.44 9.07 2.00 2.75
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Figure 5.3:
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